U.S. v. ($20,392.00), More or Less
| Decision Date | 04 March 2008 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 2005-71. |
| Citation | 546 F.Supp.2d 302 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. TWENTY THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED AND NINETY TWO DOLLARS IN UNITED STATES CURRENCY ($20,392.00), MORE OR LESS, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Virgin Islands |
Jocelyn Hewlitt, AUSA, St. Thomas, U.S.V.I., for Plaintiff.
Thurston T. McKelvin, FPD, St. Thomas, U.S.V.I., for Defendant.
Before the Court is the motion of the plaintiff, United States of America (the "Government"), for summary judgment against the defendant property, Twenty Thousand Three Hundred and Ninety Two Dollars in United States Currency ($20,392.00), more or less (the "Defendant Property").
The Government brought this one-count action in April, 2005, to forfeit and condemn to its use and benefit the Defendant Property for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1960(a)(b)(1)(B).1 The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1345 and 28 U.S.C. 1355.
According to the Government's verified complaint, the Defendant Property was seized on December 9, 2004, from the cruise ship cabin of Chuchi Kue (the "Claimant") aboard the M/V Dawn Princess (the "Dawn Princess") in St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands. Attached to the complaint is the affidavit of an Immigration and Customs Enforcement special agent. That affidavit states that the Dawn Princess arrived in St. Thomas on December 9, 2004, from Montego Bay, Jamaica, and that U.S. Customs and Border Protection ("CBP") officers thereafter conducted a random search of the vessel, including the Claimant's cabin. During the search, the CBP officers discovered various documents and effects belonging to the Claimant, including the Defendant Property. After waiving her Miranda rights, the Claimant was questioned, stating that she received payments from crew members of the Dawn Princess and other cruise ships in exchange for sending money from various locations in the United States to the Philippines. The Claimant was subsequently taken into custody.
On December 30, 2004, the Claimant was charged in a six-count indictment. The Claimant later pled guilty to Count I of the indictment, which charged her with knowingly conducting, controlling, managing, directing or owning all or part of an unlicensed money transmitting business, which affected foreign commerce, without complying with the registration requirements of 31 U.S.C. § 5330, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 1960(a)(b)(1)(B). Consequently, the Government brought this action for forfeiture pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A), alleging that the Defendant Property constitutes property involved in a transaction or attempted transaction in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1960, and requesting that the Court issue a warrant and summons for the arrest and seizure of the Defendant Property.
The Government now moves for summary judgment on its forfeiture claim. The Claimant, as a person claiming to have an interest in the Defendant Property, has filed an opposition.2
Summary judgment is appropriate if "the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED.R.CIV.P. 56(C); see also Hersh v. Allen Products Co., 789 F.2d 230, 232 (3d Cir. 1986).
The movant has the initial burden of showing there is no genuine issue of material fact, but once this burden is met it shifts to the non-moving party to establish specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Gans v. Mundy, 762 F.2d 338, 342 (3d Cir.1985). The non-moving party "may not rest upon mere allegations, general denials, or ... vague statements ...." Quiroga v. Hasbro, Inc., 934 F.2d 497, 500 (3d Cir.1991). "[T]here is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
"[A]t the summary judgment stage the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. In making this determination, this Court draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. See Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 850, 122 S.Ct. 2559, 153 L.Ed.2d 735 (2002); see also Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 32 F.3d 768, 777 (3d Cir.1994).
On April 25, 2000, Congress passed the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 ("CAFRA"), Pub.L. No. 106-185, 114 Stat. 202, to address concerns associated with federal civil forfeitures. Since the Government commenced this action after August 23, 2000, the date on which CAFRA became effective, CAFRA applies to this case. See United States v. One "Piper" Aztec "F" De Luxe Model 250 PA 23 Aircraft, 321 F.3d 355, 358 (3d Cir.2003) (citations omitted).
Under CAFRA, "the burden of proof is on the Government to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the property is subject to forfeiture." 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1); see also One "Piper" Aztec, 321 F.3d at 357.3 "The burden of showing something by a `preponderance of the evidence,' the most common standard in the civil law, `simply requires the trier of fact to believe that the existence of a fact is more probable than its nonexistence before [he] may find in favor of the party who has the burden to persuade the [judge] of the fact's existence.'" United States v. Real Prop. In Section 9, Town 29 N., Range 1 W., 308 F.Supp.2d 791, 806 (E.D.Mich. 2004) (quoting Concrete Pipe and Products of California, Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern California, 508 U.S. 602, 622, 113 S.Ct. 2264, 124 L.Ed.2d 539 (1993)). "If the Government's theory of forfeiture is that the property ... was involved in the commission of a criminal offense, the Government shall establish that there was a substantial connection between the property and the offense." 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(3).
"Once the Government has met its burden, the burden then shifts to the claimant to prove by a preponderance of evidence a defense to the forfeiture or to prove that the property is not otherwise subject to forfeiture." United States v. $52,000.00, More or Less, in United States Currency, 508 F.Supp.2d 1036, 1040 (D.Ala.2007) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 983(d)(1); United States v. $21,000.00 in United States Postal Money Orders, 298 F.Supp.2d 597, 601 (E.D.Mich. 2003)); see also United States v. Six Negotiable Checks, 207 F.Supp.2d 677, 683 (E.D.Mich.2002) (citing United States v. One Parcel of Property Located at 2526 Faxon Ave., 145 F.Supp.2d 942 (W.D.Tenn.2001)).
To meet its burden for summary judgment in this matter, the Government must prove that it is more probably true than not true that (1) the Claimant was operating an illegal money transmitting business, and (2) there is a substantial connection between the Defendant Property and her criminal offense. See United States v. 47 10-Ounce Gold Bars, 35 1-Ounce Gold Coins, & 3,069 1-Ounce Silver Coins, Civ. No. 03-955, 2005 WL 221259, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2906 (D.Or. Jan. 28, 2005).
Most material facts in this matter are undisputed. Those facts show that the Claimant's cabin aboard the Dawn Princess was searched by CBP officers, who found notebooks with names and currency figures next to the names, e-mail documents, wire transfer documents, including remitter slips from various financial institutions showing the transfer of large sums of money. The CBP officers also seized the Defendant Property from among those documents and effects in the Claimant's cabin. The Claimant was thereafter taken into custody and questioned. The Claimant stated that she had bank accounts in Alaska, Florida,
St. Thomas, and the Philippines, and that she operated a licensed money transmitting business in the Philippines. The Claimant used her St. Thomas bank account as a depository for funds that she illegally transmitted to the Philippines from the Virgin Islands. The undisputed material facts further show that the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network conducted a search of official records and determined that the Claimant was not registered in the United States as a money services business. It is also undisputed that the Claimant thereafter pled guilty to Count I of a December 4, 2004, indictment, charging with six counts of violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1960(a)(b)(1)(B), for operating an unlicensed money transmitting business.
With respect to the first element of proof, the Government has submitted competent evidence showing that the Claimant pled guilty to Count I of a December 30, 2004, indictment, charging her with violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1960(a)(b)(1)(B). That provision outlaws the operation of an unlicensed money transmitting business. The Government has therefore met its burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the Claimant operated an illegal money transmitting business. Indeed, the Claimant does not dispute that she pled guilty to that offense.
With respect to the second element of proof, the Government seeks to meet its burden by asserting that the Defendant Property was involved in her illegal money transmitting business, and that the Defendant Property cannot be wages that the Claimant made from any legitimate work she might have performed aboard the Dawn Princess. In support of these assertions, the Government points the Court to several pieces of competent evidence.
The most persuasive evidence provided by the Government is the hearing transcript of the Claimant's plea colloquy. During the plea colloquy, the Government recited the evidence it would present against the Claimant if the case proceeded to trial. Significantly, the Government stated that CBP officers had discovered the Defendant Property,...
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