U.S. Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Bob Evans Farms, LLC

Citation275 F.Supp.3d 635
Decision Date17 August 2017
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 2:15–cv–1237
Parties U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff, v. BOB EVANS FARMS, LLC, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania

Deborah A. Kane, Lisa H. Hernandez, United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Pittsburgh, PA, for Plaintiff.

Jonathan R. Vaughn, Taryn M. Filo, Vorys, Sater, Seymour and Pease LLP, Columbus, OH, Daren S. Garcia, Melissa McCoy Gormly, Vorys, Sater, Seymour and Pease LLP, Pittsburgh, PA, Kevin M. Gormly, Steptoe & Johnson PLLC, Canonsburg, PA, for Defendant.

OPINION

Mark R. Hornak, United States District Judge

It is the rare lawsuit in which the record entitles a plaintiff to the grant of summary judgment in its favor. This is one of those cases.

This case stems from the removal of Hayley Nadalin, née Macioce ("Macioce"),1 who was pregnant at the time, from the automatic shift scheduling process utilized by the Bob Evans Farms, LLC ("Bob Evans") restaurant located in West Mifflin, Pennsylvania ("West Mifflin Bob Evans"), where she worked as a server. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") brings this action alleging pregnancy discrimination pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et. seq. , and certain amendments thereto, including the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 ("PDA"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k), and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a.

The EEOC, charged with the enforcement of Title VII, is authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(1) and (3) to bring this action. It seeks compensatory damages, punitive damages, back pay and injunctive relief. Both parties have moved for summary judgment. (ECF Nos. 58 and 61). The EEOC moves for partial summary judgment, seeking judgment in its favor on liability and as to the "good faith" defense to punitive damages asserted by Bob Evans. (ECF No. 58). It also seeks an order setting a trial schedule for a jury to determine damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1981a and for the Court to determine the amount of any back pay to be awarded for the benefit of Macioce. Id. Bob Evans moves for summary judgment on the pregnancy discrimination claim against it, and also alternatively seeks summary judgment on the EEOC's claims for emotional distress, damages, and injunctive relief. (ECF No. 61).

I. STANDARD ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a) ; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The parties must support their position by "citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A).

Once that burden has been met, the non-moving party must set forth "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial ," or the factual record will be taken as presented by the moving party and judgment will be entered as a matter of law. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a), (e) ) (emphasis in Matsushita ). To meet its burden, the "opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita , 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348. The non-moving party "must present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion" and cannot "simply reassert factually unsupported allegations." Williams v. Borough of West Chester , 891 F.2d 458, 460 (3d Cir. 1989). Moreover, a party's labelling or characterizing a fact as "disputed" does not make it so—the record evidence the opposing party points to must support the dispute of fact, whether through reasonable inference or otherwise. If the non-moving party's evidence merely is colorable or lacks sufficient probative force, summary judgment must be granted. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. 477 U.S. 242, 249–50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

In other words, summary judgment may be granted only if there exists no genuine issue of material fact that would permit a reasonable jury to find for the nonmoving party. See id. at 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505. "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a reasonable trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’ " Matsushita , 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348 ; Huston v. Procter & Gamble Paper Products Corp. , 568 F.3d 100, 104 (3d Cir. 2009).

In reviewing the record evidence, the court draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc. , 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) ; Matsushita , 475 U.S. at 587–88, 106 S.Ct. 1348 ; Huston , 568 F.3d at 104 (citations omitted). It is not the court's role to weigh the disputed evidence and decide which is more probative, or to make credibility determinations. See Anderson , 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ; Marino v. Indus. Crating Co. , 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir. 2004) ; Boyle v. Cnty. of Allegheny , 139 F.3d 386, 393 (3d Cir. 1998). "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit: under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson , 477 U.S. at 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505. "Where the defendant is the moving party, the initial burden is on the defendant to show that the plaintiff has failed to establish one or more essential elements to his case." See Podobnik v. U.S. Postal Serv. , 409 F.3d 584, 589 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Celotex Corp. , 477 U.S. at 323–24, 106 S.Ct. 2548 ).

"On cross-motions for summary judgment, the law in our Circuit is clear—the Court considers each Motion on its own merits, tested against the standards of [ Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 ]." Wallace v. Nat'l Indem. of Mid–Am. , 2:14–cv–1253, 2016 WL 6948781, at *1 (W.D. Pa. July 8, 2016) (citing J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. , 650 F.3d 915, 925 (3d Cir. 2011) ); see also Home for Crippled Children v. Prudential Insurance Co. , 590 F.Supp. 1490, 1495 (W.D. Pa. 1984). Accordingly, in considering whether either such motion now before the Court should be granted, "as to the Plaintiff's Motion, I am to view the record facts in a light most favorable to the Defendant. As to the Defendant's Motion, the opposite is the rule." Wallace , 2016 WL 6948781, at *1. On cross-motions, seemingly contradictory positions do "not constitute an agreement that if one is rejected the other is necessarily justified or that the losing party waives ... determination [of] whether genuine issues of material fact exist," Rains v. Cascade Industries, Inc. , 402 F.2d 241, 245 (3d Cir. 1968), preventing judgment in favor of the other party. The standards under which a court grants or denies each party summary judgment do not change by virtue of cross-motions being presented. Home for Crippled Children , 590 F.Supp. at 1495.

Succeeding on an affirmative summary judgment motion filed by a plaintiff, such as that filed by the EEOC here, can prove a particularly difficult but not insurmountable task. This is because the EEOC, as plaintiff:

bears the burden of proof on the [discrimination] claim. "After all, the burden of proof includes the obligation to persuade the factfinder that one's propositions of fact are indeed true. Thus, if there is a chance that a reasonable factfinder would not accept a moving party's necessary propositions of fact, pre-trial judgment cannot be granted. Specious objections will not, of course, defeat a motion for summary judgment, but real questions about credibility, gaps in the evidence, and doubts as to the sufficiency of the movant's proof, will."

Wallace , 2016 WL 6948781, at *3 n. 2 (citing El v. Se. Pennsylvania Transp. Auth. (SEPTA) , 479 F.3d 232, 238 (3d Cir. 2007) ).

II. FACTS

The following material facts are undisputed2 unless otherwise noted. In 2009, Macioce began working as a server at the West Mifflin Bob Evans. (ECF Nos. 60 [EEOC's Concise Statement of Material Facts], 72 [Bob Evans' Response to EEOC's Concise Statement of Material Facts], at ¶ 1). As a part-time server, Macioce was not guaranteed any set number of work hours. (ECF Nos. 63 [Bob Evans' Concise Statement of Material Facts], 75 [EEOC's Response to Bob Evans' Concise Statement of Material Facts], at ¶ 17). In 2012, at a time when Jay Moreau ("Moreau") was then the Assistant General Manager at her location, (ECF No. 64–1 at 7), Macioce gave birth to her first child. She neither needed nor took leave prior to childbirth in 2012, and she requested and received leave after that childbirth without any problem. (ECF Nos. 63, at ¶¶ 19, 20, 21; 75, at ¶ 17).

By 2014, Jay Moreau ("Moreau") was the General Manager at the West Mifflin Bob Evans. (ECF Nos. 60, 72, at ¶ 3). As General Manager, Moreau's responsibilities included shift-scheduling, and he also was one of the people designated by Bob Evans to implement its anti-discrimination policies and procedures. (ECF Nos. 60, 72, at ¶¶ 4, 5, 6). Throughout his employment at Bob Evans, Moreau was aware that it is illegal to discriminate as to terms and conditions of employment on the basis of pregnancy. (ECF Nos. 60, 72, at ¶ 5).

Bob Evans uses an automated computer-based scheduling system to create employee schedules based on factors such as employees' availability and the anticipated needs of the restaurant. (ECF Nos. 60, 72, at ¶ 8). Subject to manager approval, servers are able to change their own availability in the computer system for the purpose of the automatically generated shift schedule. (ECF Nos. 60, 72, at ¶ 9).

According to Bob Evans' Employee Handbook, its seven-day workweek runs from the beginning of...

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