U.S. ex rel. Goddard v. Vaughn

Decision Date12 February 1980
Docket NumberNo. 79-1395,79-1395
Citation614 F.2d 929
PartiesUNITED STATES of America ex rel. Regent GODDARD, Appellant, v. James T. VAUGHN, Superintendent, Delaware Correctional Center, Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Richard E. Fairbanks, Jr., Asst. Public Defender (argued), Wilmington, Del., for appellant.

Francis A. Reardon, Deputy Atty. Gen. (argued), Dept. of Justice, Wilmington, Del., for appellee.

Before HUNTER, WEIS and GARTH, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

WEIS, Circuit Judge.

The question in this appeal is whether a state may place the burden of proving voluntary intoxication on an accused who invokes it as a defense to a crime requiring specific intent. We find no constitutional prohibition to such a statutory allocation of the onus probandi and affirm the denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by a state prisoner convicted of first degree murder.

A Delaware state court convicted the petitioner of first degree murder, first degree rape, and first degree conspiracy. He is serving sentences of life imprisonment for the murder and rape convictions and 30 years for the conspiracy count. After exhausting state remedies, he sought a writ of habeas corpus in the federal district court only with respect to the conviction for murder. 1 After reviewing records of the state proceedings, the court denied the petition.

In February of 1976, the petitioner, then 18 years of age, and two other youths, Robert W. Jones, Jr., the petitioner's codefendant in state court, and Carey Dale Shirk, were living on the second floor of a farmhouse in Smyrna, Delaware. Goddard and Jones had rented the rooms from a third party while the owner, a woman over 70 years of age, was away. When she returned a week after the premises had been rented, Goddard suggested to his roommates that they kill her to avoid paying rent. The three youths then went to a pool hall for about two hours. When they came back to the farmhouse, Goddard again proposed that they lure the landlady to their rooms and kill her. After instructing his roommates to hide, he went to the first floor and persuaded the woman to accompany him upstairs. After she entered the rooms, he attacked her. Shirk fled, but Jones remained in an adjoining room. Goddard then bound, raped, and strangled the woman.

Jones came into the room as Goddard finished killing his victim and assisted in disposing of her body. They placed the corpse in the trunk of the victim's car and, with Goddard at the wheel, drove to Elkton, Maryland. There, they concealed the body in a wooded area.

At trial, the petitioner testified that he had taken LSD and smoked marijuana and "angel dust" shortly before the murder. He contended that as a result he was hallucinating and never consciously intended to kill the victim. Jones and Shirk testified that to their knowledge Goddard had not used any drugs on the day of the killing, and in their opinion he was not intoxicated. Jones stated that Goddard was "(p)retty calm" and acted "like he knew what he was doing."

The trial judge charged the jury that voluntary intoxication was available as a defense only if it was "such as to make it impossible for (Goddard) to have the state of mind required for (the) offense ((first degree murder)). In this case, the relevant state of mind was the intent to kill the alleged victim." If the defendant was able to prove the necessary degree of intoxication by a preponderance of the evidence, then the jury was told to consider whether he was guilty of second degree murder or manslaughter. 2

The court also charged that to find the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree, the jury had to find two elements: (1) that the defendant caused the death of the victim, and (2) that the "defendant acted intentionally; that is, it must have been the defendant's conscious object or purpose to cause death . . . . If after considering all of the evidence, you find that the State has established beyond a reasonable doubt that either defendant acted in such a manner as to satisfy all the elements, which I have just stated, at or about the date and place stated in the indictment, you should find the defendant guilty of Murder in the First Degree."

Instructions were also given with respect to the lesser degrees of murder and manslaughter, specifying that the state had the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Near the conclusion of the charge, the judge said:

"You should, however, keep in mind that at all times it's the defendant's state of mind which is at issue here, and in order to convict the defendant, you are required to find beyond a reasonable doubt that he in fact had the intention and/or recklessness required for guilt."

The Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed Goddard's conviction over his contention that the instructions concerning the intoxication defense violated due process by relieving the state of its obligation to prove each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The court found that the charge met federal constitutional standards on the burden of proof articulated in Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977). Goddard v. State, 382 A.2d 238 (Del.1977). The habeas court, however, read the charge as placing the burden on the petitioner to negate intent, an essential element of first degree murder, counter to Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975). Nevertheless, the district judge refused to grant the writ, deciding that in light of the overwhelming evidence of the petitioner's guilt, the erroneous instruction was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."

The issue in this case is whether Delaware was constitutionally prohibited from requiring the petitioner to prove the affirmative defense of voluntary intoxication by a preponderance of the evidence. Phrased differently, once the defense of intoxication had been raised, was the prosecutor required to prove its absence? In charging the jury on intoxication, the trial judge faithfully followed the provisions of the Delaware Criminal Code, so necessarily we must pass upon their validity. Resolution of the question requires a brief review of the relevant statutes and a consideration of several leading cases on the burden of proof in criminal trials, including In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970); Mullaney v. Wilbur, supra ; and Patterson v. New York, supra. We turn first to the statutory framework.

I.

At the time Goddard committed his crime, § 421 of the Delaware Criminal Code recognized the defense of voluntary intoxication "if it negative(d) the element of intentional or intentionally." 59 Del. Laws c. 203, § 37 (1973), amending 58 Del. Laws c. 497, § 1 (1972). 3 Section 304 of the Code provides that when an "affirmative" defense is raised, the defendant must establish it by a preponderance of the evidence. The burden of proof on the state in every criminal case is governed by § 301(b). It provides: "No person may be convicted of an offense unless each element of the offense is proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 301(b) (Michie 1979).

The petitioner was charged with first degree murder, "intentionally caus(ing) the death of another person." Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 636(a)(1) (Michie 1979). Although the defense of voluntary intoxication was available to counter the element of "intentionally," it could not negative the mental state of recklessness inherent in lesser degrees of homicide where the intoxicant's effect was merely to make the accused unaware that he had created a risk sufficient to satisfy that standard. See note 3 supra ; 11 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 231(c) (Michie 1979) (definition of recklessness); Model Penal Code § 2.08, comment 3, at 9 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959). Thus, under the Criminal Code, voluntary intoxication only served to make what otherwise would have constituted first degree murder a reduced grade of homicide, where recklessness or some less culpable state of mind is all that is required. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §§ 231 (definitions regarding state of mind), 635 (second degree murder), 632 (manslaughter), and 631 (criminally negligent homicide) (Michie 1979). Against this statutory background, we must consider the relevant Supreme Court pronouncements on the burden of proof.

II.

In In re Winship, supra, the Supreme Court held that "the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime." 397 U.S. at 364, 90 S.Ct. at 1073. Five years later, in Mullaney v. Wilbur, supra, the Court reviewed the habeas corpus appeal of a defendant convicted of first degree murder by the Maine courts. The trial court had charged that malice aforethought was an essential and indispensable element of murder and was inconsistent with the defense of heat of passion on sudden provocation. The jury was further instructed that if the prosecution established that the homicide was both intentional and unlawful, malice aforethought was to be conclusively implied unless the defendant proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence that he acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation.

Noting that malice aforethought distinguished murder from lesser degrees of felonious homicide, Mullaney held that by placing the burden on the defendant to establish the converse, the state had violated his right to due process. In the Court's judgment, this persuasion-shifting arrangement relieved the prosecution of its constitutional obligation to establish every fact critical to a greater degree of culpability. See 421 U.S. at 696-701, 95 S.Ct. at 1888-1890. In a concurring opinion, Justice Rehnquist wrote that he saw no inconsistency between the result reached by the majority and the Court's opinion in Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 72 S.Ct. 1002, 96 L.Ed. 1302 (1952), where...

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