U.S. Cas. Co. v. Russell

Decision Date18 September 1958
Docket NumberNo. 2,No. 37332,37332,2
Citation98 Ga.App. 181,105 S.E.2d 378
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

Syllabus by the Court

In determining whether an injury to an employee on the premises of his employer arises in the course of his employment, the period of employment should include a reasonable time for ingress to and egress from the immediate place of work while on the employer's premises. In the present case, where it was necessary for the employee after entering the premises of his employer to park his automobile in a lot supervised by plant guards for that purpose and then walk approximately a half mile to the place where he received his identification badge and from there to an adjacent building to actually commence work, an allowance of 30 minutes between leaving the car and commencing work was not an unreasonable time under all the circumstances of this case.

The undisputed evidence in this workmen's compensation case shows the following: the claimant, Harrison Russell, was employed by Ivey Brothers Construction Company in connection with work on the Buford Dam project in Gwinnett County. He lived an undisclosed distance from this project which covered a large area. On the date of his injury he arrived on the premises of the employer by automobile; passed through the entrance gate to enter the enclosed premises; parked on the access road near the parking lot in accordance with the direction of a guard stationed there to direct parking, and commenced walking up to the building where he was to pick up his 'brass' or identification and report for work. This building was approximately a half mile from the gate. The claimant had been a truck driver and helper. His usual time for starting work was 8 a. m. From July 2, to July 13, prior to July 24, 1956, when he was injured, it had been his duty to report for work at 7 a. m., and receipt for ice delivered by a driver for Buford Ice Company which ice was then washed, loaded, and delivered to various places on the project by truck for use in drinking water. Between July 13, and July 24, at about 7:30 a. m., having parked his personal automobile and commenced walking from it to the power house by way of the sole access road, he met the ice truck returning from a delivery, and the driver hailed him. The claimant's testimony here is that he thought the driver wanted him to receipt for ice tickets; the driver's testimony is that he called out to ask why the claimant had been taken off the ice truck. In any event, in answer to the driver's call, the claimant started across the road to the truck, and in so doing was run over by a vehicle driven by a fellow employee, sustaining severe injuries.

The hearing director found against the claimant. On appeal to the Superior Court of Gwinnett County this judgment was reversed and remanded with direction that a finding on disability and a proper award for compensation be entered. Error is assigned on this judgment.

Nall, Miller, Cadenhead & Dennis, A. Paul Cadenhead, B. Carl Buice, Atlanta, for plaintiff in error.

Smith, Field, Doremus & Ringel, Richard D. Carr, Charles L. Drew, Atlanta, for defendant in error.


It has been well established that 'the period of employment generally includes a reasonable time for ingress to and egress from the place of work, while on the employer's premises.' Federal Ins. Co. v. Coram, 95 Ga.App. 622, 625, 98 S.E.2d 214. See also Maryland Cas. Co. v. Sanders, 49 Ga.App. 600(2), 176 S.E. 104; Employers Ins. Co. of Ala. v. Bass, 81 Ga.App. 306, 58 S.E.2d 516; General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corp. v. Worley, 86 Ga.App. 794, 72 S.E.2d 560; Travelers Ins. Co. v. Smith, 91 Ga.App. 305, 311, 85 S.E.2d 484. These are all cases in which an award in favor of a claimant by the Board of Workmen's Compensation was affirmed by this court on the theory that the facts of each case were such as to authorize a finding that the elapsed time between the arrival of the injured claimant on his employer's premises and the time when he was to commence remunerative labor was such as to justify a conclusion of reasonableness. We are now faced with the converse of the question: where an employee comes from some unascertained distance necessitating the use of an automobile by him for transportation to premises of his employer covering a large area, and, in accordance with customary procedure, enters the premises through a gate, parks in a parking lot or adjacent thereto under directions of company employees, and proceeds up the only available route provided by his employer, where he must travel between three tenths and a half mile on foot, enter one building, receive identification, go to another building and reprot to work, is a 30 minute interval between the time of entering the premises and the time of reporting for work so unreasonable as to justify a finding on the part of the director denying compensation? That the hearing director failed to take into account the fact that the claimant was on the premises of the employer engaged in an activity under provisions made by his employer is evinced by a statement in the award as follows: 'The general rule is that an employee injured while going to or from his place of work is not in the course of his employment.' The...

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27 cases
  • Frett v. State Farm Emp. Workers' Comp.
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • November 2, 2018
    ...claimant’s employment. Id. at 624, 98 S.E.2d 214. The earliest mention of "ingress" and "egress" comes from United States Cas. Co. v. Russell , 98 Ga. App. 181, 105 S.E.2d 378 (1958), in which we stated: "It has been well established that the period of employment generally includes a reason......
  • Marwede v. Eqr/Lincoln Ltd. Partnership
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • March 5, 2007
    ...a reasonable time for ingress to and egress from the place of work, while on the employer's premises.'" United States Cas. Co. v. Russell, 98 Ga.App. 181, 182, 105 S.E.2d 378 (1958). In this regard, it has been said that this exception is "predicated on the rationale that until the employee......
  • Bonner-Hill v. Southland Waste Sys. of Ga., Inc.
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • November 18, 2014
    ...reported for daily duty but was en route to do so); DeHowitt, 99 Ga.App. at 148(7), (8), 108 S.E.2d 280; U.S. Cas. Co. v. Russell, 98 Ga.App. 181, 184, 105 S.E.2d 378 (1958) (employee walking from the place he was instructed to park his vehicle to the location where he would pick up work or......
  • Dupper v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.
    • United States
    • New Mexico Supreme Court
    • February 3, 1987
    ...from the place where the work is actually done. See, e.g., Brown v. Reed, 209 Va. 562, 165 S.E.2d 394 (1969); U.S. Casualty Co. v. Russell, 98 Ga.App. 181, 105 S.E.2d 378 (1958). We join respectable company in forsaking a "going-and-coming" rule that does not recognize a premises exception.......
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1 books & journal articles
  • Workers' Compensation - H. Michael Bagley, Daniel C. Kniffen, and Katherine D. Dixon
    • United States
    • Mercer University School of Law Mercer Law Reviews No. 60-1, September 2008
    • Invalid date
    ...at 334-35, 649 S.E.2d at 330. 35. Id. at 338, 649 S.E.2d at 332. 36. Id. at 338-39, 649 S.E.2d at 332 (quoting U.S. Cas. Co. v. Russell, 98 Ga. App. 181, 182, 105 S.E.2d 378, 379 (1958)). 37. Id. at 339, 649 S.E.2d at 332. 38. Id. 39. 286 Ga. App. 878, 650 S.E.2d 427 (2007). 40. Id. at 878-......

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