U.S. ex rel. Reis v. Wainwright, 74--3422

• Decision Date: 16 January 1976
• Docket Number: No. 74--3422,74--3422
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America ex rel. Lillian REIS, Petitioner-Appellant, Cross-Appellee, v. Louie L. WAINWRIGHT, Director, Division of Corrections, Respondent-Appellee, Cross-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 1269

525 F.2d 1269

UNITED STATES of America ex rel. Lillian REIS Petitioner-Appellant, Cross-Appellee, v. Louie L. WAINWRIGHT, Director, Division of Corrections Respondent-Appellee, Cross-Appellant.

No. 74--3422.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

Jan. 16, 1976.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 23, 1976.

Joel Hirschhorn, Yale T. Freeman, Miami, Fla., for petitioner-appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Linda C. Hertz, Asst. Atty. Gen., Miami, Fla., for respondent-appellee.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

Before GEWIN, GOLDBERG and DYER, Circuit Judges.

GEWIN, Circuit Judge:

In two separate state proceedings appellant Reis was convicted of unlawful possession of marijuana ¹ and of obtaining prescription drugs by giving a false name and address. ² In her § 2254 habeas corpus petition filed below she challenged the constitutionality of both convictions, raising two grounds for relief. Her first contention was that she had been denied her right to reasonably effective assistance of counsel. ³ Concluding that Reis had failed to show a deprivation of constitutional dimension, the district court denied relief on this allegation. Reis has appealed from this denial. Applying the standard for evaluating retained counsel set forth in Fitzgerald v. Estelle, 505 F.2d 1334 (5th Cir. 1974) (en banc), we affirm the lower court's denial of relief on this issue.

As a second basis for relief, Reis asserted that evidence admitted in the prosecution of the marijuana charge had been obtained in an unlawful search and seizure. On this issue the district court ruled in her favor and granted the writ with respect to the conviction for possession of marijuana. The government has elected to appeal from this partial grant of relief. We reverse, finding the search lawful under the Fourth Amendment as construed and applied by the Supreme Court at the time of the challenged search.

On March 26, 1965 Miami Beach police officers arrested Reis in the living room of her apartment. They had reasonable grounds to believe that she was the person who had obtained prescription drugs under an alias. ⁴ A search of her entire apartment disclosed a marijuana cigarette in a purse in the bedroom. ⁵

Thereafter she was charged by information with one count of unlawful possession of marijuana and six counts ⁶ of unlawfully obtaining prescription drugs by giving a false name and address. She elected to waive trial by jury on the charge of unlawful possession of marijuana. The case was tried by the court; a judgment of conviction was entered; and she was sentenced to a two year term of imprisonment. A jury subsequently convicted her of all six counts of obtaining prescription drugs by giving a false name and address. On each count she received a two year prison sentence. All sentences were to be served concurrently. She was represented in both cases by the same attorney, whom she had retained.

A lengthy delay between trial and appeal ensued due to the refusal of the Florida courts to declare Reis insolvent and authorize an appeal in forma pauperis with a free transcript. ⁷ Ultimately she was granted a belated direct appeal; and the two cases were consolidated; the same attorney who had represented her at trial prosecuted her appeal. The District Court of Appeal for the Third District of Florida affirmed the judgments of conviction on all counts, rejecting her contentions of insufficient evidence and unlawful search. Reis v. State, 248 So.2d 666 (Fla.App.1971). The Florida Supreme Court denied certiorari. Reis v. State, 252 So.2d 798 (1971).

Reis then left the state of Florida and refused to return for approximately two years. Immediately after she relented and surrendered herself to Florida authorities, she filed in state court, through new counsel, as Motion to Vacate and Set Aside Judgment and Sentence pursuant to Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.850. She alleged two grounds for post-conviction relief. First, she again contended that the marijuana cigarette had been obtained in an illegal, rummaging search. Second, she claimed that her trial counsel had provided ineffective assistance. The state judge summarily denied relief on the issue of the search. After hearing oral argument on the issue of ineffective counsel, he also denied relief with respect to that claim, stating that Florida jurisprudence does not recognize ineffectiveness of privately retained counsel as a basis for post-conviction relief.

No further appeal was prosecuted in the Florida courts. Instead, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Reis filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal court.

I. Exhaustion of State Remedies

As she did not appeal from the denial of her Motion to Vacate and Set Aside Judgment and Sentence, Reis has never given the Florida appellate courts an apportunity to consider her claim of incompetent counsel. ⁸ The state contends, therefore, that we should dismiss the petition until the Florida courts have had occasion to consider that issue.

The doctrine of exhaustion of state remedies is bottomed on federalism and the resultant policy necessary to the smooth functioning of our dual court system, state and federal; ⁹ it is a matter of comity--not jurisdiction--and we are not powerless to act in the absence of exhaustion.

Petitioners seeking federal habeas corpus need not exhaust state remedies where it is plain that resort to the state courts would be futile. St. Jules v. Savage, 512 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1975); Layton v. Carson, 479 F.2d 1275 (5th Cir. 1973); Davis v. Smith, 430 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1970); Bruce v. Beto, 396 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1968); McDonald v. Moore, 353 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1965); Reed v. Beto, 343 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1965), aff'd on other grounds sub nom., Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 87 S.Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967). In an uninterrupted line of cases Florida has steadfastly refused to recognize incompetence of privately retained counsel as a valid basis for post-conviction relief. ¹⁰ The rule appears firmly entrenched in Florida's jurisprudence, and we see no indication that a Florida appellate court would be inclined to deviate from this well worn path.

We do not face the situation where dismissal would be proper in order to permit the state appellate court to reconsider its rule in light of a recent contrary pronouncement of this court. See Glenn v. Askew, 513 F.2d 61 (5th Cir. 1975). The rule has been maintained in Florida, even in the face of holdings of this circuit ¹¹ that a defendant who is denied due process because of the incompetency of privately retained counsel is as deserving of post-conviction relief as a defendant who has had court-appointed counsel, e.g., Bell v. State of Alabama, 367 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1966).

Even the state, in opposition to the appellant's motion for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of incompetent counsel under Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.850, argued that an evidentiary hearing was unnecessary because 'Florida cases are legion in holding that in post-conviction relief cases one may not contest the competency of privately retained counsel.' The state is unable to cite a single Florida case evidencing even the slightest penchant to abandon its precedent. In these circumstances, dismissal for want of exhaustion of state remedies is not justified. 'Neither the statute nor the spirit of needed comity behind it require such a formalistic waste of precious judicial energy, state or federal.' Reed v. Beto, supra, 343 F.2d at 725.

The district court did not err, therefore, in refusing to dismiss Reis's petition for failure to exhaust state remedies.

II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

The standard by which we must gauge the adequacy of the representation of retained counsel was set forth in Fitzgerald v. Estelle,supra. In Fitzgerald we stated that the right to effective assistance of counsel is safeguarded both by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment standing alone and by the Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective representation (applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment). When defense counsel's representation is so blatantly incompetent as to render the whole proceeding fundamentally unfair, the due process clause itself is violated. When, however, the aggregate of retained counsel's alleged errors does not rise (or sink) to the level of fundamental unfairness, in order to support a finding of a Sixth Amendment violation there must be a showing that the state was somehow involved in the ineffective representation:

To find state involvement in retained counsel's conduct which is adjudged to be less than reasonably effective, yet not so grossly deficient as to render the proceedings fundamentally unfair, it must be shown that some responsible state official connected with the criminal proceeding who could have remedied the conduct failed in his duty to accord justice to the accused. That the trial judge and the prosecutor have such a capacity and duty is unquestionable. Therefore, if the trial judge or the prosecutor can be shown to have actually known that a particular defendant is receiving incompetent representation and takes no remedial action, the state action requirement is satisfied. If they directly participate in the incompetency, it is even more so. Furthermore, if the incompetency of a retained attorney's representation is so apparent that a reasonably attentive official of the state should have been aware of and could have corrected it then again the state action requirement is satisfied.

505 F.2d at 1337 (footnote omitted).

Reis simply has not shown either that her trial was fundamentally unfair ¹² or that her retained counsel's representation was so egregious that a reasonably attentive state official should have interceded to take corrective action. Her claim is thus not of constitutional dimension.

At the evidentiary hearing below Reis's trial counsel testified and explained his trial tactics. He testified...