U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, AFL-CI

• Citation: 833 F.2d 1129
• Decision Date: 25 November 1987
• Docket Number: AFL-CI,Nos. 87-3513,I,s. 87-3513
• Parties: 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3235 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Social Security Administration, Petitioners, v. FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY, Respondent, and American Federation of Government Employees,ntervenor (Two Cases). UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Social Security Administration, Social Security Administration Field Operations, New York Region, Petitioners, v. FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY, Respondent, and American Federation of Government Employees,ntervenor. (L), 87-3514 and 87-3515.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit)

Page 1129

833 F.2d 1129

126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3235

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Social Security Administration, Petitioners, v. FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY, Respondent, and American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO,

Intervenor (Two Cases).

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,

Social Security Administration, Social Security

Administration Field Operations, New

York Region, Petitioners, v. FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY, Respondent, and American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Intervenor.

Nos. 87-3513(L), 87-3514 and 87-3515.

United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit.

Argued July 7, 1987.

Decided Nov. 25, 1987.

Al J. Daniel, Jr., Dept. of Justice (Richard K. Willard, Asst. Atty. Gen.; Leonard Schaitman, Dept. of Justice on brief), for petitioners.

William E. Persina, Deputy Solicitor, Federal Labor Relations Authority (Ruth E. Peters, Solicitor; Pamela P. Johnson on brief), for respondent.

Joseph F. Henderson, Staff Counsel, American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO (Mark D. Roth, General Counsel on brief), for intervenor.

Before CHAPMAN and WILKINS, Circuit Judges, and HENDERSON, District Judge for the District of South Carolina, sitting by designation.

HENDERSON, District Judge:

The Department of Health and Human Services, Social Security Administration ("SSA"), petitions for review of three decisions, consolidated on appeal, of the Federal Labor Relations Authority (the "Authority"). ¹ The Authority cross-petitions for enforcement of these decisions. 5 U.S.C. Sec. 7123(a), (b). In each case, the Authority ruled that it was an unfair labor practice under the Federal Labor Management Relations Act (the "Statute"), Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 7101 et seq. (1982), for SSA to refuse to provide intervenor American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO ("AFGE" or the "Union"), or its locals, with a list of the names and home addresses of SSA employees within specific bargaining units.

On appeal, SSA challenges three conclusions of the Authority made in each of the underlying cases: (1) the requested information is sufficiently relevant to the collective bargaining process to be subject to disclosure under 5 U.S.C. Sec. 7114(b)(4)(B); (2) the requested information may be presumed "necessary" within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. Sec. 7114(b)(4)(B); and (3) disclosure is not prohibited by the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552a (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Because we find no error in the Authority's rulings, we enforce the orders.

I

In each of the underlying cases, the Union as the authorized exclusive representative of all SSA employees requested the names and home addresses of all employees in a specified bargaining unit. The Union made its requests pursuant to 5 U.S.C. Sec. 7114(b)(4), which imposes on SSA a duty to negotiate in good faith by providing data to the Union "to the extent not prohibited by law." Although the precise purpose for each of the requests varies, in essence the Union wished to advise bargaining unit employees of its activities by mail and to solicit employees' opinions with respect to negotiations between the Union and SSA. ²

SSA denied the requests as either being prohibited by the Privacy Act or not relevant or necessary to the outcome of negotiations within the meaning of the Statute. 5 U.S.C. Sec. 7114(b)(4)(B). The Union then filed unfair labor practice charges in each case pursuant to 5 U.S.C. Sec. 7116(a)(1), (5) and (8). In each case, the Authority found that SSA's refusal to release employees' home addresses constituted an unfair labor practice and ordered SSA to provide the requested information to the Union and to post notices of intent to disclose within SSA. In so ruling, the Authority relied on its decision on remand in Farmers Home Administration Finance Office, St. Louis, Missouri, ("FHAFO" ), 23 F.L.R.A. 788 (No. 101) (Oct. 31, 1986). In FHAFO, the Authority held that a union request for names and home addresses of its bargaining unit employees is consistent with its statutory responsibility to represent those employees and that an agency must furnish such information upon request without regard to whether a means of communication other than direct mailing is available. The Authority further concluded in FHAFO that the balance of competing interests under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") favors disclosure; therefore, the release of home addresses is not prohibited by the Privacy Act.

II

The threshold issue is whether the Union's requests come within the scope of the Statute, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 7114(b)(4)(B). The Statute requires an agency to negotiate in good faith by, inter alia, providing to an authorized union on request "data which is [sic ] reasonably available and necessary for full and proper discussion, understanding, and negotiation of subjects within the scope of collective bargaining...." 5 U.S.C. Sec. 7114(b)(4)(B). If, as SSA contends, the requests are insufficiently related to the collective bargaining process or the information sought is not necessary for the Union's participation in the process, SSA is not obligated to release its employees' names and home addresses to the Union and we need not reach the issue of whether such release is prohibited by the Privacy Act.

A.

SSA contends at the outset that the purposes for which the Union sought the requested information are not properly related to collective bargaining as defined by the Statute. We do not agree. The term collective bargaining is defined as:

the performance of the mutual obligation of the representative of an agency and the exclusive representative of employees ... to meet at reasonable times and to consult and bargain in a good-faith effort to reach agreement with respect to the conditions of employment affecting such employees and to execute, if requested by either party, a written document incorporating any collective bargaining agreement reached....

5 U.S.C. Sec. 7103(a)(12).

At the time the Union made its requests, negotiations for reaching an "agreement with respect to the conditions of employment" were either pending or imminent. We do not perceive, therefore, that the Authority misconstrued the literal language of the Statute by ordering disclosure. See Davis v. Lukhard, 788 F.2d 973, 983 (4th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Staton v. Lukhard, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 231, 93 L.Ed.2d 157 (1986) (a statute is interpreted according to its literal language unless such interpretation would contravene clear legislative intent).

We do not, however, ground our conclusion that the Union's requests were sufficiently relevant to the collective bargaining process solely on the fact that the requested information was sought to aid the Union during the course of negotiations. ³

The Union's duties as the exclusive representative of agency employees do not begin and end abruptly with each round of negotiations but continue during the interim. It is well settled in the private sector that an employer's obligation to furnish information needed by a union for proper performance of its duties extends to information needed for the administering and policing of a contract as well as for contract negotiations. See NLRB v. ACME Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432, 435-36, 87 S.Ct. 565, 568, 17 L.Ed.2d 495, 499 (1967). We see no reason to restrict a union's role in the public sector inasmuch as the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, which governs labor matters in the private sector, and the Statute share a similar definition of collective bargaining as well as a similar purpose. ⁴ Such a result is also implicit in the language of the Statute: the agency is to disclose data necessary not only for "negotiations of subjects within the scope of collective bargaining," but for "full and proper discussion [and] understanding" of such subjects as well. 5 U.S.C. Sec. 7114(b)(4)(B).

Communication between the Union and bargaining unit employees appears to be as important to the performance of the Union's representational duties in the interim between negotiations as it is during negotiations. "It seems manifest beyond dispute that the Union cannot discharge its obligation unless it is able to communicate with those in whose behalf it acts." Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. NLRB, 412 F.2d 77, 84 (2nd Cir.) cert. denied, 396 U.S. 928, 90 S.Ct. 263, 24 L.Ed.2d 226 (1969) (holding a union request for employee names and addresses was relevant to collective bargaining in the private sector). Therefore, the Union's requests for employees' names and home addresses, which would enable communication in furtherance of the Union's duties, must be deemed relevant under 5 U.S.C. Sec. 7114(b)(4)(B).

B.

The Statute further requires that data requested by the Union be, inter alia, "necessary" to discharge of the Union's responsibilities. 5 U.S.C. Sec. 7114(b)(4)(B). ⁵ The Authority in its decision on remand in FHAFO, 23 F.L.R.A. 788, interpreted the Statute to embrace requests for employees' names and home addresses without regard to the adequacy of alternative means of communication such as the agency's internal mail system and bulletin boards or hand-distribution of literature in the workplace. SSA contends that this interpretation overreaches the language of the Statute; rather, the Statute should be construed to require a case-by-case determination of necessity. We do not agree.

In enacting the Statute, Congress expressed its intent that certain collective bargaining procedures be established "to meet the special requirements and needs of the Government. The provisions of [the Statute] should be interpreted in a manner consistent with the requirement of an effective and efficient Government." 5 U.S.C. Sec. 7101(b). As stated above, communication between the Union and bargaining unit employees is essential to fulfillment of the Union's duties as their exclusive representative in the...