U.S. v. Alexander

• Citation: 948 F.2d 1002
• Decision Date: 04 November 1991
• Docket Number: No. 91-3113,91-3113
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael ALEXANDER, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 1002

948 F.2d 1002

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael ALEXANDER, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 91-3113.

United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.

Argued Sept. 30, 1991.

Decided Nov. 4, 1991.

Joseph P. Schmitz, Asst. U.S. Atty., Cleveland, Ohio (argued and briefed), for plaintiff-appellee.

Richard A. Damiani, Cleveland, Ohio (argued and briefed), for defendant-appellant.

Before KENNEDY and SUHRHEINRICH, Circuit Judges, and ENGEL, Senior Circuit Judge.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant-appellant Michael Alexander appeals from the District Court's denial of his motion to vacate his guilty plea and to reopen a previously conducted suppression hearing. For the reasons stated below, we AFFIRM the District Court's orders.

I.

On January 8, 1990, defendant Michael Alexander was indicted for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). On May 10 and 11, 1990, the court below conducted an evidentiary hearing to entertain Alexander's nineteen-page motion to suppress certain evidence. At the hearing, Alexander's team of attorneys presented evidence that included witness testimony. On June 21, 1990, the court entered its Memorandum and Order granting Alexander's motion in part, and denying it in part.

On July 19, 1990, Alexander entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving under Rule 11(a)(2), Fed.R.Crim.P., the right to appeal the partial denial of his motion to suppress. After granting Alexander several continuances, the court finally scheduled sentencing for December 11, 1990. Four days before sentence was to be imposed, Alexander filed a motion to vacate his plea of almost five months earlier, and to reopen the suppression hearing concluded seven months earlier. In a memorandum in support of the motion, Alexander stated only the names of two additional witnesses who, although available to have testified at the original hearing on the motion to suppress, were not called to do so. Alexander offered little indication as to the expected testimony of the prospective witnesses, its prospective relevance, or the presence of any mitigating factors justifying their sudden appearance at the last minute. He merely stated that they would "verify" Alexander's testimony. The District Court denied the motion and proceeded to sentence Alexander. This appeal of the denial of the motion followed.

II.

Under Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(d), a court "may permit withdrawal of [a] plea upon a showing by the defendant of any fair and just reason." Granting of a withdrawal is a matter left to the discretion of the District Court, and we will reverse only for an abuse of that discretion. United States v. Stephens, 906 F.2d 251, 252 (6th Cir.1990). The appellant has the burden of proving that the withdrawal would be justified. Id.

We strongly prefer that district courts state their reasons for decisions left to their discretion, such as this one, rather than simply making marginal entries as was done here. As we have noted often, "[i]n order to review a discretionary decision, some understanding of the trial court's reasons is necessary." Morscott, Inc. v. Cleveland, 936 F.2d 271, 272 (6th Cir.1991) (quoting Israel v. Barberton, 936 F.2d 573 (6th Cir.1991)). However, on the face of the record before us, it is clear that it was not an abuse of discretion to deny Alexander's motion to vacate the plea of guilty and reopen the suppression hearing.

Although the federal rules do not establish criteria for determining whether a defendant's proferred reasons for vacating his plea are "fair and just," the Notes of (the) Advisory Committee on Rules, Federal Criminal Code and Rules (West 1987), relative to the 1983 amendment to Rule 32(d), do provide guidelines for the standard set forth. United States v. Spencer 836 F.2d 236, 238 (6th Cir.1987). These include the amount of time that elapsed between the plea and the motion to vacate, the presence (or absence) of a valid reason for the failure to present the grounds for withdrawal at an earlier point in the proceedings, and whether the movant has asserted his legal innocence. Id. at 238-39.

Applying this analysis to the present case, we conclude that it was not an abuse of discretion for the District Court not to credit Alexander with having offered "fair and just" reasons to vacate his plea. His motion to vacate was filed some five months after his plea was entered. Courts have noted that the aim of the rule is to allow a hastily entered plea made with unsure heart and confused mind to be undone, not to allow a defendant "to make a tactical decision to enter a plea, wait several weeks, and then obtain a...