U.S. Steel Corp. v. Save Sand Key, Inc.

• Decision Date: 12 June 1974
• Docket Number: No. 44402,44402
• Citation: 303 So.2d 9
• Parties: UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation, Petitioner, v. SAVE SAND KEY, INC., a nonprofit Florida corporation, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 9

303 So.2d 9

UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation, Petitioner, v. SAVE SAND KEY, INC., a nonprofit Florida corporation, Respondent.

No. 44402.

Supreme Court of Florida.

June 12, 1974.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 4, 1974.

Dennis P. Thompson of Richards, Nodine, Gilkey, Fite, Meyer & Thompson, Clearwater and William F. McGowan, Jr., and Thomas A. Clark, of Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emmanuel, Smith & Cutler, Tampa, for petitioners.

Tom R. Moore, Clearwater, for respondent.

ROBERTS, Justice.

This cause is before us on certiorari granted to review the decision of the District Court of Appeal, Second District, reported at 281 So.2d 572 (Fla.App.1973), which directly conflicts with this Court's decision in Sarasota County Angelers Club, Inc. v. Kirk, 200 So.2d 178 (Fla.1967), thus vesting jurisdiction in this Court. Article V, Section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution, 1973, F.S.A.

The Attorney General of this State and respondent, Save Sand Key, a non-profit Florida corporation organized for the specific purpose of securing for the public use as much as possible of Sand Key, a gulf-front island in Pinellas County owned by petitioner, United States Steel Corporation, filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against petitioner. In its action, Save Sand Key sought to enjoin United States Steel from interfering with certain alleged rights of the public generally, including individual members of the plaintiff corporation, to use a portion of the soft sand beach area of Sand Key. Such rights to the public use of United States Steel's lands were alleged to have been acquired by the public by prescription, implied dedication and/or general and local custom. Inter alia, respondent alleged that petitioner recently commenced construction of rental and high-rise condominium apartment buildings based upon its development plan for Sand Key, that petitioner has fenced portions of Sand Key around its present construction sites which alleged effectively and substantially prohibits and interfers with the rights of the public to the full use and enjoyment of the tract. Respondent by its complaint sought injunctive relief from any future acts which interfere with, impair or impede the exercise of the public's rights and from an alleged public nuisance in the form of a purpresture blocking enjoyment of those rights.

United States Steel moved to dismiss the complaint as filed by Save Sand Key, Inc. alleging, inter alia, that Save Sand Key had no standing to sue because it did not allege a special injury differing in kind from injury to the general public and because the respondent (plaintiff below) corporation was not itself claiming any right or title to the United States Steel's lands and was therefore not a real party in interest.

Upon consideration of the briefs, the arguments, the statutes and the authorities governing the issue, the trial court determined that Save Sand Key, Inc. lacked standing to bring this lawsuit. In his order dismissing the complaint as to Save Sand Key, Inc., the trial judge explained:

'Paragraph 6 alleges: 'Save Sand Key, Inc. is a nonprofit Florida corporation organized for the specific purpose of securing for public use as much as possible of Sand Key . . .' The question before the Court is whether a group of people can organize a private nonprofit corporation and seek relief for members of the public in the name of that corporation. This precise question was before the Court in Sarasota County Anglers Club, Inc. v. Burns, (Fla.App.,) 193 So.2d 691 (1st DCA--1967), certiorari denied, (Fla.,) 200 So.2d 178 (1967). In this case, an identical-type corporation was organized and suit was filed against the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund and a landowner in Sarasota County. Plaintiffs prayed 'for a declaratory decree and injunctive relief . . . abating the alleged purpresture and nuisance, and that the land in question be declared to be impressed with a public easement for boating, bathing, navigation, fishing and other public uses . . .' (page 692). The appellate court held, on page 693: 'The plaintiffs are not in a position to maintain this action.' This case is controlling precedent in Florida as to the question of standing of Save Sand Key, Inc. Further, the Court is persuaded by Florida Rule 1.210, RCP, (30 F.S.A.) that the parties who would be injured would be the proper persons to bring an action upon the facts alleged by Plaintiff Save Sand Key, Inc.; they would be the 'real party in interest'.'

As indicated by the decision of the District Court of Appeal, Second District, the court refused to dismiss the Attorney General permitting him to pursue the action insofar as it pertains to the alleged public nuisance; however, the Attorney General has taken a voluntary non-suit.

The District Court of Appeal reversed the order of dismissal and specifically stated:

'Necessarily, of course, that must be the holding of the lower court in this case. But we perceive a more profound and complex problem here. The full question to be answered in this case is whether an organization such as appellant which asserts certain vested property rights in the public generally, and thus derivatively in its members individually, can sue to enforce or protect those rights on behalf of those of its members who are personally aggrieved by an intrusion thereon, even though such rights are non-special and are enjoyable in common with every other member of the public.'

Sub judice, the District Court explicated:

'We think it's time to say, therefore, that the 'special injury' concept serves no valid purpose in the present structure of the law and should no longer be a viable expedient to the disposition of these cases. . . .

'Summarizing our conclusions, then, we hold first, that a person who is entitled to enjoyment of a right or who directly and personally suffers or is about to suffer an injury may sue for relief or redress whether or not such right or injury is special to him or is shared in common with the public generally. Secondly, we hold that a bona fide non-profit organization may sue for and on behalf of some or all of its members who have been or will be directly and personally aggrieved in some manner relating to and within the scope of the interests represented and advanced by such organization. Finally, we hold, within the rationale of City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, supra, (now pending in Supreme Court) that facts and circumstances are alleged which, if true, are sufficient to support a finding that there exist enforceable prescriptive rights in the public to the soft sand area of Sand Key.'

The District Court also expressly receded from and overruled those portions of Askew v. Hold the Bulkhead--Save Our Bays, 269 So.2d 696 (Fla.App.2d, 1972) which conflicts with its instant decision.

With all due respect, we comment as we did in Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.2d 431 (Fla.1973) and Gilliam, et al. v. Stewart, et al., Fla., 291 So.2d 593 opin. filed Jan. 10, 1974, that it is not the province of the District Court of Appeal to recede from decisions of this Court. A much better solution would be to follow the decisions of the Supreme Court and then certify the cause as being one of great public interest in order to facilitate a re-examination of the decision of this Court in question.

We adhere to our decision in Sarasota County Anglers Club, Inc. v. Kirk, supra, wherein, upon certification by the District Court of Appeal, First District, of their decision in Sarasota County Anglers Club v. Burns, 193 So.2d 691 (Fla.App.1967), we adopted their opinion as the decision of this Court, and, therefore, we reverse the instant decision of the District Court and approve the order of dismissal by the trial court for lack of standing to sue on the part of the appellee.

Sarasota County Anglers Club, Inc. v. Burns, 193 So.2d 691 (Fla.App.1967), 200 So.2d 178 (Fla.1967), a suit strikingly similar in nature to the instant cause involved a declaratory judgment action by the Anglers Club, a private non-profit corporation identical in type to respondent corporation acting in behalf of its members, and a private citizen against the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund, a landowner and the town of Longboat Key, seeking to enjoin fill operations at Longboat Key to the detriment of the club and others interested in fishing, bathing, and boating in the area, seeking that the land in question be impressed with a public easement for boating, bathing, navigation and other public uses, and praying for a decree declaring the dredge-fill permit to be illegal and void. Finding that the plaintiffs were not in a position to maintain this action, the trial court dismissed the complaint. Upon appeal the District Court of Appeal affirmed the order of dismissal by the trial court and succinctly stated 'Suffice it to say that we agree with the chancellor in his finding and holding that the plaintiffs are not in a position to maintain this action. (O'Dell v. Walsh, 81 So.2d 554 (Fla.1955)). Plaintiffs claim as authority to bring this action as authorized by Section 64.11, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., is untenable as to the facts in the case sub judice, and its application limited to those cases referred to in 823.05, Florida Statutes, F.S.A. Further, we must agree with the chancellor that the plaintiffs have failed to show in what manner they have been damaged as private citizens differing in kind from the general public, and, therefore, have no right to sue. (Deering v. Martin, 95 Fla. 224, 116 So. 54 (1928)).'

Upon certification of the decision to this Court, we held:

'The history, factual background, questions presented and disposition are clearly set out in the opinion of the District Court. Argument having been heard and the court having considered the records and briefs, it is our opinion that the ruling of the District Court is correct and it is adopted as the opinion of this court.'...