U.S. Inv. and Development Corp. v. Cruz

Decision Date02 January 1986
Docket NumberNos. 85-1388,85-1480,s. 85-1388
PartiesUNITED STATES INVESTMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. Antone B. CRUZ, Jr., Paul Mathieu, Francis O. Quinn, Chester L. Rymszewicz, and Normand Maranda, as they constitute the New Bedford Housing Authority, Ralph E. Moore, as he is the Superintendent of Buildings of the City of New Bedford, a municipal corporation, and the United States of America Department of Housing and Urban Development, Defendants, Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

David L. Goodhue, Boston, Mass., for appellants.

Richard Welch, III, Boston, Mass., Philip N. Beauregard, Fairhaven, Mass., John Letourneau, New Bedford, Mass., for appellees.

Before BREYER and TORRUELLA, Circuit Judges, and HILL, * District Judge.

TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge.

These appeals arise from the dismissal for lack of prosecution of a twelve year old law suit. The appellant United States Investment and Development Corporation ("USIDC") is a private developer who entered an agreement to build a federally-funded housing project in New Bedford, Massachusetts. When the city of New Bedford refused to issue the necessary building permit, USIDC filed a suit in equity seeking declaratory and injunctive relief that would enable it to continue with the project. The complaint, filed in May, 1973, named as defendants Ralph Moore, Superintendent of Buildings of the City of New Bedford ("Moore"); the City itself; the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD"); and individual members of the New Bedford Housing Authority. The complaint did not specifically name as a defendant the Housing Authority itself; however, USIDC's prayer sought judgment against the Housing Authority.

In May 1975, the Bristol Superior Court dismissed from the suit the individual members of the Housing Authority. Three years later in 1978, USIDC filed a motion to amend the complaint. The amended complaint sought to add many new facts as well as new causes of action for breach of contract and money damages. Moreover, the motion to amend the complaint sought to rename as defendants the Housing Authority's members. The motion was denied.

In October 1984, in its second motion to amend before the Bristol Superior Court, USIDC for the first time attempted to add the Housing Authority itself as a defendant. USIDC also repeated its 1974 tactic of attempting to add new facts and new causes of action, both for breach of contract and sounding in tort. This second motion to amend had not been adjudicated when the case was subsequently removed to federal court at HUD's request. It was after such removal that, on January 30, 1985, the federal district court denied the motion to amend.

On March 27, 1985, a hearing was held on HUD's motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, and also, on a motion by the Housing Authority for final judgment. 1 In a bench ruling, the court granted HUD's motion to dismiss on dual grounds of failure to state a cause of action and failure to prosecute, and granted the Housing Authority's motion for final judgment. On June 11, 1985, the court granted the motions to dismiss the two remaining defendants, Moore and the City of New Bedford, for failure to prosecute. USIDC seeks review of these orders.

The appellant's first claim of error is that the district court abused its discretion in denying USIDC's motion to amend filed in October of 1984. The district court clearly has broad discretion in ruling on a motion to amend the pleadings. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 330, 91 S.Ct. 795, 802, 28 L.Ed.2d 77 (1971); Johnston v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 595 F.2d 890, 896 (1st Cir.1979). The federal rules specify that such discretion should be exercised in favor of allowing amendment "when justice so requires." Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a).

The district court's order and memorandum of March 27, 1985, evinces due consideration of the relevant factors in deciding whether justice would be served by allowing amendment in this instance. The court noted that the amended complaint added new causes of action in contract and tort, alleged new facts, and requested monetary damages. It further noted that a similar motion to amend had been denied six years earlier when the case was still in state court.

As we have noted before, when "a considerable period of time has passed between the filing of the complaint and the motion to amend, courts have placed the burden upon the movant to show some valid reason for his neglect and delay." Hayes v. New England Millwork Distributors, Inc., 602 F.2d 15, 19-20 (1st Cir.1979); Tiernan v. Blyth, Eastman, Dillon & Co., 719 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir.1983). It cannot be gainsaid that a "considerable period" of time has elapsed here. The original complaint was filed in 1973. The first unsuccessful motion to amend, naming the Housing Authority as a defendant, was filed in 1978. The second motion to amend, seeking essentially the same amendments as the 1978 motion, was filed in 1984. After careful perusal of the appellant's argument, we agree with the district court that the USIDC has failed to meet its burden of showing some valid reason for its delay. Nor has USIDC convinced us that we should reach a different result from that ordered by the state court six years earlier on essentially the same motion. Accordingly, we...

To continue reading

Request your trial
5 cases
  • Rodriguez v. Doral Mortg. Corp., 94-2227
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit
    • April 4, 1995
    ...see, e.g., Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp. v. Garrity Oil Co., 884 F.2d 1510, 1517-18 (1st Cir.1989); United States Inv. & Dev. Corp. v. Cruz, 780 F.2d 166, 168 (1st Cir.1986). A host of other factors also may be relevant and may compound the decisionmaker's difficulties. See, e.g., Foman v. Da......
  • In re Williams
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island
    • December 7, 1998
    ...("Dismissal of an appeal is warranted in instances involving bad faith, negligence or indifference."); cf. United States Inv. & Dev. Corp. v. Cruz, 780 F.2d 166, 168 (1st Cir.1986) (stating the general rule that dismissal is a proper sanction for failure to prosecute "when necessary to prev......
  • In re Williams, C.A. No. 97-590L (D. R.I. 12/__/1998)
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island
    • December 1, 1998
    ...("Dismissal of an appeal is warranted in instances involving bad faith, negligence or indifference."); cf. United States Inv. & Dev. Corp. v. Cruz, 780 F.2d 166, 168 (1st Cir. 1986) (stating the general rule that dismissal is a proper sanction for failure to prosecute "when necessary to pre......
  • Cosme Nieves v. Deshler, 86-2032
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit
    • May 8, 1987
    ...ignorance of warnings, contumacious conduct, or some other aggravating circumstance. See, e.g., United States Investment and Development Corp. v. Cruz, 780 F.2d 166, 168 (1st Cir.1986) (dismissal after years of inaction); Colokathis v. Wentworth-Douglass Hosp., 693 F.2d 7, 9 (1st Cir.1982) ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT