U.S. v. 0.376 Acres of Land
Decision Date | 26 January 1988 |
Docket Number | No. 86-5905,86-5905 |
Citation | 838 F.2d 819 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. 0.376 ACRES OF LAND, et al., Defendants-Appellants. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Bernard E. Bernstein (argued), Allyn Lay, Bernstein, Susano & Stair, Beverly S. Burbage (argued), Richard T. Beeler (Knox Co.) Knoxville, Tenn., for defendants-appellants.
Thomas P. Carolan, Vicki L. Plaut (argued) U.S. Dept. of Justice, Land and Natural Resources Div., Robert L. Klarquist, Washington, D.C., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before MERRITT, KRUPANSKY and NELSON, Circuit Judges.
This is an appeal from a district court order denying the award of attorney fees in three eminent domain cases. Each of the landowners was a "prevailing party" within the definition set forth in 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2412(d)(2)(H), but the district court declined to award fees and expenses under the Equal Access to Justice Act because the court found that the government had sustained its burden of showing that its position in the proceedings was "substantially justified." Finding no abuse of discretion, we shall affirm the district court's order.
In November of 1984 the United States filed complaints in condemnation and declarations of taking to acquire three separately owned parcels of unimproved real estate in a certain city block in downtown Knoxville, Tennessee. Each of the parcels was being used for surface parking. Their combined area came to approximately 52,708 square feet. The declarations of taking were followed by deposits into the registry of the court of sums totaling $943,850, the government's estimate of just compensation for the land taken. See 40 U.S.C. Sec. 258a.
The cases were consolidated, and the issue of compensation was referred to a three-person commission appointed by the district court pursuant to Rule 71(A), Fed.R.Civ.P.
Among the valuation guidelines provided the commissioners by the district court was a standard-form instruction, captioned "Sales to the Government," that read as follows:
The commissioners conducted a view of the landowners' property and heard evidence of just compensation. The landowners presented valuation testimony from two experienced and well-qualified expert appraisers, Robert J. Fletcher and Claude M. Wood. Mr. Wood expressed the opinion that the land was worth $30 per square foot, and Mr. Fletcher opined that it was worth $29.50 per square foot. The United States offered the testimony of Mr. William S. Broome, MAI, also an experienced and qualified real estate appraiser; Mr. Broome expressed the opinion that the land was worth $18.30 per square foot.
The commission questioned the comparability of some of the transactions used by the government's appraisers as well. After weighing all the evidence, the commission determined that each of the parcels it was responsible for valuing was worth $25 per square foot--a number close to the mid-point between the highest valuation attested to by the landowners' witnesses ($30) and the valuation attested to by the government's witness ($18.30). The total value of the three parcels, as determined by the commissioners, came to $1,317,689. The government filed no objections to the report of the commissioners, and the district court entered a judgment fixing just compensation on the basis of the commissioners' valuation of $25.00 per square foot.
The landowners subsequently moved for an award of attorney fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act. That statute provides, in pertinent part, that a court "shall" award attorney fees and other expenses to a "prevailing party" in a civil action brought by the United States (given net worth qualifications that were met by the prevailing parties here), "unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified...." 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2412(d)(1)(A) (emphasis supplied). As reinstated in amended form in 1985, the Act provides that " 'prevailing party', in the case of eminent domain proceedings, means a party who obtains a final judgment ... the amount of which is at least as close to the highest valuation of the property involved that is attested to at trial on behalf of the property owner as it is to the highest valuation of the property involved that is attested to at trial on behalf of the Government." 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2412(d)(2)(H).
The government did not deny that the landowners were prevailing parties in the case at bar. It is indisputable that the amount of the final judgment ($25 per square foot) was at least as close to the landowners' highest valuation ($30) as to the government's ($18.30), and each of the landowners thus unquestionably comes within the statutory definition of a "prevailing party."
The government maintained, nonetheless, that its position was substantially justified. The government based its argument not only on the existing record but also on newly filed affidavits purporting to show pre-trial settlement offers and describing appraisals made by a certain Mr. Pipkin. That individual had not testified at the hearings conducted by the commissioners, but his appraisals were said to have been used in determining the amounts the government deposited into the registry of the court when the land was taken. The landowners objected vigorously to any use of the government's affidavits, and filed a counter-affidavit contesting the government's account of the settlement offers.
The district court, in a memorandum opinion explaining its decision to deny attorney fees, agreed with the landowners that the position taken by the government in settlement negotiations was irrelevant. In this connection the court relied on 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2412(d)(1)(B), which provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
The district court went on to note, however, that the record of the eminent domain...
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