U.S. Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Coughlin, Inc.

• Docket Number: 2:21-cv-99-wks
• Decision Date: 18 May 2022
• Parties: U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff, JENNIE LUMBRA, Plaintiff-Intervenor, STATE OF VERMONT, Plaintiff-Intervenor, v. COUGHLIN, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Vermont

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U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff, JENNIE LUMBRA, Plaintiff-Intervenor, STATE OF VERMONT, Plaintiff-Intervenor, v. COUGHLIN, INC., Defendant.

No. 2:21-cv-99-wks

United States District Court, D. Vermont

May 18, 2022

OPINION AND ORDER

William K. Sessions III U.S. District Court Judge

Pending before the Court are two motions for entry of a protective order, one filed by Defendant Coughlin, Inc. (“Coughlin”) (ECF No. 55) and one filed by Plaintiff United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) (ECF No. 57). Following a hearing to compel discovery responses and production on March 14, 2022, the Court ordered the parties to submit a proposed protective order (ECF No. 49).^[1] Both parties agreed to try, in good faith, to negotiate a proposed protective order. While the parties have agreed on a number of provisions, three outstanding disputes remain: (1) the definition of “confidential information”; (2) the scope of the protective order, specifically whether the order would apply to publicly-filed judicial documents and the time frame in which the order's restrictions would be in effect; (3) and whether documents considered confidential can be destroyed at the conclusion of the case. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's Motion to Enter its Proposed Order is granted in part and denied in part and Plaintiff's Motion for Protective Order is also granted in part and denied in part. Furthermore, Plaintiff's request for a hearing on this issue is denied as moot.

Also before the Court is Plaintiff's Leave to File a Memorandum Following Oral Argument (ECF No. 50) and Defendant's opposition to that request (ECF No. 54). The Court heard the parties on Plaintiff's Motion to Substitute Party (ECF No. 36) at the March 14 hearing. Following that hearing, Plaintiff requested that the Court consider its additional arguments. The Court has decided to consider Plaintiff's additional arguments. As such Plaintiff's Leave to File a Memorandum Following Oral Argument (ECF No. 50) is granted and Defendant's motion in opposition to Plaintiff's additional briefing is denied (ECF No. 54). In considering Plaintiff's additional arguments, the parties' briefings, and issues raised at oral argument, for the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff's Motion to Substitute Party (ECF No. 36) for its state law claim and its compensatory damages claim under federal law. The Court, however, dismisses Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages and declaratory relief under federal law.

Factual Background

This case involves Plaintiff and Plaintiff Intervenors' allegation that Defendant subjected a class of employees to a sexually hostile work environment between 2014 and 2019 in violation of 703(a)(1) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) and the Vermont Fair Employment Practices Act (“VFEPA”). Defendant owns and operates ten franchised McDonald's stores in Vermont and New Hampshire and employs and has employed a number of people at those restaurants, including former Second Assistant Manager Peter Pratt. The events in this case allegedly occurred at Defendant's McDonald's restaurant in Randolph, Vermont. Specifically, Plaintiff and Plaintiffs-Intervenors (collectively “Plaintiffs”) allege that Mr. Pratt regularly made unwelcome sexual remarks and comments; at times engaged in unwanted physical contact; and that Defendant ignored complaints about Mr. Pratt's behavior and subjected Plaintiff-Intervenor Jennie Lumbra and a class of similarly aggrieved employees to a sexually hostile work environment. Plaintiffs also allege that Defendant retaliated against Ms. Lumbra for submitting complaints about Mr. Pratt's conduct. Defendant counters that it “exercised reasonable care to prevent, and promptly investigate[d] and correct[ed] any alleged discriminatory, retaliatory, or harassing behavior.” See ECF No. 9 at 8.

This case is brought by the EEOC on behalf of the class of aggrieved employees. The case is also brought by PlaintiffIntervenor Jennie Lumbra^[2] and Plaintiff-Intervenor State of Vermont. Plaintiff EEOC seeks a permanent injunction to enjoin Defendant from engaging in discriminatory employment practices on the basis of sex or retaliating for complaints based on those practices, and to order Defendant to implement policies which provide equal employment opportunities. The EEOC also seeks appropriate backpay; compensation for past and future pecuniary losses; punitive damages to compensate the aggrieved individuals for the alleged unlawful employment practices; the costs of this litigation; and any other relief the Court deems necessary and proper. Ms. Lumbra (now Ms. Lumbra's estate) seeks declaratory relief that Defendant's actions were unlawful; compensatory damages for “sexual and physical assaults, emotional stress, mental anguish, deterioration of well-being and economic loss, ” See ECF No. 6 at 14; punitive damages; and attorney's fees. The State of Vermont requests a declaratory judgment finding that Defendant engaged in unlawful discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Vermont's Fair Employment Practices Act (“VFEPA”), 21 V.S.A. §§ 495-496; and seeks civil penalties of up to $10, 000 for each VFEPA violation, a permanent injunction prohibiting future employment practices that violate VFEPA, and reasonable costs and attorney's fees.

Legal Standards

I. Protective Order

In general, courts have broad discretionary power over the discovery process. See Koster v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 93 F.R.D. 471, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (noting that while litigants have a “broad right of access to information” in order to “avoid potential abuse of this broad right . . . the rules invest the trial court with discretionary authority to control the discovery process”). Under Rule 26(c), a court can “make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c). The party seeking the protective order has the burden of demonstrating good cause for that order. See Gambale v. Deutsche Bank AG, 377 F.3d 133, 142 (2d Cir. 2004). Usually in order to establish good cause, the moving party must articulate a “clearly defined and very serious injury” which would result in the absence of a protective order. See United States v. Int'l Bus. Machines Corp., 67 F.R.D. 40, 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). “Broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples of articulated reasoning, do not satisfy the Rule 26(c) test.” Schiller v. City of New York, No. 04 CIV. 7921 KMK JCF, 2007 WL 136149, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2007) (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1121 (3d Cir. 1986)). Furthermore, the Court must weigh the countervailing interests of both parties. See Rossini v. Ogilvy & Mather, Inc., 798 F.2d 590, 601 (2d. Cir. 1986) (stating that a court is expected to strike a balance between the plaintiff's “desire for full disclosure of relevant information against the defendant's desire to preserve the privacy of its employees”).

Once the moving party has established good cause, “the court should consider other factors that may militate against issuing a protective order . . . [such as] whether the order will prevent the threatened harm, whether there are less restrictive means of preventing the threatened harm, the interests of the party opposing the motion, and the interests of the public.” See Koster, 93 F.R.D. at 479. Trial courts have broad discretion in making the forementioned determinations. See Dove v. Atl. Capital Corp., 963 F.2d 15, 19 (2d Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“The grant and nature of protection is singularly within the discretion of the district court and may be reversed only on a clear showing of abuse of discretion.”).

II. Rule 25 Substitution of Party

Following the unexpected death of Ms. Lumbra, the coadministrators of her estate filed a Motion to Substitute Party (ECF No. 36). Defendant opposes that motion (ECF No. 38), alleging that Ms. Lumbra's claims for punitive damages and declaratory relief do not survive her death. Under Rule 25, when “a party dies and the claim is not extinguished, the court may order a substitution of the proper party.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 25(a)(1). The question in this case thus becomes if Ms. Lumbra's claims survive her death.

Discussion

I. Protective Order

Here, both parties agree on the need for a protective order; they disagree, however, on the conditions of that order. Specifically, the parties disagree on the definition of “confidential information, ” the temporal scope of the order and if it applies to publicly-filed documents, as well as whether the documents deemed confidential can be destroyed at the conclusion of this case. The Court will address each of those issues below.

A. Definition of “Confidential Information”

First the parties disagree on the definition of “confidential information, ” which has a direct bearing on what is covered by the protective order. Plaintiff proposes that confidential information includes “information that constitutes or contains trade secrets pursuant to the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“USTA”) § 1(4) (1985) or 9 V.S.A. § § 4601, et seq.; or information that is otherwise entitled to protection from dissemination under applicable law.” ECF No. 57-2 at 3. Defendant proposes that the definition of confidential information be expanded to include “information a party in good faith contends constitutes or contains trade secrets or other confidential business information that could provide a competitor with a competitive advantage;” or “information that a party agreed to or is required to keep confidential;” or “information that is otherwise entitled to protection from dissemination under...