U.S. ex rel. Joseph v. Cannon
| Citation | 642 F.2d 1373,206 U.S.App.D.C. 405 |
| Decision Date | 30 January 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. 78-1618,78-1618 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America ex rel. Joel D. JOSEPH, and Joel D. Joseph, Appellants, v. Howard W. CANNON et al. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (District of Columbia) |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (D.C. Civil No. 77-00452).
Joel D. Joseph, Washington, D.C., with whom Paul D. Kamenar, Washington, D.C., was on the brief, pro se.
Kevin T. Maroney, Washington, D.C., with whom Edward P. Morgan, Washington, D.C., was on the brief, for appellees.
Before ROBINSON and MacKINNON, Circuit Judges, and HAROLD H. GREENE, District Judge. *
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SPOTTSWOOD W. ROBINSON, III.
This appeal challenges the District Court's disposition of a somewhat novel suit brought by Joel D. Joseph, the appellant, against Senator Howard W. Cannon and his administrative assistant, Chester B. Sobsey, the appellees. Initiated pursuant to Section 231 of the False Claims Act, 1 the litigation features two counts respectively charging that Senator Cannon authorized payment of Sobsey's federal salary during a period when Sobsey was working "extensively and exclusively" on the Senator's 1976 reelection campaign, 2 and that other members of the Senator's staff performed personal services for him and his family while collecting their governmental salaries. 3 The District Court dismissed the first count for lack of jurisdiction, 4 and the second for failure to state with sufficient specificity a claim upon which relief could be granted. 5
While we depart from aspects of the District Court's analysis, we agree that the False Claims Act does not empower the federal courts to address appellant's first claim, 6 and that the vagueness of appellant's complaint is fatal to the second. 7 We accordingly affirm the District Court's judgment in both respects.
Howard W. Cannon is a United States Senator from the State of Nevada. At all times relevant to this case, Chester B. Sobsey was a Senate employee serving as his administrative assistant. In 1969, Senator Cannon, compliably with then Senate Rule 43, 8 filed a written designation with the Secretary of the Senate authorizing Sobsey to solicit, receive, distribute, and act as custodian of the Senator's campaign funds.
According to appellant, however, Sobsey did far more for the 1976 Cannon campaign than administer contributions. From March, 1975, through November, 1976, Sobsey allegedly worked "extensively and exclusively" for the Senator's reelection. 9 Throughout this period, the complaint avers, "Sobsey accepted his regular pay for services ostensibly performed as Senator Cannon's administrative assistant even though such services were not performed or (were) performed in a perfunctory or nominal manner." 10 Appellant maintains that Senator Cannon was aware of the nature of his assistant's activities, yet authorized these salary payments. 11 Appellate further asserts that at unspecified times other unnamed members of the Senator's staff rendered personal services to the Senator and his family. 12
Invoking the False Claims Act, appellant brought suit against Senator Cannon and Sobsey in the District Court for recovery, on behalf of the United States, of double the damages allegedly sustained by the federal treasury plus $2,000 for each claim made, 13 and punitive damages of $50,000 from each. 14 For himself, as relator or qui tam plaintiff, he asked "fair and reasonable compensation," 15 and reimbursement for the expenses of the litigation. 16 The United States declined to participate in the suit, and appellees moved to dismiss the complaint. The District Court granted the motion, 17 and this appeal followed.
Appellant theorizes that Senator Cannon's authorization of salary payments to Sobsey while the aide was not performing "official legislative and representational duties" made out an actionable false claim. 18 The District Court held that the Government already possessed the information set forth in appellant's complaint, and that the action was barred by Section 232(C) of the Act 19 for that reason. 20 Although an examination of the language and purposes of that provision convinces us that the court's interpretation was incorrect, we are persuaded that dismissal of appellant's first count was nonetheless proper. 21
The False Claims Act 22 was adopted during the Civil War, a time when massive frauds were being committed against the Government. 23 To encourage action against defrauders, 24 Congress authorized private citizens to bring civil actions against wrongdoers on the Government's behalf, and to retain half of any recovery. 25 The Act's original language permitted a plaintiff to launch a suit and collect his share of the damages even when he contributed absolutely nothing to exposure of the crime, 26 however, and this provision was much abused in later years by piranha-like plaintiffs who sued solely on the basis of information already contained in governmental files and indictments. 27 The Act was therefore amended in 1943 28 to permit only those persons unveiling new information to sue:
The court shall have no jurisdiction to proceed with any such suit brought under clause (B) of this section or pending suit brought under this section whenever it shall be made to appear that such suit was based upon evidence or information in the possession of the United States, or any agency, officer, or employee thereof, at the time such suit was brought.... 29
The District Court concluded that appellant had not surmounted this statutory barrier because the Secretary of the Senate had in his files Senator Cannon's written designation of Sobsey to administer campaign contributions. 30 We cannot, however, subscribe to this holding. Merely because the Government holds some information related to an allegedly false claim does not mean that suit under the Act is barred by Section 232(C). As the Ninth Circuit has trenchantly observed:
To require that the evidence and information possessed by the United States be a mirror image of that in the hands of the qui tam plaintiff would virtually eliminate the bar. On the other hand, to permit the bar to be invoked when the United States possesses only rumors while the qui tam plaintiff has evidence and information would be to permit the bar to repeal effectively much of the False Claims Act. Between these extremes lies the answer.
More precisely, the answer rests in that area where it is possible to say that the evidence and information in the possession of the United States at the time the False Claims Act suit was brought was sufficient to enable it adequately to investigate the case and to make a decision whether to prosecute. 31
The question, properly, then, is whether the information conveyed by the designation transmittal to the Secretary of the Senate could have formed the basis for a governmental decision on prosecution, or could at least have alerted law-enforcement authorities to the likelihood of wrongdoing; quite obviously it could have had no such effect. The designation, filed in accordance with then Senate Rule 43(1), 32 revealed only that Sobsey was authorized to solicit and handle campaign contributions. And because Sobsey could have discharged this function without neglecting his official duties in any way, the Rule 43 filing by itself cannot be deemed to have adequately informed the Government of possible wrongdoing by either Senator Cannon or his aide. Only when combined with appellant's allegation that Sobsey completely disregarded his duties as the Senator's administrative assistant does any possibility of a cause of action emerge. This case thus differs radically from those where the Government possessed comprehensive and crucial evidence prior to initiation of a Section 231 suit. 33 Since the information the Government derived from the Senator's designation was innocuous by itself, we conclude that Section 232(C) does not apply and that the District Court improperly predicated its dismissal of count one upon that provision.
Although we thus disagree with the District Court's jurisdictional analysis, we are nevertheless constrained to hold that dismissal of appellant's first count was appropriate. We recognize, of course, that a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should not be granted "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of this claim which would entitle him to relief." 34 But the stark fact of the matter is that the construction of the Act for which appellant contends the only construction through which appellant could hope to achieve victory would require us to venture far beyond the limits of acceptable judicial action. Consequently, we decline to read the Act as proscribing the particular conduct alleged in appellant's complaint.
We approach our interpretation of the False Claims Act mindful of long-established principles governing the scope of judicial power in our constitutional scheme. We maintain, too, a candid recognition of functional limitations on the ability of the judiciary to deal with certain types of problems. Constitutionally speaking, federal courts may decide only "cases" and "controversies," 35 and while neither of these terms has proven susceptible to precise definition, 36 the courts traditionally have refused to undertake decisions on questions that are ill-suited to judicial resolution. 37 This concept of justiciability appears in many GUISES, 38 AND TRACES ITS ORIGINS BOTH to inherENT LIMItations on the capabilities of judicial tribunals as well as to the separation-of-powers concerns central in our system of government. 39
So it is that so-called political questions are denied...
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