U.S. Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. MJC, Inc., Civ. No. 17–00371 SOM–RLP

Decision Date24 January 2018
Docket NumberCiv. No. 17–00371 SOM–RLP
Citation306 F.Supp.3d 1204
Parties U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff, v. MJC, INC.; GAC Auto Group, Inc. dba Cutter Mazda of Honolulu; and Does 1–10 Inclusive, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Hawaii

Anna Y. Park, Sue J. Noh, US Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Los Angeles Los Angeles District Office, Los Angeles, CA, Eric Yau, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Honolulu Local Office, Honolulu, HI, Rumduol Vuong, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Fresno, CA, for Plaintiff.

Joachim P. Cox, Kamala S. Haake, Cox Fricke a Limited Liability Law Partnership LLP, Honolulu, HI, for Defendants.

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STAY PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE TO SATISFY 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5, AND GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

Susan Oki Mollway, United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION.

Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") complains that Defendants MJC, Inc., and GAC Auto Group, Inc., which separately or together own or operate a car dealership, violated the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") by failing to hire Ryan Vicari because he had a hearing disability. Defendants move to stay the proceedings on the ground that the EEOC allegedly failed to engage in the informal conciliation process mandated by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5, which is a condition precedent to an EEOC lawsuit. Defendants also move to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim, arguing that the Complaint fails to adequately allege that Vicari is a "qualified individual" under the ADA.

The court declines to issue a stay but grants the motion to dismiss. Defendants fail to meet their burden as movants of showing that a stay is warranted. This court does, however, dismiss the Complaint because it fails to allege facts tending to show that Vicari is a qualified individual under the ADA.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND.

Defendants are two Hawaii corporations, GAC Auto Group, Inc., and MJC, Inc., and some of their unidentified employees ("Does 1–10" in the Complaint). ECF 1, PageID # s 2–3. GAC Auto Group is the legal name of a car dealership doing business as Cutter Mazda of Honolulu. See id. at PageID # 3. GAC Auto Group is wholly owned by MJC, which, in turn, manages the dealership. Id. GAC Auto Group and MJC jointly have hiring and firing rights for the dealership. Id.

On July 31, 2017, the EEOC filed a Complaint alleging that "Defendants have engaged in unlawful employment practices in violation of Section 102(a) and (b) of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) and (b)." ECF 1, PageID # s 5, 8. The ADA provides:

No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.
...
[A qualified individual is] an individual who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.

42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(8), 12112(a).

The EEOC alleges that Defendants failed to hire Ryan Vicari, who is deaf, "based on his actual ... [and] perceived disability" after he "applied for [a car] detailer position with Defendants on June 24, 2015." Id. at PageID # s 5–6. The EEOC presents the events of June 24, 2015, succinctly:

Charging Party [i.e., Ryan Vicari] was interviewed on or about [June 24, 2015,] by Defendants. During the interview, Defendants were informed that Charging Party is hearing impaired and can read lips. In response, Defendants stated they could not hire Charging Party because he was deaf and ended the interview. Consequently, Charging Party was not considered and/or hired for the detailer position and/or any other position with Defendants.

Id. at PageID # 6. The EEOC seeks compensatory and punitive damages for Vicari, "reinstatement or front pay," an injunction forbidding Defendants from engaging in further disability discrimination, and an order requiring Defendants to implement prophylactic policies and programs. See id. at PageID # s 6–7; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(g)(1) (detailing a federal court's remedial powers under the ADA).

Defendants deny that they failed to hire Vicari for the detailer position because he is deaf. Instead, Defendants say they truthfully advised Vicari "that there were no detailer positions available." ECF 18–1, PageID # 76. Defendants claim that they then

interview[ed] [Vicari] for the only available position—a Service Lot Attendant. [But] [d]ue to the nature of the Service Lot Attendant position, which requires constant communication with other employees via two-way radios, often while driving, Defendants understood that Mr. Vicari would not have been able to fulfill the essential functions of the position.

Id. at PageID # s 76–77. This particular factual dispute is not currently before the court.

Defendants have moved to stay the present action following the EEOC's alleged failure to engage Defendants in the informal conciliation process mandated by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(b), which is a condition precedent to an EEOC lawsuit against an employer. See ECF 18–1, PageID # s 80–83; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(b), (f)(1) ; see also Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC , ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 1645, 1649, 191 L.Ed.2d 607 (2015) ("Before suing an employer for discrimination, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ... must try to remedy unlawful workplace practices through informal methods of conciliation."). Defendants claim that the EEOC failed in fact to conciliate; they do not contest the adequacy of the Complaint's allegations on this score. See ECF 18–1, PageID # 76. Defendants' stay request is brought under Rule 7 and Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(1). ECF 18, PageID # 73.

Defendants have also moved under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim. Defendants describe the Complaint as deficient because it fails to set forth facts tending to show that Vicari is a "qualified individual" under the ADA. Id.

The court first assures itself of jurisdiction over this matter, then addresses the stay and the Rule 12(b)(6) matter.

III. THE COURT HAS JURISDICTION.

Defendants' Motion requests a stay under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in addition to Rule 7 and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(1). See ECF 18, PageID # 73. Rule 12(b)(1) authorizes a court to dismiss claims over which it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). At the hearing on January 8, 2018, Defendants clarified that they are not moving to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and are only seeking to stay this court's proceedings pending further conciliation efforts. ECF 23. The court nevertheless assures itself of its subject matter jurisdiction over this matter. See Leeson v. Transam. Disability Income Plan , 671 F.3d 969, 975 n.12 (9th Cir. 2012) (explaining that if a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it must dismiss the complaint, sua sponte if necessary).

Title VII, and by extension the ADA,1 grants this court jurisdiction over EEOC lawsuits generally. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(3) ("Each United States district court ... shall have jurisdiction of actions brought under this subchapter. Such an action may be brought in any judicial district court in the State in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed."). Title VII also sets forth various conditions precedent to an EEOC lawsuit against an employer. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(b). One such condition requires the agency, before it "may bring a civil action," to "endeavor to eliminate any ... alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion." Id. § 2000e–5(b), (f)(1). This court concludes that this conciliation requirement is not "jurisdictional"; that is, a federal court is not required to dismiss an ADA action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction whenever the EEOC fails to satisfy this obligation prior to filing suit. See Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chicago , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S.Ct. 13, 17, 199 L.Ed.2d 249 (2017) (explaining that a "[f]ailure to comply with a jurisdictional [requirement] ... deprives a court of adjudicatory authority over the case, necessitating dismissal").

This court exercises jurisdiction regardless of whether the EEOC conciliated. Title VII empowers a court, in the event of nonconciliation, to "stay further proceedings for not more than sixty days pending ... further efforts of the Commission to obtain voluntary compliance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(1) (emphasis added). In Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC , ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 1645, 1656, 191 L.Ed.2d 607 (2015), the Supreme Court declared that "the appropriate remedy [following a failure to conciliate] is to order the EEOC to undertake the mandated efforts to obtain voluntary compliance," given the statute's authorization of a stay for that purpose. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(1) ). The Ninth Circuit, following Mach Mining , has recently held that "if the EEOC ... failed to conciliate prior to bringing suit, the appropriate remedy [is] a stay of proceedings to permit an attempt at conciliation, not the dismissal of the aggrieved employees' claims. " Arizona ex rel. Horne v. Geo Grp., Inc. , 816 F.3d 1189, 1199 (9th Cir. 2016) (emphasis added), cert. denied sub nom. Geo Grp., Inc. v. EEOC , ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S.Ct. 623, 196 L.Ed.2d 515 (2017).

The Ninth Circuit in Geo Group did not discuss its earlier ruling in EEOC v. Pierce Packing Co. , 669 F.2d 605, 608–09 (9th Cir. 1982), which held that "conciliation [is a] jurisdictional condition[ ] precedent to suit by the EEOC," and which affirmed a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. But this court need not wait for an express abrogation of Pierce Packing by the Ninth...

To continue reading

Request your trial
4 cases
  • Wiese v. Becerra, Civ. No. 2:17–903 WBS KJN
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
    • February 6, 2018
    ... ... asserted claims and which adds (1) an Equal Protection claim under the U.S. and California ... State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Cuomo , 804 F.3d 242, 25860 (2d Cir. 2015) ; ... ...
  • Hilliard v. Twin Falls Couinty Sheriff's Office
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Idaho
    • January 15, 2021
    ...because of the disability. See Samper v. Providence St. Vincent Med. Ctr., 675 F.3d 1233, 1237 (9th Cir. 2012);EEOC v. MJC, Inc., 306 F.Supp.3d 1204, 1221 (D. Haw. 2018); Harris v. Treasure Canyon Calcuim Co., 132 F.Supp.3d 1228, 1236 (D. Idaho 2015). A. Disability To qualify as being disab......
  • Iwaniszek v. Pride Transp., Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Nevada
    • February 17, 2021
    ..."in part because a prima facie case is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement." U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. MCJ, Inc., 306 F. Supp. 3d 1204, 1221 (D. Haw. 2018) (quotations and citation omitted). Thus, while an ADA plaintiff may not be strictly bound by the elem......
  • U.S. Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. George Wash. Univ.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • May 8, 2019
    ...v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 516 (2006); EEOC v. Agro Distribution, LLC, 555 F.3d 462, 469 (5th Cir. 2009)); EEOC v. MJC, Inc., 306 F. Supp. 3d 1204, 1211-12 (D. Haw. 2018) (discussing, e.g., Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515-16). Accordingly, the Court shall not examine any aspect of the Commissio......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT