U.S. Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Farmers Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 30 May 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:13–cv–01574–AWI–SKO.,1:13–cv–01574–AWI–SKO. |
| Citation | 24 F.Supp.3d 956 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
| Parties | U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff, v. FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. |
Rumduol Vuong, Govt, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Fresno, CA, Anna Y. Park, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiff.
Andrew Marc Paley, George E. Preonas, Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Laura J. Maechtlen, Seyfarth Shaw LLP, San Francisco, CA, Robert Brian Wong, Baker and McKenzie, Palo Alto, CA, for Defendant.
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION AND FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM
The U.S. Equal Opportunity Commission (“Plaintiff”) brought this action for violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 against Defendant Farmers Insurance Company (“Defendant”) to seek relief for charging parties Chia Xiong (“Xiong”), Jason Lowry (“Lowry”), and other similarly situated individuals who were affected by Farmers' allegedly unlawful conduct. Defendant has filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Defendant also requests that the court take judicial notice of its exhibits in support of its motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201. Defendant's request for judicial notice is granted. For the reasons discussed below, Defendant's motion to dismiss will be denied.
Xiong, Lowry, and John Yang (“Yang”) were all employed by Defendant. See Doc. 1, Complaint (“Compl.”) at ¶¶ 13–14. On or about October 31, 2005, Xiong was hired as a claims representative for Defendant. Defendant's Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN”), Exhibit 1 at ¶ 1. Plaintiff alleges that, prior to 2009, Xiong and other employees in Defendant's Fresno, California office were instructed by their supervisor, Tim Cavanaugh, and Office Training Specialist, Brian Ponte, to code payments as partial payments to avoid negative customer service surveys. See Compl. at 12; RJN, Exh. 1 at ¶ 1. In 2009, Defendant conducted an audit regarding the issuance of partial payments. Compl. at ¶ 13. During this audit Defendant interviewed several claims representative relating to the coding of partial payments. Compl. at ¶ 13. Xiong, Yang, and Lowry were among those interviewed. Compl. at ¶ 13.
After the employee interviews concluded Defendants terminated the employment of Xiong and Yang (both Asian) while retaining similarly situated non-Asian employees who had also coded cases as partial payments. Compl. at ¶ 14.
On June 24, 2009, Xiong filed a charge of discrimination with the E.E.O.C. Compl. at ¶ 15; RJN, Exh. 1. On or about May 24, 2012, the E.E.O.C. interviewed Lowry in connection with its investigation. Compl. at ¶ 16. On or about June 5, 2012, Lowry was questioned by Defendant about his interview with the E.E.O.C. Compl. at ¶ 17. The following day Lowry was placed on administrative leave. Plaintiff alleges that, on or about July 18, 2012, Lowry was terminated due to his participation in the E.E.O.C. investigation.
Xiong filed a charge of discrimination with the E.E.O.C. alleging that he was subject to racial discrimination at Farmers in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Compl. at ¶ 8. Plaintiff thereafter attempted to eliminate the allegedly unlawful employment practices that it found and to effect voluntary compliance with Title VII through informal methods of conciliation, conference and persuasion. Compl. at ¶ 9.
Plaintiff alleges that all conditions precedent to institution of this lawsuit have been fulfilled. Compl. at ¶ 11.
On September 30, 2013, the E.E.O.C. filed suit on behalf of Chia Xiong, Jason Lowry, and other similarly situated individuals alleging violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as well as of Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Doc. 1. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss on January 28, 2014. Plaintiff filed an opposition on February 24, 2014, and Defendant filed its reply on March 3, 2014.
Federal courts are of limited jurisdiction, having subject matter jurisdiction only over matters authorized by the Constitution and Congress. See, e.g. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994) ; A–Z Intern. v. Phillips, 323 F.3d 1141, 1145 (9th Cir.2003). For federal question jurisdiction to exist, the requirements of 28 U.S.C. Section 1331, which gives federal courts jurisdiction only to those cases which arise under federal law, must also be met. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The question of whether a procedural rule is jurisdictional “is not merely semantic but one of considerable practical importance for judges and litigants.”Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, ––––, 131 S.Ct. 1197, 1202, 179 L.Ed.2d 159 (2011). Branding a rule as going to a court's subject-matter jurisdiction alters the normal operation of our adversarial system. Id. Rule 12(b)(1) allows a party to seek dismissal of an action where federal subject matter jurisdiction is lacking. Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). When subject matter jurisdiction is challenged, the burden of establishing federal subject-matter jurisdiction always rests with the party who invokes the Court's jurisdiction. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992).
The United States Supreme Court in Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 511, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2006), in an attempt to curtail “drive-by jurisdictional rulings” advised courts to be cognizant of the “subject-matter jurisdiction / ingredient-of-claim-for-relief” dichotomy so as not to “erroneously conflate[ ]” subject matter jurisdiction with a plaintiff's need and ability to prove a violation of federal law a merits based determination. To that end, a district court must ensure that a jurisdictional ruling is not made upon a “provision that ‘does not speak in jurisdictional terms or refer in any way to the jurisdiction of the courts.’ ” Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515, 126 S.Ct. 1235 (quoting Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 394, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982) ).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a claim may be dismissed because of the plaintiff's “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). A dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) may be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or on the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Conservation Force v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 1240, 1242 (9th Cir.2011) ; Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir.2008). In reviewing a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), all allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Faulkner v. ADT Sec. Servs., 706 F.3d 1017, 1019 (9th Cir.2013) ; Johnson, 534 F.3d at 1121. However, the Court is not required “to accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir.2001) ; Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754–55 (9th Cir.1994) ().
In the employment discrimination context, a plaintiff need not plead a prima facie case in order to survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002). However, to avoid a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ; see Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Courts therefore must look at a complaint in light of the relevant evidentiary standard, in order to decide whether it “contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). The Ninth Circuit has interpreted Iqbal and Twombly to hold that 1) to be entitled to the presumption of truth, allegations in a complaint or counterclaim may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action, but must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively; and 2) the factual allegations that are taken as true must plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief, such that it is not unfair to require the opposing party to be subjected to the expense of discovery and continued litigation. Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir.2011).
Accordingly, while a plaintiff need not plead facts constituting all elements of...
To continue reading
Request your trial