U.S. ex rel. Williams v. DeRobertis
Decision Date | 19 August 1983 |
Docket Number | No. 82-2497,82-2497 |
Citation | 715 F.2d 1174 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America ex rel. John WILLIAMS, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Richard DeROBERTIS, et al., Respondents-Appellants. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Marcia L. Friedl, Atty. Gen. of Ill., Chicago, Ill., for respondents-appellants.
Ann C. Tighe, Cotsirilos & Crowley, Chicago, Ill., for petitioner-appellees.
Before ESCHBACH and COFFEY, Circuit Judges, and CAMPBELL, Senior District Judge. *
Respondents appeal from the judgment of the district court granting petitioner John Williams a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court entered summary judgment for petitioner, who is in custody pursuant to a bench verdict, on the ground that Williams had not knowingly and intelligently waived his right to a trial by jury secured by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. For the reasons below, we reverse.
In 1975, Williams was convicted after a bench trial of armed robbery and unlawful use of weapons. His convictions, and those of his co-defendants, Willie Nelson and Victor Watts, stemmed from a robbery of a real estate office during which Williams threatened the victims with a sawed-off shotgun. Prior to trial, Williams signed a jury waiver form, which read: "I, the undersigned, do hereby waive jury trial and submit the above cause to the Court for hearing." At the time the waiver was signed, the following colloquy took place among the presiding judge, the defendants, and their separate attorneys:
MR. VISHNY [Counsel for Williams]: In behalf of John Williams, it will be a bench.
MR. ISRAELSTAM [Counsel for Watts]: In behalf of Watts, it will be a bench.
MR. LIVINGSTON [Counsel for Nelson]: In behalf of Willie Nelson it will be a bench also.
And you, Mr. Williams, do you know what a jury trial is? I just explained it to Mr. Nelson and Mr. Watts.
Let the record reflect that the defendants in open court accompanied by their counsel have executed jury waivers and they thereby waive their rights to a jury trial.
Williams appealed his conviction and twenty to forty-five year sentence, contending, inter alia, that the trial court record was devoid of any evidence that he had been advised of his right to trial by jury aside from a jury trial waiver form which he had signed. The state filed the above quoted colloquy to supplement the record, and the appellate court held that Williams "understandingly waived his right to trial by jury." People v. Williams, 47 Ill.App.3d 798, 802, 8 Ill.Dec. 177, 180, 365 N.E.2d 415, 418 (1977). The Illinois Supreme Court denied Williams' petition for leave to appeal. The trial court denied Williams' petition for post-conviction relief in 1980.
On April 14, 1981, Williams filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Appointed counsel filed an amended petition raising a single ground for relief: that his waiver of a jury trial was constitutionally infirm because the trial court had not sufficiently informed Williams of his right to trial by jury. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the amended petition, arguing that the Constitution does not require a defendant to be informed of his right to jury trial by the trial court as a condition of a valid waiver.
The district court denied the motion to dismiss. 538 F.Supp. 899 (N.D.Ill.1982). While it rejected the argument that a state trial judge is compelled by the Constitution to interrogate the defendant to assure that a waiver is knowing and voluntary, it held that in order for a waiver of the right to trial by jury to be sustained against collateral attack, there must be an affirmative showing that the waiver was in fact voluntary and intelligent. Since petitioner did not claim his waiver was involuntary, the court proceeded to scrutinize the state court record and concluded that it was insufficient to establish that Williams' waiver was a knowing and intelligent one. The court reasoned that one cannot knowingly waive a right unless one is cognizant of the character or nature of the right he is waiving, and concluded that a defendant must have knowledge of four concepts to effect a constitutionally valid waiver of the right to trial by jury: (1) a jury is composed of 12 members of the community; (2) a defendant may participate in the selection of jurors; (3) a "substantial majority" of the jurors must vote to convict in order for a conviction to be obtained; and (4) if a defendant waives a jury trial, a judge alone will decide his guilt or innocence. The court found the record sufficient to uphold the waiver regarding the first and fourth items, but since the record was silent on the question of Williams' knowledge of the other concepts, the court denied the motion to dismiss.
Petitioner then filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that if the defendant's knowledge of his right does not appear in the record, the waiver of that right is constitutionally infirm. Respondents argued that the crucial question was whether petitioner in fact was aware of his right at the time of the waiver and urged that an evidentiary hearing was required on that issue. Petitioner replied by reiterating his position, but despite the fact that petitioner contended it was unnecessary, he filed an affidavit in which he stated that he had not been aware "that a jury trial would allow him to participate in the selection of the jurors who would try his cause," nor had he been aware "that a jury trial would require a unanimous decision of the jurors in order for him to be convicted." 1 He also stated in his affidavit that he had "waived his right to a jury trial and was tried by the court pursuant to the advice of his counsel ...," and that his 1975 trial was his first trial. Respondents did not file any counter-affidavits, though they did assert in a brief that they had contacted petitioner's trial counsel, who reportedly said that he remembered discussing the jury trial waiver with Williams, but did not remember the details of the conversation.
The district judge granted petitioner's motion for summary judgment, finding no material issue of fact, and holding that petitioner was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court observed that respondents wholly failed to establish a material issue of fact by their failure to submit any affidavits or other evidentiary material to contradict Williams' affidavit, and again observed that the record itself was silent regarding Williams' knowledge of concepts the court had ruled essential to a constitutionally valid waiver.
The dispositive question on appeal is whether a criminal defendant must have personal knowledge of his right to participate in the selection of his jury and his right to be convicted only upon a substantial majority vote of the jurors in order for him to effect a constitutionally valid waiver of his right to trial by jury under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. We conclude that an accused's ignorance of these attributes of a jury trial does not render his jury trial waiver and subsequent bench trial conviction void as a matter of constitutional law.
The district court reached its conclusion that specific knowledge of the "substantial majority" and "participation" attributes of a jury trial is essential to intelligent waiver by giving constitutional dimension to a case this court had decided under its supervisory power over lower federal courts of the circuit. In United States v. Delgado, 635 F.2d 889 (7th Cir.1981), we expanded on the supervisory rule we had laid down in United States v. Scott, 583 F.2d 362, 364 (7th Cir.1978) (per curiam), requiring interrogation of the defendant before accepting a jury waiver. In...
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