U.S. v. 2751 Peyton Woods Trail, No. 94-8931

• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (11th Circuit)
• Writing for the Court: Before BIRCH and BARKETT; BARKETT
• Citation: 66 F.3d 1164
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. 2751 PEYTON WOODS TRAIL, S.W., Atlanta, Fulton County, Georgia, Including all buildings and appurtenances thereon, described in Exhibit A, attached, Defendant, Approximately 4.37 Acres of Land, Lying in Land Lot 213 of the 14th District of Fulton County, Georgia, Being lots 2, 3, 5, 6 & 7 of the Hope Court Subdivision, Including all buildings and appurtenances thereon, described in Exhibit B, attached, Defendant, Danielle Richardson and William Richardson, Claimants-Appellants.
• Decision Date: 17 October 1995
• Docket Number: No. 94-8931

Page 1164

66 F.3d 1164 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
2751 PEYTON WOODS TRAIL, S.W., Atlanta, Fulton County,
Georgia, Including all buildings and appurtenances
thereon, described in Exhibit A,
attached, Defendant,
Approximately 4.37 Acres of Land, Lying in Land Lot 213 of
the 14th District of Fulton County, Georgia, Being lots 2,
3, 5, 6 & 7 of the Hope Court Subdivision, Including all
buildings and appurtenances thereon, described in Exhibit B,
attached, Defendant,
Danielle Richardson and William Richardson, Claimants-Appellants. No. 94-8931. United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit. Oct. 17, 1995.

Page 1165

William Richardson, Camp Spring, MD, pro se.

Danielle Richardson, Atlanta, GA, pro se.

George M. Lawson, Lawson & Thornton, Atlanta, GA, for appellants.

Kent Alexander, U.S. Atty., Joseph Andre Plummer, Albert L. Kemp, Asst. U.S. Attys., Organized Crime Strike Force, Atlanta, GA, for appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.

Before BIRCH and BARKETT, Circuit Judges, and SMITH ^*, Senior Circuit Judge.

BARKETT, Circuit Judge:

William Richardson appeals from a final judgment of civil forfeiture entered in favor of the government. He argues that the government's failure to afford him notice and a hearing before seizing his properties violated due process and that the district court should have dismissed the forfeiture complaint. Based on United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 492, 126 L.Ed.2d 490 (1993), we conclude that the government's ex parte seizure of the properties violated Richardson's right to due process and that the forfeiture complaint therefore must be dismissed. Accordingly, we reverse the district court's denial of Richardson's motion to dismiss and the final judgment of forfeiture. ¹

BACKGROUND

In 1993, the government received ex parte warrants authorizing seizure of the defendant properties after convincing a U.S. magistrate that probable cause existed to believe they were involved in or traceable to money laundering proscribed by 18 U.S.C. Secs. 1956 & 1957. Thereafter, the government filed a verified complaint for forfeiture pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 981(a)(1)(A) and received warrants for arrest of the properties in rem. The government then executed process on the properties and changed the locks on an uninhabited home situated on the one developed property.

Richardson subsequently filed a claim asserting an ownership interest in the properties. He also moved to dismiss the seizure warrants and the forfeiture complaint, arguing that he was not given pre-seizure notice or a hearing. The district court denied the motion to dismiss and granted the government's motion for summary judgment.

Page 1166

DISCUSSION

In United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 492, 126 L.Ed.2d 490 (1993), the Supreme Court established that absent exigent circumstances, the seizure of real property for civil forfeiture violates fifth amendment due process if the property owner is not afforded notice and a hearing prior to the seizure. Id. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 505. ² The Court rejected the argument that due process is satisfied by a post-seizure hearing, concluding that:

based upon the importance of the private interests at risk and the absence of countervailing Government needs, ... the seizure of real property under Sec. 881(a)(7) is not one of those extraordinary instances that justify the postponement of notice and hearing. Unless exigent circumstances are present, the Due Process Clause requires the...