U.S. Postal Service v. American Postal Union
| Decision Date | 22 March 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. Civ.A.98-1355-A.,Civ.A.98-1355-A. |
| Citation | 46 F.Supp.2d 457 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia |
| Parties | UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, Plaintiff, v. AMERICAN POSTAL WORKERS UNION, AFL — CIO, Defendant. |
Helen F. Fahey, Dennis E. Szybala, U.S. Attorney's Office, Alexandria, VA, for United States Postal Service, plaintiff.
Peter Joshua Leff, O'Donnell, Schwartz & Anderson, PC, Washington, DC, for American Postal Workers Union, AFL — CIO, defendant.
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's and Defendant's Motions for Summary Judgment.
Plaintiff, the United States Postal Service ("USPS") and Defendant, the American Postal Workers Union ("APWU"), are parties to a collective bargaining agreement known as the National Agreement ("Agreement"). Article 15.1 of the Agreement contains a comprehensive grievance arbitration procedure for the resolution of any "dispute, difference, disagreement or complaint between the parties related to wages, hours, and conditions of employment." The final step of this procedure is binding arbitration. In the event that a dispute proceeds to this final step, Article 15.5.A(6) provides that the arbitrator's decisions "shall be limited to the terms and provisions of this Agreement, and in no event may the terms and provisions of this Agreement be altered, amended, or modified by an arbitrator." While Article 15 provides most postal employees access to the grievance arbitration procedure, Article 12.1.A specifically exempts probationary employees from this procedure.1
Huong Hoang was employed by the USPS as a window clerk in Arlington, Virginia. During Ms. Hoang's probationary period the USPS notified her that she had been rated "unsatisfactory" in her last probationary period evaluation and that she would be separated from the USPS the following day.
Notwithstanding the language in Article 12.1.A of the Agreement, the APWU filed a grievance on Hoang's behalf, challenging her separation. The APWU claimed that the process used to effect the separation did not comply with certain provisions of the USPS' Employee and Labor Relations Manual ("ELM"), arguably incorporated into the Agreement via Article 19.2 Specifically, the APWU contended that Hoang's separation was not effected because the proper USPS official did not initiate the separation, as is required by ELM 365.325, and because the notice provided Hoang did not contain "conclusions as to the inadequacies of performance or conduct," as is required by ELM 365.326. Because separation was not properly effected due to the defects of the USPS, the APWU contended that Hoang's separation must be effected as a removal pursuant to Article 16 of the Agreement, as is required by ELM 365.323. The USPS denied the APWU's grievance at all steps of the grievance procedure, and the APWU appealed the matter to arbitration.
Arbitrator Christopher Miles heard the case on April 7, 1998. The USPS challenged the arbitrator's authority to hear the matter, and the parties bifurcated the case. As a result, the only issue before Arbitrator Miles was the arbitrability of a grievance challenging the separation of a probationary employee. Arbitrator Miles found the grievance arbitrable. Specifically, he found that:
"Article 12, Section 1 of the Agreement entitles the Postal Service to terminate probationary employees prior to the expiration of their probationary period; however, in taking such action, the Postal Service must do so in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Agreement; i.e., Section 365.32 of the ELM."
The USPS now appeals this determination. Their Complaint seeks declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to Section 1208(b) of the Postal Reorganization Act, 39 U.S.C. § 1208(b), vacating Arbitrator Miles' award as beyond the arbitrator's authority. The APWU counterclaims for the entry of an Order enforcing and directing the USPS to comply with the Miles' award, and granting a permanent injunction prohibiting the USPS from violating the Agreement by failing to comply with the Miles' award. Further, the APWU prays for an Order requiring the USPS to pay in full the APWU's attorneys' fees and costs.
Both sides have now moved for summary judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. See FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c). Once a motion for summary judgment is properly made and supported, the opposing party has the burden of showing that a genuine dispute exists. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). A material fact in dispute appears when its existence or nonexistence could lead a jury to different outcomes. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A genuine issue exists when there is sufficient evidence on which a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party. See id. Unsupported speculation is not enough to withstand a motion for summary judgment. See Ash v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 800 F.2d 409, 411-12 (4th Cir. 1986). Summary judgment is appropriate when, after discovery, a party has failed to make a "showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Both sides agree that this case involves no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that summary judgment is appropriate. They disagree, however, about the interpretation of the Agreement.
As a matter of Federal labor policy, arbitration is the favored means of resolving labor disputes. See 29 U.S.C. § 173(d). Accordingly, an arbitration award should be sustained if it "draws its essence" from the collective bargaining agreement. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960). Further, disputes are presumed arbitrable. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960) ( ). The Fourth Circuit has recognized that judicial review of arbitration awards is "among the narrowest known to the law" and "every presumption is in favor of the validity of the award." Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. Transportation Communications Int'l Union, 973 F.2d 276, 278 (4th Cir. 1992).
Despite the preference courts express in favor of deferring to arbitration awards, courts will review and set-aside awards, when appropriate, based upon a number of grounds. For instance, courts will review arbitration decisions for a "manifest disregard of law." American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Serv., 682 F.2d 1280, 1284 (9th Cir.1982). The Federal Arbitration Act provides additional grounds for vacating awards, including fraud, arbitrator bias or misconduct, procedural unfairness, and the ground that the arbitrator exceeded his authority. See 9 U.S.C. § 10.3
Most significantly, courts will review arbitration awards to insure that the arbitrator based his decision on an interpretation of the parties' contract rather than on his own "brand of industrial justice." Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 597, 80 S.Ct. 1358. Thus, courts will decline to enforce awards which are so arbitrary as to be without rational basis. See United States Postal Serv. v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 847 F.2d 775, 778 (11th Cir.1988). The issue of whether a dispute is subject to arbitration, and thus within the arbitrator's power to consider, is a matter strictly for judicial, rather than arbitral, determination. See AT & T Techs., Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 649, 106 S.Ct. 1415, 89 L.Ed.2d 648 (1986).
The USPS argues that in concluding that he could hear the merits of a probationary employee's discharge, Arbitrator Miles altered the meaning of Article 12.1.A, which the USPS claims clearly and unequivocally denies probationary employees all access to the grievance-arbitration procedure in relation to their separation. Since altering the meaning of any provision of the Agreement is forbidden by Article 15.5.A(6), the USPS claims there was no rational basis for Miles' decision. Instead, the USPS contends, Miles dispensed his own "brand of industrial justice" in arriving at a decision which directly contradicts the parties' Agreement.
The APWU asserts that they do not challenge the USPS' right to separate Ms. Hoang from the USPS during her probationary period, but that they do challenge whether Ms. Hoang was actually separated during her probationary period. It is the APWU's argument that Arbitrator Miles did not exceed his authority under the Agreement because Article 12 does not even apply in Ms. Hoang's situation. For Article 12 to apply, APWU argues, it first must be determined whether the probationary employee was actually separated. The determination about whether the employee was separated, the APWU contends, is a matter subject to arbitration due to the incorporation of the ELM provisions into the Agreement through Article 19. Further, given the presumption of arbitrability and the courts' considerable deference to arbitration awards, the APWU argues that the Miles' award must be upheld.
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US. Postal Serv. v. Am. Postal Workers Union, AFL-CI
...district court vacated the award on the ground that the arbitrator exceeded his authority. See United States Postal Serv. v. American Postal Workers Union, 46 F. Supp. 2d 457 (E.D. Va. 1999). Because the arbitrator completely rewrote the collective bargaining agreement by creating a new cla......