U.S. Bank v. Lindsey, 1-07-2606.

• Citation: 920 N.E.2d 515,336 Ill. Dec. 306
• Decision Date: 07 December 2009
• Docket Number: No. 1-07-2606.,1-07-2606.
• Parties: U.S. BANK, a Corporation, as Independent Administrator of the Estate of Willie Taylor, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Harold LINDSEY and Carmichael Leasing Company, Inc., Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

920 N.E.2d 515

336 Ill. Dec. 306

U.S. BANK, a Corporation, as Independent Administrator of the Estate of Willie Taylor, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Harold LINDSEY and Carmichael Leasing Company, Inc., Defendants-Appellants.

No. 1-07-2606.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, First Division.

December 7, 2009.

Shimon B. Kahan, Haynes, Studnicka, Kahan, O'Neill & Miller, LLC, Chicago, IL, for Appellant.

Michael J. Kralovec, Kralovec, Meenan, LLP, Chicago, IL, for Appellee.

Justice PATTI delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff U.S. Bank, the independent administrator of the estate of Willie Taylor, decedent, filed suit against defendants Harold Lindsey and Carmichael Leasing Company, Inc. (Carmichael), alleging, among other things, that Lindsey acted negligently when he drove a truck leased from Carmichael which struck decedent and resulted in his death. Plaintiff alleged negligence against Carmichael under the "logo liability" doctrine, claiming that it was vicariously liable for the actions of Lindsey. The matter was tried before a jury and a verdict was returned in favor of plaintiff for $3 million and reduced by 50% based on decedent's contributory negligence. Defendants appeal the judgment of the circuit court alleging that: (1) the circuit court erred in denying their motion for directed verdict based on immunity under the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act (Act) (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West 2002)); (2) plaintiff failed as a matter of law to establish that decedent was the biological father of the beneficiaries; (3) the circuit court erred in allowing evidence of Lindsey's failure to obtain a commercial driver's license and lack of experience; (4) it was an abuse of discretion to allow testimony that the accident at issue was preventable; (5) it was error for the circuit court to bar evidence of decedent's alleged chronic heroin use; and (6) the effect of cumulative error merits a new trial. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

BACKGROUND

Defendant Lindsey and decedent worked for Open Kitchens, a company that delivers food for children, people with disabilities and the Chicago Housing Authority's breakfast and lunch programs. On July 28, 2003, decedent was employed as a helper for Open Kitchens loading and unloading trucks that were delivering milk when Lindsey accidentally backed his truck into decedent, crushing him against another truck, ultimately resulting in his death. Lindsey was working as a truck driver for Open Kitchens on the day of the accident and the truck he was driving was leased to Open Kitchens from Carmichael, which owned the vehicle. Decedent was working in the dock area unloading another truck before Lindsey backed into him. Lindsey and decedent were not working together in the same truck that day, although they were both working for Open Kitchens at its location in Chicago, Illinois.

Jerry Williams was assigned to work as decedent's partner on July 28, 2003, unloading milk crates from a truck that was facing eastbound. Williams testified that he saw Lindsey driving a truck that was heading westbound before he stopped and began backing up in the area where decedent was working. Williams guided Lindsey back toward the area where decedent was unloading. When the truck was situated where it could be unloaded, Williams shouted and motioned for Lindsey to stop. The truck initially stopped, however, it suddenly began rolling back. Williams was able to move away from the truck's path, but he was struck on his arm and thrown to the ground. Lindsey's truck, however, pinned decedent between it and another truck crushing his rib cage. Williams testified that he observed decedent carrying out his duties that morning which included lifting heavy boxes and entering and exiting trucks. Williams did not notice anything different or strange about decedent on that day and testified that he performed his duties without any difficulty.

Lindsey testified that on July 28, 2003, he was working as a truck driver for Open Kitchens and at the time of the incident he was approaching the delivery dock from his usual route. As Lindsey arrived near the dock, he noticed that a road was closed for a neighborhood festival. Lindsey took a different route that required him to back up toward another parked truck where Williams and decedent were unloading milk crates. He stated that he saw Williams and used him as a spotter to guide his truck into the proper location for unloading. When Lindsey "got the OK" from Williams, he began to back up. Lindsey testified that Williams yelled at him to continue backing up and that he stopped when he thought he was close enough. He stated that he heard someone yelling "whoa, whoa, did your foot slip off the brake?" Lindsey denied that his foot slipped off the brake or that his truck lurched back toward the parked truck. He stopped his truck upon hearing the shouting and moved the vehicle forward. Lindsey exited the truck and discovered that decedent had been struck by the Carmichael truck he was driving and was crushed between it and the eastbound-facing truck.

Santana Robinson, also an employee of Open Kitchens, began work at 3:30 a.m. on the day of decedent's death. She testified that she was a helper assigned to work with Lindsey on the day at issue. Robinson was riding in the truck with Lindsey and asleep in the passenger seat when she felt the truck jerk in a manner that woke her up. Robinson testified that Lindsey said, "Oh my God, I don't know what I did, my foot slipped." Melvin Payton, an Open Kitchens helper, was stacking crates in a milk truck when he heard shouting. He turned to look in the direction of the eastbound-facing truck that decedent was unloading and observed Lindsey's truck back into decedent and crush him between the two trucks. Payton immediately phoned 911.

Plaintiff offered Arthur Atkinson as an expert in motor fleet safety. Atkinson testified that the Carmichael truck was subject to federal regulations that required Lindsey to be qualified and trained to possess a commercial driver's license (CDL). He testified to the minimum safety standards, federal regulations and industry standards. Atkinson further testified that Lindsey did not meet the minimum training requirements nor did he possess the necessary technical knowledge to properly maintain his vehicle or to safely operate it. Atkinson stated that had Lindsey avoided backing up altogether by planning a better route or exiting the truck, inspecting the area behind the truck before backing up or simply waiting for the parked truck to leave before backing and unloading, the accident would have been prevented.

Defendant Carmichael sought to admit expert testimony from Dr. O'Donnell, a pharmacologist, pharmacist and nutritionist to support one of its affirmative defenses. Carmichael alleged that decedent was under the influence of narcotics, specifically heroin, at the time leading up to his death, resulting in decedent's diminished ability to perceive, react to and judge danger. Prior to trial, plaintiff moved to bar Dr. O'Donnell from making any references to heroin, morphine or Dr. O'Donnell's opinion regarding indications of heroin abuse based on the presence of morphine in decedent's blood following his death. Plaintiff alleged that any reference to morphine or heroin would be unduly prejudicial and irrelevant in the absence of evidence that decedent was intoxicated or impaired. Plaintiff further asserted that Dr. O'Donnell's theory was speculative and lacked a proper foundation for purposes of admissibility.

The circuit court denied plaintiff's motion to bar Dr. O'Donnell's testimony and permitted him to testify to an opinion that decedent was impaired based on the presence of morphine in his blood at the time of his death. Dr. O'Donnell, however, was prohibited from testifying that decedent was a heroin abuser based on the evidence of morphine in his blood. O'Donnell testified that decedent had between and 10 and 20 times the amount of morphine in his blood that would customarily be administered to a patient in moderate pain. He described the effect of such an amount of morphine as "molasses on your brain." It would cause confusion, disorientation, and generally impaired cognitive and motor ability. Finally, Dr. O'Donnell testified that there were no records or other indications that decedent was administered morphine by the paramedics or by anyone else at the hospital prior to his death, although he admitted on cross-examination that the paramedic who responded to the accident carried morphine and decedent was alive upon arrival at the emergency room.

At the conclusion of Dr. O'Donnell's testimony, the defense made an offer of proof that he would have testified that heroin is metabolized in the blood to morphine, that the amount of morphine found in decedent was equivalent to approximately 100 milligrams of heroin, which would be an overdose in the average person, and that decedent's tolerance to that amount, evidenced by his ability to walk, talk and generally function, proved that he was an "every day chronic heroin addict." The circuit court rejected Carmichael's offer of proof, holding that the issue before the jury was whether decedent was impaired and thus contributorily negligent. The jury heard testimony regarding the impairing qualities of morphine and the quantity thereof in decedent's blood. The circuit court ruled that any testimony from Dr. O'Donnell with respect to his opinion that decedent became impaired as a result of chronic heroin abuse was more prejudicial than probative and barred him from testifying as such.

Sandra Logan, the mother of the beneficiaries, testified that she and decedent met in August 1983. He was 23 years old and she was 18 years old. After dating for a short period, the two began to live together, and although they never married, they continued living together continuously until...