U.S. Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Marquez Bros. Int'l, Inc.
| Decision Date | 26 June 2018 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 1:17-CV-44 AWI-EPG |
| Parties | U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff v. MARQUEZ BROTHERS INTERNATIONAL, INC.; MARQUEZ BROTHERS ENTERPRISES, INC.; MARQUEZ BROTHERS FOODS, INC.; MARQUEZ BROTHERS SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, INC.; MARQUEZ BROTHERS NEVADA, INC.; MARQUEZ BROTHERS TEXAS, INC.; and DOES 1 thru 10, Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
(Doc. No.'s 46, 48, 49)
The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the "EEOC" or the "Agency") has alleged Defendants engaged in unlawful employment practices by failing to hire multiple persons based on their race. Pertinent to this Order:
The Court will (I) grant Defendants' summary judgment motion in part and deny in part, (II) grant the EEOC's motion to amend, and (III) order supplemental briefing on the motion for sanctions.
On October 4, 2010, Alfred Davis filed a charge with the EEOC contending Defendants refused to hire him or otherwise give him an application for employment "because of his race, Black." Doc. No. 59-3, ¶ 1 (Statement of Facts). Mr. Davis charged that Defendants only hire individuals of Hispanic origin, and that he believed other non-Hispanics were treated similarly. See Doc. No. 56-5 (Davis Charge of Discrim.). On September 28, 2011, Marvell Moon filed a charge with the EEOC that mirrored Mr. Davis's. Doc. No.'s 59-3, ¶ 2; 56-7 (Moon Charge of Discrim.) (hereinafter, Mr. Davis and Mr. Moon are the "Charging Parties.").
In late 2011, the EEOC opened an investigation into these two charges, interviewing Defendants' human resources manager and attempting to interview a former employee. See Doc. No. 56-27 (EEOC's 1/3/2012 Let. to Def's.). Additionally, over the next year and a half, the EEOC sent eight separate letters requesting Defendants turn over documentation concerning their hiring practices—including all applications Defendants received in the few years prior. See Doc. No.'s 56-15, -17, -18, -19, -21, -22, -23, and -24 (EEOC's Let's. to Def's). Defendants initially responded by objecting to the EEOC's requests, then by providing some of the requested information a year later, and finally by submitting Mr. Davis's application in April 2013. See Doc. No.'s 56-16, -20, and -23 (Def.'s 1/13/12, 11/20/12, and 4/22/13 Let's. to EEOC). After the EEOC received Mr. Davis's application, it noted Defendants had still not submitted all of the requested information, and requested full disclosure; Defendants failed to respond. See Doc. No. 56-24 (EEOC's 6/20/13 Let. to Def's).
Between April 2013 and June 2015, the EEOC only contacted Defendants once, in September 2014, about this investigation. Doc. No. 59-3, ¶ 5. In June 2015, the EEOC issued a determination letter under Mr. Davis's charge, finding reasonable cause to believe that Defendants refused to hire Mr. Davis because of his race; the EEOC invited Defendants to "join in a collective effort toward a just resolution of this matter." Doc. No.'s 56-6 (EEOC's 6/30/15 Determ. Let. Davis); 48-2, ¶¶ 9-10 (Madrid Decl. Supp. Defs. Sanctions Mot.). In January 2016, the EEOCissued its last conciliation correspondence with Defendants concerning Mr. Davis's charge; Defendants rejected the EEOC's offer, and in March 2017 the EEOC concluded its conciliation efforts in Mr. Davis' case. See Doc. No.'s 49-2, at p.14 ; Id. at pp. 4-5 (EEOC's 3/23/18 Let.). Near the end of the conciliation process, the EEOC became aware that Mr. Davis had died a few months prior, in December 2015. Doc. No.'s 59-3, ¶ 34; 49-2, pp. 5-6. The EEOC did not immediately share this information with Defendants. See Id.
In August 2016, the EEOC found reasonable cause in Mr. Moon's case, and again invited conciliation with Defendants on the same issues. See Doc. No.'s 56-8 and -9 . Conciliation continued through January 10, 2017, concluding without resolution. See Doc. No.'s 56-9; 56-29 .
On January 11, 2017—almost a year after discovering Mr. Davis's death—the EEOC filed the instant suit, under its own name, alleging Defendants "engaged in a pattern or practice of hiring Hispanics and non-hiring non-Hispanics based on race[,]" in violation of Title VII, § 706(f)(1) and (3); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f)(1) and (3). See Doc. No. 5 (1AC). The EEOC sought multiple forms of injunctive relief, and also prayed the Court order Defendants:
See Id. at p. 14-15. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss based on, among other things, the alleged failure to adequately plead pattern-or-practice discrimination and its defense of laches; the Court denied these requests. See Doc. No.'s 17 and 28. The parties pivoted toward settlement, setting a conference schedule before Magistrate Judge Thurston. See Doc. No.'s 32 and 34.
In October 2017, the EEOC became aware that Mr. Moon had died almost two-and-a-half years prior, in May 2015. See Doc. No.'s 56-4 (Li Decl. at ¶ 2); 49-2, p. 5-6; 59-3, ¶ 34. The EEOC then filed its Rule 26 disclosures, omitting Mr. Davis and Mr. Moon from its witness list.Doc. No. 59-3, ¶ 30. In December 2017, Defendants discovered the deaths of the two Charging Parties after conducting an independent investigation. Doc. No.'s 45, p. 3, ¶¶ 17-24 (Transcript of Proceedings); 59-3 at ¶ 33. Shortly after, Defendants requested the scheduled settlement conference be vacated, and a summary judgment timetable be instituted; the Magistrate Judge stayed further discovery until the summary judgment proceedings concluded. See Doc. No. 36.
On both March 5 and 12, 2018 Defendants notified the EEOC that they would be seeking sanctions. See Doc. No.'s 55-19 and -20 (Defs.' Let.'s re: Sanctions). On March 23, the EEOC filed the instant request for leave to amend the 1AC, maintaining it "did not deliberately conceal Davis and Moon's deaths[,]" averring instead these omissions were due to "oversights and mistakes." See Doc. No.'s 46, p. 2, ¶¶ 19-21 (Mot. to Amend); 56-4, p. 3, ¶ 5. Therein, the EEOC submitted its intention to remove the prayer for money damages on behalf of Mr. Davis and Mr. Moon, but otherwise stated its intent to press forward with the request for injunctive relief and damages on behalf of the "class." See Doc. No. 46. Defendants responded by filing the instant motions for summary judgment and for sanctions, seeking among other things dismissal of the suit with prejudice. See Doc. No.'s 48 and 49.
Summary judgment is proper when no genuine issue as to any material fact exists, entitling the moving party to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56.2 A dispute is "genuine" if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the non-moving party. Freecycle Sunnyvale v. Freecycle Network, 626 F.3d 509, 514 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). A fact is "material" if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. United States v. Kapp, 564 F.3d 1103, 1114 (9th Cir. 2009).
The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of the legal basis for its motion and of identifying the portions of the declarations, pleadings, and discovery that demonstrate an absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,323 (1986)). Where the moving party will bear the burden of proof on an issue at trial, the movant must affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the movant. Id. Where the moving party will not bear the burden of proof on an issue at trial, the movant may prevail by "merely by pointing out that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Id. If a moving party fails to carry its burden of production, then "the non-moving party has no obligation to produce anything, even if the non-moving party would have the ultimate burden of persuasion." Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 160 (1970)).
If the moving party meets this initial burden, the opposing party must then establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually exists. Id. at 1103. The opposing party cannot rest upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleading, but must instead produce evidence that sets forth specific facts showing that there is a...
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