U.S. Cas. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co.

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Florida
• Writing for the Court: HOBSON; TERRELL, Acting Chief Justice, THOMAS, ADAMS, and ROBERTS, JJ., and OGILVIE; CHAPMAN; CHAPMAN; This is a workmen's compensation case originating in the Circuit Court of Orange County, Florida, the Honorable M. B. Smith
• Citation: 55 So.2d 741
• Decision Date: 05 October 1951
• Parties: UNITED STATES CASUALTY CO. et al. v. MARYLAND CASUALTY CO. et al.

Page 741

55 So.2d 741 UNITED STATES CASUALTY CO. et al.
v.
MARYLAND CASUALTY CO. et al. Supreme Court of Florida, en Banc. Oct. 5, 1951.
Rehearing Denied Dec. 15, 1951.

Page 742

Heskin A. Whittaker, Orlando, for appellant.

Maguire, Voorhis & Wells, Orlando, for appellees.

HOBSON, Justice.

This is a workmen's compensation case wherein there was conflicting evidence before the Deputy Commissioner upon the question of whether an injury sustained by Louis A. Livingston on April 14th, 1949,

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was an aggravation, and a manifestation of the continuance, of an injury which he suffered in the course of his employment on a prior date, to-wit: June 11th, 1948, or a new accident and a new injury.

The Deputy Commissioner, the only arbiter before whom the witnesses appeared and testified, found as a matter of fact that the accident of April 14th, 1949, was one from which an injury evolved that 'was the result of the prior injury of June 11th, 1948, and a manifestation of the continuance of that injury and an aggravation of said prior injury.'

Upon appeal to the full Commission, the Deputy Commissioner's findings and award were affirmed.

This order of affirmance was appealed to the Circuit Court of the Ninth Judicial Circuit in and for Orange County, Florida. The Circuit Judge who heard the appeal reversed the order of affirmance which had been entered by the full Commission, and in his order stated, 'I do not think it can be said that from the evidence as a whole that the second injury (April 14th 1949) was a recurrence of the first (June 11th, 1948) or a result of it; but the evidence shows that the April 14th, 1949, incident was in fact a new accident and a new injury.'

On June 11th, 1948, Maryland Casualty Company was the carrier while on April 14th, 1949, the United States Casualty Company occupied such position. Thus it may be seen that if the accident of April 14th, 1949, 'was in fact a new accident' and resulted in 'a new injury', the United States Casualty Company was responsible for the medical expense incurred by claimant on account of such injury. On the other hand, if, as was determined by the Deputy Commissioner upon the conflicting evidence which he heard and evaluated, said accident produced an injury which was but an aggravation and a manifestation of the continuance of the former injury, the Maryland Casualty Company was responsible for the medical expense incurred by claimant.

It is crystal clear that our burden upon this appeal is to determine for the benefit of the bench and bar, as well as the Florida Industrial Commission, just what weight the full Commission should give to the Deputy Commissioner's findings of facts when such findings are before said Commission at the time it performs its statutory duty of considering 'the matter upon the record * * *.' (Italics supplied.) In considering this matter we should also decide whether under existing statutory law we should adhere to our pronouncement that 'they probity of the evidence is for the Industrial Commission to determine and their findings should not be reversed unless shown to be clearly erroneous.' (Italics supplied.) See Sonny Boy's Fruit Co. v. Compton, Fla., 46 So.2d 17, 18, and cases cited therein.

We believe the confusions wrought by our opinions developed by virtue of the fact that after the 1941 amendments of Sections 440.25 and 440.27, Florida Statutes 1941, F.S.A., we inadvertently continued to follow our earlier pronouncement that 'the probity of the evidence is for the Industrial Commission to determine and their findings should not be reversed unless shown to be clearly erroneous', and failed to consider the amendments of said sections which were made by the legislature during its 1941 session. Prior to said amendments the law provided: 'The hearing may be conducted by a deputy commissioner, or by any member of the Commission * * *' and that 'It an application for review is made to the Commission within seven days from the date of notice of the award, the full Commission shall review the evidence or, if deemed advisable, as soon as practicable, hear the parties at issue, their representatives and witnesses * * *.' Laws 1937, c. 18413, § 11. (Italics supplied.) As amended, the law reads as follows: 'The hearing shall be conducted by a deputy commissioner * * *' (italics supplied) and, in lieu of the provision that the full commission might hear the witnesses and in effect conduct a hearing de novo, it was provided by the 1941 amendment that 'The full commission shall consider the matter upon the record as prepared and certified by the deputy commissioner * * *.' (Italics supplied.)

Page 744

Section 440.25, supra, as amended, in addition to providing that the hearing shall be conducted by a deputy commissioner further provides that such deputy commissioner shall 'within twenty days after such hearing determine the dispute in a summary manner.' He is then empowered to make an award, designated in the Act as the 'compensation order;' and if no interested party makes or files an application for a review thereof by the full Commission within seven days after said compensation order is filed in the office of the Commission at Tallahassee, such order shall become final. Thus it may be seen that under the law now existing and which existed at the time the instant matter was first lodged with the Florida Industrial Commission, the deputy commissioner is charged with the duty of not only holding a hearing and making findings of facts, but it is also his obligation to enter the compensation order. Consequently, his position under the law is somewhat analogous to that of a Chancellor, and the full Commission occupies a position which in many ways is similar to that of an appellate court. After the deputy commissioner has held a hearing, made his findings of facts and entered the compensation order and a review is requested, the full Commission should adhere to the findings of fact so made by the deputy commissioner unless there is no competent substantial evidence to sustain them. This is so because of the aforementioned fact that under the law the deputy commissioner is the only person charged with the burden and responsibility of hearing the witnesses and making findings of facts. It is patent that the full Commission functions much in the same manner as does an appellate court, although it is quasi judicial rather than strictly so.

There is a difference under existing law between the positions of a deputy commissioner and the full Commission, and those of a special master and a chancellor. The chancellor, of course, should give due consideration to the findings of facts made by a special master and should consider the many advantages which the master had in personally hearing and observing the witnesses. Harmon v. Harmon, Fla., 40 So.2d 209. However, although the Chancellor may use the services of a special master (he is not required to do so) and receive from him his advisory findings and recommendations, the fact remains that it is the Chancellor who under the law is charged with the duty and responsibility of making findings of facts and entering the final decree. He may, if he deems it necessary, conduct a hearing de novo as the full Commission under the old law was authorized to do. It is the Chancellor's decree just as it is the deputy commissioner's compensation order which becomes final by lapse of time, absent an appeal or request...