U.S. Bank Trust Nat'l Ass'n v. Junior
| Decision Date | 24 June 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 1–15–2109.,1–15–2109. |
| Citation | 57 N.E.3d 588,404 Ill.Dec. 829 |
| Parties | U.S. BANK TRUST NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, Not in Its Individual Capacity but Solely as Owner Trustee for Newlands Asset Holding Trust, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Natalie JUNIOR and Marvin Junior, Defendants–Appellants. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Natalie Junior and Marvin Junior, of Chicago, appellants pro se.
Louis J. Manetti, Jr., of Codilis & Associates, P.C., of Chicago, for appellee.
delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
¶ 1 Defendants Natalie and Marvin Junior, pro se, appeal from the circuit court of Cook County's order approving the sale of their property in a judicial foreclosure action.1 On appeal, defendants contend that the Illinois mortgage foreclosure procedures violate due process. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
¶ 3 Initially, we note that defendants represented themselves in the proceedings below. No transcript of the proceedings is included in the record on appeal. Accordingly, the facts recited herein are derived from the documents filed with the circuit court and included in the record on appeal.
¶ 4 This matter commenced as a mortgage foreclosure action pursuant to the Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Law (Foreclosure Law) (735 ILCS 5/15–1501 et seq.
(West 2014)). JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (JPMorgan), initially filed the complaint on December 30, 2013, alleging defendants were in default for failure to make payments toward the mortgage on the property located at 15616 S. Ridgeway Avenue in Markham (the property). Attached to the complaint were copies of the mortgage and the note, which included a chain of indorsements from their original mortgage lender, First Home Mortgage Corporation to JPMorgan. The note was also indorsed in blank. The complaint also included copies of three loan modification agreements; the most recent being executed on January 18, 2013, between defendants and JPMorgan.
¶ 5 On March 4, 2014, defendants were present at a case management conference and were provided until April 1, 2014, to file an appearance and answer or otherwise plead.
¶ 6 Defendants did not file an appearance. On August 7, 2014, however, defendants filed a document entitled “Counter Claim” with the circuit court. In this document, defendants generally alleged that: (1) JPMorgan is not the holder of the note; (2) “[t]he original 13th Amendment to our Constitution has been illegally removed from publication”; (3) JPMorgan knowingly filed fraudulent documents with the court to expedite the foreclosure; (4) JPMorgan violated the Truth in Lending Act; (5) JPMorgan violated New Jersey business law; (6) JPMorgan violated New Jersey banking law; and (7) JPMorgan did not comply with the National Housing Act (12 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq. (2012)
). Defendants also made discovery requests for production of such items as the original promissory note, the “call reports,” and the “original order.” The record does not indicate whether defendants were granted leave to file this document.
¶ 7 On August 8, 2014, the circuit court found defendants to be in default and entered a judgment of foreclosure and sale. Thereafter, on August 10, 2014, Marvin filed a motion to vacate the judgment of foreclosure on behalf of defendants, arguing that they were not present in court when the judgment was entered and, generally, that there is a defense to the foreclosure action. The circuit court denied the motion, but did not provide a basis for its ruling.
¶ 8 On January 7, 2015, JPMorgan filed a motion to substitute party plaintiff from JPMorgan to U.S. Bank Trust National Association (U.S. Bank).
¶ 9 On January 13, 2015, defendants filed a “Writ in the Nature of Discovery,” which set forth generalized statements citing to the Uniform Commercial Code (810 ILCS 5/1–101 et seq.
(West 2014)) and the Truth in Lending Act (15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. (2014) ). The document also contained requests for numerous items of discovery.
¶ 10 On February 10, 2015, defendants filed a three-page document in which they maintained there is a “missing 13th Amendment” which prohibits lawyers from serving in government, and, therefore, the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the foreclosure action.
¶ 11 The property was subsequently sold at a judicial sale on March 20, 2015, pursuant to the judgment of foreclosure previously entered on August 8, 2014. On March 24, 2015, JPMorgan filed two motions to strike the documents filed on January 13 and February 10, 2015, with prejudice. Neither of these documents were noticed for presentment before the court. Thereafter, JPMorgan filed a motion to confirm the sale. On June 10, 2015, the circuit court granted JPMorgan's motion and struck the two documents. The circuit court also entered a briefing schedule on the motion to confirm the sale. In addition, the court, having not yet ruled on the motion to substitute plaintiff, requested that JPMorgan provide the court with the documents supporting its motion.
¶ 12 Defendants' response to the motion to confirm the sale was similar in form and substance to their prior filings. Defendants argued that they had been requesting discovery documents for a year and a half, that JPMorgan had not proven it had standing, and that the court and JPMorgan's counsel did not have jurisdiction to enter the order approving the sale based on the “missing 13th Amendment.” In addition, defendants asserted that, when asked, a judge must provide his or her “Oath of Office.” Defendants' response cited various provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code and a Massachusetts foreclosure case.
¶ 13 In reply, JPMorgan maintained that defendants set forth no reason pursuant to section 15–1508(b) of the Foreclosure Law (735 ILCS 5/15–1508(b)
(West 2014)) to deny the confirmation of the sale. JPMorgan also filed with the circuit court a document entitled “Assignment of Judgment for Foreclosure and Sale” which indicated that it has assigned and transferred all of the rights and interests under the judgment of foreclosure entered in this matter on August 8, 2014, to U.S. Bank for good and valuable consideration.
¶ 14 On July 14, 2015, the sale was confirmed by the circuit court and an order of possession was entered in favor of U.S. Bank.2 This appeal followed.
¶ 16 Prior to addressing the merits of the appeal, we observe that pro se litigants, such as defendants here, are not entitled to more lenient treatment than attorneys. See Lewis v. Heartland Food Corp., 2014 IL App (1st) 123303, ¶ 5, 384 Ill.Dec. 646, 17 N.E.3d 219
. In Illinois, parties choosing to represent themselves without a lawyer are “presumed to have full knowledge of applicable court rules and procedures and must comply with the same rules and procedures as would be required of litigants represented by attorneys.” In re Estate of Pellico, 394 Ill.App.3d 1052, 1067, 334 Ill.Dec. 12, 916 N.E.2d 45 (2009).
¶ 17 With these principles in mind, we note that the brief filed by defendants fails to comply with our supreme court rules at various levels. First, defendants' brief fails to abide by our supreme court's rules regarding the structure and content of appellate briefs. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341
(eff. Jan. 1, 2016); R. 342 (eff. Jan. 1, 2005). These rules are not mere suggestions, but are compulsory. In re Marriage of Hluska, 2011 IL App (1st) 092636, ¶ 57, 356 Ill.Dec. 612, 961 N.E.2d 1247. The purpose of these rules is to require the parties to present clear and orderly arguments before a reviewing court, so that the court can properly ascertain and dispose of the issues involved. Hall v. Naper Gold Hospitality LLC, 2012 IL App (2d) 111151, ¶ 7, 360 Ill.Dec. 885, 969 N.E.2d 930.
¶ 18 Here, defendants' brief fails to provide a statement of facts regarding the history of the matter in the circuit court in violation of Rule 341(h)(6)
. Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(6) (eff. Jan. 1, 2016). The brief also contains no citations to the record in violation of Rule 341(h)(7). Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Jan. 1, 2016). The failure to substantiate factual assertions with such citation to the record warrants the dismissal of an appeal because it renders it “next to impossible for this court to assess whether the facts as presented * * * are an accurate and fair portrayal of the events in this case.” Collier v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., 248 Ill.App.3d 1088, 1095, 188 Ill.Dec. 201, 618 N.E.2d 771 (1993). Defendants' brief also does not contain an appendix as required by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 342 (eff. Jan. 1, 2005).
¶ 19 Second, defendants' assertions are not coherent legal arguments and are not supported by citations to legal authority as required by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341
(eff. Jan. 1, 2016). Rule 341(h)(7) requires that the argument “shall contain the contentions of the appellant and the reasons therefor, with citation of the authorities and the pages of the record relied on.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Jan. 1, 2016). “It is a rudimentary rule of appellate practice that an appellant may not make a point merely by stating it without presenting any argument in support.” Housing Authority of Champaign County v. Lyles, 395 Ill.App.3d 1036, 1040, 335 Ill.Dec. 463, 918 N.E.2d 1276 (2009). Failure to properly develop an argument does “not merit consideration on appeal and may be rejected for that reason alone.” Id. While defendants reference numerous cases outside of our jurisdiction, at no point in their argument do they reference an Illinois Appellate Court or an Illinois Supreme Court case in support of their argument. Although in certain instances we may consider cases from other jurisdictions (see Majmudar v. House of Spices (India), Inc., 2013 IL App (1st) 130292, ¶ 18, 377 Ill.Dec. 320, 1 N.E.3d 1207 ), defendants here do not set forth a compelling reason for us to do so as none of the cases relied upon involve the...
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