U.S. v. Alaska

• Decision Date: 19 June 1997
• Docket Number: 84
• Citation: 117 S.Ct. 1888,138 L.Ed.2d 231,521 U.S. 1
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF ALASKA. rig
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

521 U.S. 1

117 S.Ct. 1888

138 L.Ed.2d 231

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff,

v STATE OF ALASKA.

No. 84, Orig.

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued Feb. 24, 1997.

Decided June 19, 1997.

Syllabus ^*

This suit involves a dispute between the United States and Alaska over the ownership of submerged lands along the State's Arctic Coast. The Alaska Statehood Act expressly provides that the federal Submerged Lands Act applies to Alaska. The latter Act entitles Alaska to submerged lands beneath tidal and inland navigable waters and submerged lands extending three miles seaward of the State's coastline. The United States claims a right to offer lands in the Beaufort Sea for mineral leasing, and Alaska seeks to quiet its title to coastal submerged lands within two federal reservations, the National Petroleum Reserve-Alaska (Reserve) and the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, formerly known as the Arctic National Wildlife Range (Range). Both parties have filed exceptions to the Special Master's Report.

Held:

1.Alaska's exception to the recommended ruling that the State's submerged lands in the vicinity of barrier islands along its Arctic Coast should be measured as a 3-mile belt from a coastline following the normal baseline under the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (Convention) is overruled. The coastline from which a State measures its Submerged Lands Act grant corresponds to the baseline from which the United States measures its territorial sea under the Convention. According to the Convention's normal baseline approach, each island has its own belt of territorial sea, measured outward from a baseline corresponding to the low-water line along the island's coast. Alaska objects to the application of this approach to the Stefansson Sound-where some offshore islands are more than six miles apart or more than six miles from the mainland-because it gives the United States "enclaves'' of submerged lands, wholly or partly surrounded by state-owned submerged lands, beneath waters more than three miles from the mainland but not within three miles of an island. United States v. Louisiana, 470 U.S. 93, 105 S.Ct. 1074, 84 L.Ed.2d 73, does not foreclose the conclusion that the Convention's normal baseline principles apply here. Alaska has not identified a firm and continuing United States rule treating waters between the mainland and fringing islands as "inland waters'' when the openings between the off-lying islands are no more than 10 miles wide. The sources before the Master showed that, in its foreign relations, particularly in the period 1930 to 1949, the United States had advocated a rule under which objectionable pockets of high seas between the mainland and fringing islands would be assimilated to a coastal nation's territorial sea. Such a rule would have been inconsistent with Alaska's 10-mile rule, under which no objectionable pockets of high seas would have existed. The United States also advocated a rule for treating the waters of a strait leading to an inland sea as inland waters, but it is not equivalent to Alaska's rule. Pp. ____-____.

2.Alaska's exception to the recommended ruling that a gravel and ice formation known as Dinkum Sands is not an island constituting part of Alaska's coastline under the Submerged Lands Act is overruled. The Master did not err in concluding that Dinkum Sands does not meet the standard for an island because it is frequently below mean high water. The Convention's drafting history suggests that, to qualify as an island, a feature must be above high water except in abnormal circumstances. It does not support the broader conclusion that a feature with a seasonal loss in elevation that brings it below mean high water, such as Dinkum Sands, qualifies. Nor is there any precedent for deeming Dinkum Sands an island during the periods when it is above mean high water. Pp. ____-____.

3.Alaska's exception to the recommended ruling that submerged lands beneath tidally influenced waters within the Reserve's boundary did not pass to Alaska at statehood is overruled. The United States can reserve submerged lands under federal control for an appropriate public purpose. Under the strict standards of Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193, 107 S.Ct. 2318, 96 L.Ed.2d 162, the 1923 Executive Order creating the Reserve reflected a clear intent to include submerged lands within the Reserve. In addition to the fact that the Order refers to coastal features and necessarily covers the tidelands, excluding submerged lands beneath the coastal features would have been inconsistent with the Reserve's purpose-to secure an oil supply that would necessarily exist beneath both submerged lands and uplands. Section 11(b) of the Alaska Statehood Act, which noted that the United States owned the Reserve and included a statement of exclusive legislative jurisdiction under the Enclave Clause, reflects Congress' intent to ratify the inclusion of submerged lands within the Reserve and to defeat the State's title to those lands. Pp. ____-____.

4.The United States' exception to the recommended ruling that offshore submerged lands within the Range's boundaries passed to Alaska at statehood is sustained. The United States did not transfer such lands to Alaska at statehood. The 1957 Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife application to create a wildlife refuge clearly encompassed submerged lands. Since its seaward boundary is the low water line along Alaska's coast, the Range necessarily encompasses the tidelands. The justification statement accompanying the application, which describes the habitat of various species along the coast and beneath inland waters, further reflects a clear intent to withhold submerged lands. A Department of Interior regulation in effect when the application was filed and when Congress passed the Alaska Statehood Act operated to "segregate'' the lands for which the application was pending. Section 6(e) of that Act expressly prevented lands that had been "set apart as [a] refug[e]'' from passing to Alaska. It follows that, because all of the lands covered by the 1957 application had been so "set apart,'' the United States retained title to submerged lands within the Range. Pp. ____-____.

Exceptions of Alaska overruled; exception of United States sustained; Special Master's recommendations adopted to the extent consistent with the Court's opinion.

O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which STEVENS, KENNEDY, SOUTER, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined, and in Parts I, II, and III of which REHNQUIST, C.J., and SCALIA and THOMAS, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and SCALIA, J., joined.

G. Thomas Koester, Juneau, AK, for defendant.

Jeffrey P. Minear, Washington, DC, for plaintiff.

Justice O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

This original action presents a dispute between the United States and the State of Alaska over the ownership of submerged lands along Alaska's Arctic Coast. In 1979, with leave of the Court, 442 U.S. 937, 99 S.Ct. 2876, 61 L.Ed.2d 307, the United States filed a bill of complaint setting out a dispute over the right to offer lands in the Beaufort Sea for mineral leasing. Alaska counterclaimed, seeking a decree quieting its title to coastal submerged lands within two federal reservations, the National Petroleum Reserve-Alaska and the Arctic National Wildlife Range (now the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge). The Court appointed a Special Master. 444 U.S. 1065, 100 S.Ct. 1005, 62 L.Ed.2d 747 (1980). Between 1980 and 1986, the Special Master oversaw extensive hearings and briefing. Before us now are the report of the Special Master and the exceptions of the parties. We overrule Alaska's exceptions and sustain that of the United States.

I

Alaska and the United States dispute ownership of lands underlying tidal waters off Alaska's North Slope. The region is rich in oil, and each sovereign seeks the right to grant leases for offshore exploration and to share in oil and gas revenues from the contested lands.

Several general principles govern our analysis of the parties' claims. Ownership of submerged lands-which carries with it the power to control navigation, fishing, and other public uses of water-is an essential attribute of sovereignty. Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193, 195, 107 S.Ct. 2318, 2320, 96 L.Ed.2d 162 (1987). Under the doctrine of Lessee of Pollard v. Hagan, 3 How. 212, 228-229, 11 L.Ed. 565 (1845), new States are admitted to the Union on an "equal footing'' with the original 13 colonies and succeed to the United States' title to the beds of navigable waters within their boundaries. Although the United States has the power to divest a future State of its equal footing title to submerged lands, we do not "lightly infer'' such action. Utah Div. of State Lands, supra, at 197, 107 S.Ct., at 2321.

In United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 67 S.Ct. 1658, 91 L.Ed. 1889 (1947) (California I), we distinguished between submerged lands located shoreward of the low-water line along the State's coast and submerged lands located seaward of that line. Only lands shoreward of the low-water line-that is, the periodically submerged tidelands and inland navigable waters-pass to a State under the equal footing doctrine. The original 13 colonies had no right to lands seaward of the coastline, and newly created States therefore cannot claim them on an equal footing rationale. Id., at 30-33, 67 S.Ct., at 1664-1666. Accordingly, the United States has paramount sovereign rights in submerged lands seaward of the low-water line. Id., at 33-36, 67 S.Ct., at 1665-1667. In 1953, following the California I decision, Congress enacted the Submerged Lands Act, 67 Stat. 29, 43 U.S.C. §1301 et seq. That Act "confirmed'' and "established'' States' title to and interest in "lands beneath navigable waters within the boundaries of the...