U.S. Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Stanley Black & Decker, Inc.
| Decision Date | 17 May 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. CCB-19-2599 |
| Parties | U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION v. STANLEY BLACK & DECKER, INC. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") moves to enforce an administrative subpoena served on Stanley Black & Decker, Inc. ("SB&D"). (ECF 1). The motion is fully briefed and no oral argument is necessary. Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2018). For the following reasons, the motion will be granted in part and denied in part.
In July 2017, Lonnie Felters, a former employee of SB&D, filed an administrative charge with the EEOC, alleging he experienced racial discrimination during his tenure at SB&D and that he was fired due to his race. (ECF 4-3, Felters Charge). He further alleged that, upon his termination, he was offered an Agreement and General Release that provided for severance pay but, in exchange for the severance, required him to waive his right to file an EEOC charge. Felters alleged that conditioning severance pay on such a waiver was retaliatory and interfered with his rights under "Title VII, the ADA, GINA, EPA, and ADEA." (Id.). Felters did not sign the waiver. (Id.). On October 5, 2018, the EEOC requested, in connection with its investigation of Felters's charge, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000-8(a), that SB&D identify any other employees who had been provided similar releases, copies of the releases, and additional information regarding those employees, including their names, positions, work locations, dates of hire and termination, contact information, and whether they signed the release. (ECF 4-5, Oct. 5, 2018 RFI). SB&D objected to the request, arguing it was overly broad and sought information not relevant to Felters's charge (ECF 4-6, SB&D Nov. 16, 2018, Ltr.). The EEOC responded to this objection with an administrative subpoena, and the agency asserted that its authority included the ability to investigate whether SB&D had a practice of requiring employees to sign an Agreement and General Release that waived their rights to file EEOC charges in exchange for severance pay. (ECF 4-7, EEOC Nov. 28, 2018, Ltr. & Subpoena). SB&D continued to assert that any company-wide information was irrelevant to Felters's individual claims, stating that the "'EEOC can expand its charges after uncovering violations during a reasonable investigation,' [but] there is not authority for the EEOC 'expanding its investigation' beyond the scope of the charge of the discrimination." (ECF 4-9, SB&D Dec. 10, 2018, Ltr. (quoting EEOC v. TriCore Reference Labs, 849 F.3d 929, 939 n.9 (10th Cir. 2017)). On December 4, 2018, the EEOC did initiate a new charge against SB&D focused specifically on the company's compliance with the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"). The EEOC's investigation was to "specifically focus on [SB&D]'s requirement that discharged employees sign a waiver releasing their rights to file any charges with the EEOC in exchange for severance pay." (ECF 4-10, EEOC Dec. 4, 2018 Ltr). In connection with the new charge, the EEOC requested that SB&D:
(ECF 1-2 at 12, Dec. 4, 2018, RFI). After SB&D failed to respond to this FRI, the EEOC issued a second subpoena in connection with the new charge on March 18, 2019, which seeks the same information. (ECF 1-2 at 14-16, Mar. 18, 2019 Subpoena). On April 2, 2019, SB&D petitioned the EEOC to revoke the subpoena. (ECF 1-1). It is this subpoena that the EEOC asks the court to enforce.
"The district court plays a 'limited' role in the enforcement of administrative subpoenas." EEOC v. Maritime Autowash, Inc., 820 F.3d 662, 665 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting EEOC v. City of Norfolk Police Dep't, 45 F.3d 80, 82 (4th Cir. 1995)). In determining whether the subpoena should be enforced, the court is not to analyze the underlying claim on its merits; rather the EEOC need only demonstrate that "(1) it is authorized to make such investigation; (2) it has complied with statutory requirements of due process; and (3) the materials requested are relevant." EEOC v. Randstad, 685 F.3d 433, 442 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Norfolk Police, 45 F.3d at 82). If these requirements are met, "the subpoena should be enforced, unless the party being investigated demonstrates that the subpoena is unduly burdensome." Id. Here, SB&D argues the EEOC has abused its authority in requesting the materials at issue and that its request is overbroad and unduly burdensome.
The EEOC is empowered by Congress to investigate potential violations of the ADEA on its own accord and, in furtherance of its investigatory powers, to require by subpoena the production of documentary evidence "relating to any matter under investigation." 29 U.S.C. § 626(a); 15 U.S.C. § 49, incorporated in Section 9 of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 209 and, through that section, in Section 7(a) of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C.§ 626(a). The EEOC argues its request is clearly within its statutory authority under 29 U.S.C. § 626(a) because it seeks the identities of former SB&D employees who were provided with an agreement and general release which contained a provision that required them to waive the right to file a charge in exchange for severance, in order to determine whether the provision of the release violated the ADEA and, if so, who has been aggrieved by such violation. SB&D makes two arguments in response. First, it argues the EEOC's subpoena is an abuse of its broader investigatory authority under the ADEA because it is solely an attempt to gain information to support Mr. Felters's earlier individual charge. Second, SB&D contends that the EEOC's request does not seek information that pertains to a plausible unlawful employment practice under the ADEA, because merely offering the releases at issue to employees is not "facially retaliatory." The court addresses each argument in turn.
In SB&D's view, the EEOC's request is not an "autonomous" investigation of SB&D's potential violations of the ADEA, but is an end-run around its more limited authority to investigate Mr. Felters's original individual charge. Under Title VII, "in connection with any investigation of a charge" filed by an aggrieved person on a member of the EEOC, the EEOC is entitled to seek documentary evidence that "is relevant to the charge under investigation." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(a); see also EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 64 (1984) (). The EEOC's authority pursuant to the ADEA, however, contains no charge-based relevancy requirement; the agency may conduct investigations into potential ADEA violations at its discretion and may seek records "relating to any matter under investigation," 29 U.S.C. § 626(a); 15 U.S.C. § 49; see also EEOC v. Am. & Efird Mills, Inc., 964 F.2d 300, 303 (4th Cir. 1992). SB&D's contention is that when it pushedback on the EEOC's subpoena pursuant to the Felters charge, which sought company-wide information regarding employee releases, the EEOC filed a new ADEA charge directed at nationwide activity and issued the instant subpoena in bad faith in order to further its original investigation. Thus, SB&D argues the EEOC should be limited by the original Felters charge and should be entitled to seek only information relevant to his individual claims.
The court sees no evidence of bad faith in this matter. As SB&D acknowledged in its own correspondence to the EEOC, the EEOC may expand its charges after a reasonable investigation. See, e.g., EEOC v. TriCore Reference Labs, 849 F.3d 929, 939 n.9 (10th Cir. 2017). Based on information obtained in the course of its investigation of Felters's charge, the EEOC submits that it believes SB&D may have a systemic policy of using the releases at issue to deter its employees from filing charges of discrimination and cooperating in EEOC investigations. "[T]he agency may receive information concerning alleged violations of the ADEA 'from any source,' and it has independent authority to investigate age discrimination." Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991) (citing 29 C.F.R. §§ 1626.4, 1626.13).
The cases cited by SB&D are instructive. In EEOC v. McLane Co., No. CV-12-615-PHX-GMS, 2012 WL 1132758 (D. Ariz. Apr. 4, 2012) an employee initiated an EEOC charge of gender discrimination based on a physical capability test used by the defendant. Id., at *1. The EEOC opened a new charge pursuant to its authority under the ADEA and subpoenaed the personal information of every person who took the test, including their name, gender, and contact information, along with other information about the tests. Because the subpoena requested wide-ranging personal information that was not relevant to the investigation of any potential age discrimination claim, such as gender, and given the initiation of a prior Title VII charge for gender discrimination only, the court understood the subpoena to be "fishing" for evidence related to thatindividual charge, which did not allege age discrimination. Id. at *5. But in EEOC v. Performance Food Grp. Co., LLC, No. CV MJG-09-2200, 2010 WL 11570678 (D. Md. Feb. 18, 2010), after individuals initiated EEOC charges against a company for...
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