U.S. ex rel. Tyrrell v. Speaker
| Citation | 535 F.2d 823 |
| Decision Date | 21 June 1976 |
| Docket Number | 75-1669,Nos. 75-1668,s. 75-1668 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America ex rel. David TYRRELL v. Fred SPEAKER, former Atty. General of Pa., et al. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit) |
Robert P. Kane, Atty. Gen., Michael von Moschzisker, Deputy Atty. Gen., Eastern Regional Director, Michael Minkin, Deputy Atty. Gen., Com. of Pa., Philadelphia, Pa., for appellant in No. 75-1668.
Mark M. Wilcox, Ralph S. Spritzer, Thomas W. Meiklejohn and Thomas D. Panebianco, Indigent Prisoner Litigation Program, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellee in No. 75-1668 and cross-appellant in No. 75-1669.
Before SEITZ, Chief Judge, and VAN DUSEN and WEIS, Circuit Judges.
The Warden of the State Correctional Institution at Graterford (Warden) 1 appeals from a judgment of $500.00 in favor of Tyrrell, an untried prisoner, who also appeals. While awaiting trial, the prisoner was confined in the above penal institution in administrative segregation from February 10, 1970, until October 20, 1970. We affirm, but direct a reduction of the nominal damages awarded.
The action is based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 2 and the early procedural history of this case is set forth in Judge Biggs' opinion in United States ex rel. Tyrrell v. Speaker, 471 F.2d 1197 (3d Cir. 1973), where we remanded the case for further consideration on a more adequate record.
On January 20, 1970, Tyrrell was lawfully incarcerated in the Delaware County prison awaiting trial on a series of charges, including robbery and the shooting of a police officer (38a). On that date, the plaintiff was seen by William E. Rambo and Samuel LaSpena, two guards at the Delaware County prison, leaving the cell assigned to Raymond Crispt. Rambo and LaSpena observed the plaintiff covered with dust and white powder (38a). Upon investigation, the guards discovered a hole in Crispt's cell, and reported the incident to the Warden (39a).
On January 28, 1970, Warden John I. Gable, of the Delaware County prison, swore to a criminal complaint charging that the plaintiff had attempted to break prison and escape (39a, 305a-06a). On that same day, the criminal complaint, charging the plaintiff with attempting to break prison and escape, and an arrest warrant were issued by Clarence B. Nesbitt, Jr., Justice of the Peace (39a, 205a, 207a).
The following day, January 29, 1970, plaintiff was given a preliminary arraignment on the charge of attempting to break prison and escape (39a). On February 3, 1970, plaintiff was given a preliminary hearing before Justice of the Peace Clarence B. Nesbitt, Jr. on the above charges (39a). At this hearing on February 3, 1970, the plaintiff was represented by counsel, and had the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses who testified against him. Among those witnesses who testified against the plaintiff were Guards Monyar, Joines, Samuel LaSpena, and Warden John I. Gable (129a, 209a). A prima facie case of attempting to break prison and escape was established against Tyrrell and he was held, without bail, for action by the Delaware County Grand Jury (129a, 209a).
On Friday, February 10, 1970, the plaintiff was transferred to the State Correctional Institution at Graterford and placed in administrative segregation (39a). At that time, he was an untried prisoner. On Monday, February 13, 1970, the plaintiff was interviewed by the Behavior Clinic at the State Correctional Institution at Graterford (40a). During the course of that interview, the plaintiff was advised that he was being retained in administrative segregation because of his status as an alleged security risk (40a, 212a). The plaintiff was advised that the prison officials were aware of the charges being brought against him by the Delaware County officials and asked the plaintiff to make a statement. Plaintiff denied that he was attempting to break prison and escape, and reiterated his previous story that he had gone into Raymond Crispt's cell in order to get a cigarette (195-96a, 198a).
The Behavior Clinic recommended, and Rundle approved, plaintiff's retention in administrative segregation at the State Correctional Institution at Graterford (72a, 212a). This decision was based on the facts adduced at the hearing of February 13, 1970 (195-98a, 212a). During the period of plaintiff's confinement in administrative segregation at the State Correctional Institution at Graterford, he spent a total of 70 days at the Delaware County prison, where he was transferred incident to court hearings.
The plaintiff was interviewed on three other occasions by the staff at the State Correctional Institution at Graterford after his initial interview of February 13, 1970. On August 13, 1970, and September 10, 1970, the plaintiff was given the opportunity to speak, but on both occasions declined such opportunity and refused to say anything (193-98a, 40a). On October 20, 1970, the plaintiff was again interviewed and released into the general population at the State Correctional Institution at Graterford, and assigned to Cell Block "C," with employment as a cleaner (40a). This release was apparently due to his status as a convicted prisoner following his conviction on October 9, 1970, of the charges of robbery and the shooting of a policeman. On February 9, 1971, plaintiff was acquitted of the charge of attempted escape (40a).
UNCONVICTED 3 PRISONER.
Defendant Rundle challenges this Finding 10 as clearly erroneous (see F.R.Civ.P. 52):
"Plaintiff was placed in 'B-Block Gallery, Administrative Segregation' because he was a pretrial detainee or untried prisoner and not because he was determined to be a security risk at Graterford."
However, we reject this contention in view of these items of the record:
A. Paragraph 2 of the Fourth Affirmative Defense in defendant's answer states, inter alia:
" . . . the defendants aver that the plaintiff was placed in administrative segregation because of his status as an untried and unconvicted prisoner." (41a) B. Paragraph 1 of FURTHER STIPULATIONS OF FACT (71a) recites:
C. In answers to interrogatories 5 and 10(a) filed April 24, 1973 (Document 16 in Civil No. 71-939, E.D.Pa.), the defendant stated:
D. Plaintiff was released into the general prison population on October 20, 1970, after conviction for the charges on which he was arrested but prior to his February 1971 acquittal of the attempted prison break charge (15 at 40a).
The district court was justified in concluding that the release described under D above prior to disposition of the prison breach charge was inconsistent with defendant's contention that plaintiff was placed and retained in administrative segregation because he was a security risk.
The defense contends that, despite the uncontradicted admissions in the interrogatories and stipulations, the district court should have found that although plaintiff's original placement in administrative segregation was because of a policy to place untried prisoners in such segregated status, his retention there was because he was a security risk. It is difficult to understand how the defense can assert such an argument on appeal when it chose not to offer any evidence from a Warden or Assistant Warden contrary to the admissions and stipulations referred to in A-C above. The record did not give the district court the alternative of making a factual finding on this issue
different from the one challenged here. II. CONCLUSION THAT
SEGREGATION IN A STATE PRISON VIOLATED
HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.
The record supports the description in Finding 11 that the living conditions of prisoners in the administrative segregation on B-Gallery, where plaintiff was confined, were significantly more restricted than those of the general prison population. 4
We affirm the district court's holding that the state violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in arbitrarily imposing materially greater restrictions on the freedom of this pre-trial detainee than those imposed on convicted prisoners at Graterford, since the only legitimate state interest in the detention of an accused who cannot raise bail is in guaranteeing his presence at trial. 5 Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974), affirming 371 F.Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y.1974); Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F.Supp. 676, 688 (D.Mass.1973), aff'd, 494 F.2d 1196 (1st Cir. 1974). See also Wolff v. McDonald, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2975-76, 41 L.Ed.2d 935, 951-52 (1974); Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 94 S.Ct. 791, 39 L.Ed.2d 52 (1974); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 167-71, 93 S.Ct. 705, 733-36, 35 L.Ed.2d 147, 193-95 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 502-07, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 1691-94, 14 L.Ed.2d 510, 525-28 (1965) (White, J., concurring). 6
In Rhem, supra, the court said at page 336 of 507 F.2d:
"The demands . . . of due process prohibit depriving pre-trial detainees of the rights of other citizens to a greater extent than necessary to assure appearance at trial and security of the jail; and the same constitutional provisions prevent unjustifiable confinement of detainees under worse conditions than convicted prisoners."
Numerous district court cases, including the following, have...
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