U.S. Residential Mgmt. & Dev., LLC v. Head
| Citation | 922 N.E.2d 1,337 Ill. Dec. 143 |
| Decision Date | 18 December 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. 1-08-3531.,1-08-3531. |
| Parties | U.S. RESIDENTIAL MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, LLC, as Property Manager for the Chicago Housing Authority, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Michael HEAD, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Richard W. Christoff of Sanford Kahn, Ltd., Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Lawrence D. Wood, Miriam Hallbauer, Carolyn Norton of Legal Assistance Foundation of Metropolitan Chicago, Chicago, IL, for Defendant-Appellee.
Plaintiff U.S. Residential Management & Development, LLC, appeals from an order granting defendant Michael Head's combined motion to suppress and motion to dismiss in a forcible entry and detainer action. On appeal, plaintiff asserts that the circuit court improperly granted defendant's motion to suppress the evidence of defendant's drug-related criminal conduct and motion to dismiss on the basis that the exclusionary rule should not apply to plaintiff's possessory action. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court and remand for further proceedings.
On October 15, 2006, defendant was arrested in his rental residence at the Lathrop Homes public housing development for possessing cannabis in violation of section 550/4(d) of the Cannabis Control Act. 720 ILCS 550/4(d) (West 2006). Plaintiff managed the premises on behalf of the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA). Defendant's lease with plaintiff required him to refrain from engaging in any drug-related criminal activity on or off CHA premises and to keep persons under his control from engaging in any criminal activity. The lease would be terminated if there was any drug-related criminal activity on or off the premises by the resident, any family member of the household, or a guest.
CHA and the Chicago police department (CPD) were parties to an intergovernmental agreement. Pursuant to the agreement, CPD provided supplemental police services for CHA properties, including: dedicated watches, increased foot patrols, customized policing strategies, and the monitoring and prevention of gang and other illegal activities. In addition, CPD provided statistics and relevant data, including reports of the activities of the assigned officers to CHA.
CPD and CHA also shared information through established procedures about public housing residents who were arrested for committing drug-related crimes. Generally, CPD provided case reports to CHA regarding arrests on CHA properties. CHA would then complete a notice of arrest and send it to the property manager, in this case plaintiff. Plaintiff could then serve the tenant with written notice of CHA's decision to terminate the lease agreement. In exchange for these services, CHA paid CPD up to $6 million per year.
On March 9, 2007, the State dropped the criminal charges against defendant. On August 14, 2007, CHA sent plaintiff notice of defendant's arrest. Ten days later, on August 24, 2007, plaintiff sent defendant notice of its decision to terminate the lease agreement. On September 7, 2007, plaintiff filed its complaint against defendant for possession of the premises pursuant to section 9-118 of the Forcible Entry and Detainer Act (735 ILCS 5/9-118 (West 2006)) (the Act). On June 25, 2008, defendant filed his combined motion to suppress the evidence of his drug-related criminal conduct under the exclusionary rule and motion to dismiss.
On December 8, 2008, the circuit court held that the evidence of defendant's crime was seized by the arresting officers in violation of the fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. Plaintiff does not dispute this finding on appeal. In support of its holding, the circuit court reasoned that the arresting officers conducted their search without a warrant, lacked probable cause to search the premises because they were relying on information provided by an informant whom they had never before seen and whose gender they could not even remember, and that even if the officers had probable cause (which they did not), no exigent circumstances justified the warrantless search.
Next, the circuit court found that the exclusionary rule barred the admission of the illegally seized evidence. The circuit court held that the proceeding was quasi-criminal because defendant was facing eviction for unlawful drug-related activity, plaintiff filed suit under section 9-118 of the Act (a statutory provision that applies only to criminal activity), and the proposed sanction was harsh. Moreover, the circuit court reasoned that even if the forcible entry and detainer action was a purely civil proceeding, the exclusionary rule may be extended to such proceedings when its application would deter the police from committing future violations of the fourth amendment. The circuit court reasoned that CPD and CHA followed an established procedure for sharing information about public housing residents who were arrested for drug-related crimes, and that the two agencies were parties to a formal written contract that required CPD to provide CHA with supplemental policing services designed to combat the very activity for which defendant was arrested. The circuit court found that given the relationship between CPD and CHA, suppressing the illegally seized evidence in this case would deter the police from committing future fourth amendment violations. As such, the circuit court granted defendant's motion to suppress and dismissed the action with prejudice because plaintiff could not establish defendant violated his lease agreement without the illegally seized evidence. This appeal was timely filed.
On appeal, plaintiff contends that the circuit court improperly granted defendant's motion to suppress evidence, arguing that the exclusionary rule does not apply to plaintiff's forcible entry and detainer action. Plaintiff asserts that because this action is a purely civil proceeding, and not a criminal or quasi-criminal proceeding, the circuit court improperly applied the exclusionary rule. Plaintiff also asserts that the societal costs of excluding evidence of defendant's drug-related criminal conduct in this action greatly outweigh any minimal deterrent benefit upon the police.
In reviewing an appeal from a circuit court's ruling on a motion to suppress, we apply a two-part standard of review. People v. Salinas, 383 Ill.App.3d 481, 490, 322 Ill.Dec. 593, 891 N.E.2d 884 (2008). First, the circuit court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error and will only be reversed if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Salinas, 383 Ill.App.3d at 490, 322 Ill.Dec. 593, 891 N.E.2d 884. Second, the circuit court's ultimate decision as to whether suppression is warranted is reviewed de novo. Salinas, 383 Ill.App.3d at 490, 322 Ill.Dec. 593, 891 N.E.2d 884. In this case, neither party challenges any of the circuit court's factual determinations. Accordingly, the sole issue before this court is plaintiff's legal challenge to the circuit court's application of the exclusionary rule, which we review de novo.
The first issue on appeal is whether actions brought pursuant to the Forcible Entry and Detainer Act constitute quasi-criminal proceedings. The Act "sets forth a mechanism for the peaceful adjudication of possession rights in the trial court." Circle Management, LLC v. Olivier, 378 Ill.App.3d 601, 608, 317 Ill. Dec. 555, 882 N.E.2d 129 (2007). "`The distinct purpose of the forcible entry and detainer proceeding is to determine only who should be in rightful possession.'" Circle Management, LLC, 378 Ill.App.3d at 609, 317 Ill.Dec. 555, 882 N.E.2d 129, quoting Miller v. Daley, 131 Ill.App.3d 959, 961, 87 Ill.Dec. 51, 476 N.E.2d 753 (1985). In other words, "[a] forcible entry and detainer action is a limited proceeding, focusing on the central issue of possession." American National Bank v. Powell, 293 Ill.App.3d 1033, 1044, 229 Ill.Dec. 439, 691 N.E.2d 1162 (1997). "The only questions that are to be answered in such a proceeding concern which party is entitled to immediate possession and whether a defense that is germane to the distinctive purpose of the action defeats plaintiff's asserted right to possession." Subway Restaurants, Inc. v. Riggs, 297 Ill.App.3d 284, 287, 231 Ill.Dec. 437, 696 N.E.2d 733 (1998). Our supreme court recognized that a forcible entry and detainer action "is a civil proceeding to obtain restitution of premises of which the plaintiff is unjustly deprived." West Side Trust & Savings Bank v. Lopoten, 358 Ill. 631, 637, 193 N.E. 462 (1934).
Under section 9-118 of the Act, the housing authority may initiate emergency housing eviction proceedings against a tenant for possession of the premises if "there is direct evidence of * * * unlawful[ly] possessing * * * cannabis * * * within or upon the premises by or with the knowledge and consent of, or in concert with the person or persons named in the complaint." 735 ILCS 5/9-118(b)(2)(A) (West 2006). Plaintiff's complaint did not request a penalty, a forfeiture of defendant's personalty, or a fine from defendant, but instead only sought to invoke its right under the Act to regain possession of the premises. As such, because the Act's purpose is to settle disputes about possession of real property — and not to punish defendant — we hold that forcible entry and detainer actions are not quasi-criminal in nature.
In finding that plaintiff's action was quasi-criminal, the circuit court reasoned that defendant was facing eviction for unlawful drug-related activity, noting that the statute only applied to criminal activity, and that the proposed sanction was harsh. While the circuit court did not indicate its basis for finding this action to be quasi-criminal, defendant suggests that One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 85 S.Ct. 1246, 14 L.Ed.2d 170 (1965),...
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