U.S. Citizens Ass'n v. Sebelius

• Decision Date: 01 February 2013
• Docket Number: 11–3798.,Nos. 11–3327,s. 11–3327
• Parties: U.S. CITIZENS ASSOCIATION; James Grapek; Maurice A. Thompson, Plaintiffs–Appellants, Eileen Dannemann, Plaintiff, v. Kathleen SEBELIUS, in her official capacity as the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services; Timothy F. Geithner, in his official capacity as the Secretary of the U.S. Department of the Treasury; Eric H. Holder, Jr., in his official capacity as the Attorney General of the United States; United States of America, Defendants–Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

705 F.3d 588

U.S. CITIZENS ASSOCIATION; James Grapek; Maurice A. Thompson, Plaintiffs–Appellants,

Eileen Dannemann, Plaintiff,

v.Kathleen SEBELIUS, in her official capacity as the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services; Timothy F. Geithner, in his official capacity as the Secretary of the U.S. Department of the Treasury; Eric H. Holder, Jr., in his official capacity as the Attorney General of the United States; United States of America, Defendants–Appellees.

Nos. 11–3327, 11–3798.

United States Court of Appeals,Sixth Circuit.

Feb. 1, 2013.

ON BRIEF:Jonathan W. Emord, Emord & Associates, P.C., Clifton, Virginia, William G. Williams, Krugliak, Wilkins, Griffiths & Dougherty Co., LPA, Canton, Ohio, for Appellants. Mark B. Stern, Alisa B. Klein, Dana Kaersvang, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Appellees.

Before: SUHRHEINRICH, STRANCH, and DONALD, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

JANE B. STRANCH, Circuit Judge.

In this opinion we return to constitutional challenges to the individual mandate provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.¹ U.S. Citizens Association and two of its members, Maurice A. Thompson, and James Grapek (“plaintiffs”),² challenge the constitutionality of the individual mandate, which requires each individual to purchase a health insurance policy providing a minimum level of coverage or make a shared responsibility payment. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2010). The district court dismissed plaintiffs' constitutional challenges to the individual mandate, and we AFFIRM.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

U.S. Citizens Association (“USCA”) is a non-profit national civic league based in Akron, Ohio, with approximately 27,000 members. Nearly three hundred of USCA's members reside in the Northern District of Ohio. USCA notes that it devotes itself to the preservation of conservative values; favors freedom of choice in medical care and the health insurance marketplace; and opposes efforts of the federal government to interfere with market processes. Some of USCA's uninsured members object to the purchase of private health insurance because they do not believe in the effectiveness of traditional medicine, they prefer alternative and integrative medicine, or they prefer to focus on preventative care that is not covered by traditional health insurance policies.

Thompson is a citizen of Ohio and Grapek is a citizen of Maryland. They do not have, nor do they wish to acquire, health insurance, but they are not exempt from PPACA's individual mandate. Thompson claims that he has sufficient income to pay for required emergency medical care if necessary, and but for PPACA, he would not purchase health insurance in 2014. He has started contacting insurance companies to consider his options to comply with the individual mandate. Grapek claims that he cannot afford health insurance and must begin saving thousands of dollars now to pay health insurance premiums beginning in 2014.

Plaintiffs filed suit in Ohio for declaratory and injunctive relief against Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services; Timothy F. Geithner, Secretary of the United States Department of the Treasury; Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General of the United States; and the United States. Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint alleged in count one that the individual mandate violates the Commerce Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8; in count two that it violates plaintiffs' freedom of expressive and intimate association, U.S. Const. amend. I, V; in count three that it violates plaintiffs' right to liberty, U.S. Const. amend. V; and in count four that it violates plaintiffs' right to privacy, U.S. Const. amend. I, III, IV, V, IX. Defendants moved to dismiss all four counts under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

The district court granted the motion to dismiss in part and denied it in part. The court declined to dismiss the suit on the doctrines of standing or ripeness, or on the ground that the suit is barred by the Anti–Injunction Act. The court also declined to dismiss the Commerce Clause challenge, but the court dismissed Counts Two through Four holding, without substantive analysis, that plaintiffs' pleading failed to satisfy the plausibility standard of Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). The parties then filed motions for summary judgment on the Commerce Clause challenge.

While the summary judgment motions were pending, the district court sua sponte entered a partial judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) on Counts Two through Four and subsequently denied plaintiffs' motion for clarification or in the alternative, for reconsideration of that decision. Plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal from the Rule 54(b) partial judgment.

The district court thereafter stayed its ruling on the Commerce Clause issue. After this court decided that the individual mandate of the PPACA does not violate the Commerce Clause, Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529 (6th Cir.2011), abrogated by Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, –––U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 183 L.Ed.2d 450 (2012), the district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on the Commerce Clause issue (Count One). Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal from the final judgment, and this court consolidated the two appeals for resolution.

II. APPELLATE JURISDICTION

We have jurisdiction to review final orders and judgments of the district courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Ordinarily, when a district court dismisses some claims but not others, the district court's decision is not final for purposes of appeal. In limited circumstances, however, the district court may certify some claims for immediate appeal under Rule 54(b), which provides in pertinent part:

When an action presents more than one claim for relief—whether as a claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim—... the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims ... only if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay.

Proper certification under Rule 54(b) requires two steps: “the district court must expressly direct the entry of final judgment as to one or more but fewer than” all of the claims in the case and then the court must expressly find that there is no just reason to delay an appeal. Gen. Acquisition, Inc. v. GenCorp., Inc., 23 F.3d 1022, 1027 (6th Cir.1994). If Rule 54(b) certification is not properly entered, a final order does not exist from which an appeal can be taken, and we lack jurisdiction. Lowery v. Fed. Express Corp., 426 F.3d 817, 820 (6th Cir.2005).

We review de novo the district court's determination that multiple claims exist and that one or more of them have been finally determined and may be severed from the remaining claims for the purpose of immediate appeal. Gen. Acquisition, Inc., 23 F.3d at 1027. We review for an abuse of discretion the district court's finding that no just reason exists to delay an appeal. Id.

A. Multiple claims

We recently discussed the application of Rule 54(b) in the context of constitutional claims. Planned Parenthood Sw. Ohio Region v. DeWine, 696 F.3d 490 (6th Cir.2012). Concerned with various constitutional challenges to an Ohio abortion statute, we recognized that we had not previously addressed the application of Rule 54(b) to multiple constitutional claims regarding the same statute. Id. at 501. We observed that the Fifth and Tenth Circuits had applied different tests in considering Rule 54(b) partial judgments in the context of constitutional claims. Id. (citing Jordan v. Pugh, 425 F.3d 820, 827 (10th Cir.2005); Samaad v. City of Dallas, 940 F.2d 925, 930–32 (5th Cir.1991), abrogated on other grounds as recognized by Rosedale Missionary Baptist Church v. New Orleans City, 641 F.3d 86, 88–89 (5th Cir.2011)). While finding cases from the other circuits to be informative, we “decline[d] to adopt a new test for analyzing multiple facial challenges to the same statute.” Id. Importantly, we stated:

Statutory challenges will certainly all contain at least one common operative fact—the passage of the challenged law. But the aggregate of operative facts will not necessarily include just the challenged law's existence; rather, we must also consider the facts relating to the law's impact on similar or distinct constitutional rights.

Id. at 501. We distinguished our prior opinion in Lowery on the ground that there the party brought only one claim under Rule 54(b) by raising “both a Title VII retaliation claim and a state-law breach-of-contract claim, where the basis for the alleged breach and the Title VII claim was the same retaliatory act by the employer.” Id. (citing Lowery, 426 F.3d at 821). By contrast, we reasoned, a “single law that causes distinct injuries to distinct constitutional rights is not so easily analogized to a single retaliatory employment action causing one injury that can be vindicated through multiple channels of relief.” Id. at 501–02 (footnote omitted). All four “potential claims” before us in Planned Parenthood sought to disqualify the statute in question as unconstitutional and all four claims “admittedly [sought] the same declaratory and injunctive relief.” Id. at 502. But we ultimately determined that the “aggregate of operative facts” giving rise to each constitutional right to be vindicated was “sufficiently separate to confer jurisdiction despite the presence of some overlap.” Id.

Review of the counts alleged in Planned Parenthood reveals how the facts attendant to each right were found to be sufficiently distinct. The first count alleged that the statute criminalizing distribution of an abortion drug was unconstitutionally vague and impacted the right of physicians to receive notice of what behavior is criminal before they can be...