U.S. v. Allen, 93-5185

CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit)
Citation13 F.3d 105
Docket NumberNo. 93-5185,93-5185
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lawrence Restell ALLEN, a/k/a Larry Allen, Defendant-Appellant.
Decision Date21 December 1993

James Patrick McLoughlin, Jr., Jay Scot Bilas, Moore & Van Allen, Charlotte, NC, argued, for appellant.

Brian Lee Whisler, Asst. U.S. Atty., Charlotte, argued (Jerry W. Miller, U.S. Atty., on brief), for appellee.

Before WILKINS and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges, and SPROUSE, Senior Circuit Judge.

OPINION

LUTTIG, Circuit Judge:

Lawrence Restell Allen appeals from his convictions of knowingly and fraudulently concealing assets in a bankruptcy case, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 152; making a false statement in a matter within the jurisdiction of the United States Probation Office, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1001; and making a false claim against the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 287. Finding no error, we affirm.

I.

On June 24, 1987, Allen filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, seeking discharge of over $29,000 in unsecured debt. He listed his assets as having a total value of $4,800, including $300 in "[w]earing apparel, jewelry, firearms, sports equipment and other personal possessions." J.A. at 275. Over the next four years, however, Allen filed claims with two insurance companies in which he reported thefts of personal property worth over sixty thousand dollars. Among the items allegedly stolen were four cashmere overcoats, fifteen suits, twelve ultrasuede coats, seventy pairs of pants, one hundred pairs of shoes, ten sport coats, and two rings. See id. at 426-427, 457-58. In sworn statements to the insurance companies, Allen stated that he had owned almost all of these items, as well as a Piaget watch worth approximately thirty thousand dollars, at the time of his bankruptcy petition. See id. at 466-67.

On June 1, 1992, Allen was indicted under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 152 for knowingly, willfully, and fraudulently concealing assets from authorities when he filed his Chapter 7 petition, and on June 5, 1992, he was arrested and taken to the United States Marshal's office in Charlotte, North Carolina. While at the Marshal's office, Allen was asked questions by Leonard Kornberg, a student contractor with the United States Probation Office, in order to determine whether he qualified for court-appointed counsel. Kornberg warned Allen that if he provided false information or omitted information, he would be prosecuted, but Kornberg did not read Allen the rights specified in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Kornberg then requested Allen to list his assets, and as Allen replied, Kornberg completed a Form CJA 23 Financial Affidavit, which Allen signed at the conclusion of the interview. Based on the information in the CJA 23, a United States Magistrate appointed counsel to represent Allen.

After counsel was appointed, the government learned that Allen had not disclosed to Kornberg that he owned a 1986 Porsche with a bluebook value of over ten thousand dollars. The government thereafter filed a superseding indictment, charging Allen with the additional offenses of making a false statement in a matter within the jurisdiction of the United States Probation Office, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1001, and of making a false claim against the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 287. After trial in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, a jury convicted Allen on all three counts for which he had been charged. He was sentenced to three years imprisonment on the knowing concealment violation, and six months imprisonment on each of the false statement and false claims violations, the latter sentences to run concurrently with each other but consecutively to the three-year term.

II.

Allen argues in this court first that his convictions under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 287, for making a false claim against the government, 1 and under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1001, for making a false statement in a matter within the jurisdiction of a department of the United States, 2 are "multiplicitous." He contends that he committed only one act--lying about the Porsche during his interview with Kornberg--and therefore that he could be convicted and sentenced for violation of either section 287 or section 1001, but not both.

To begin with, we believe that Allen has misunderstood the doctrine of "multiplicity." That doctrine, strictly speaking, refers to the charging of each act in a series of identical acts as though it were a separate crime. See, e.g., 2 Wayne R. LaFave & Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure Sec. 19.2(e), at 457-58 & n. 121 (1984) (multiplicity refers to the circumstance where "a series of repeated acts are charged as separate crimes but the defendant claims they are part of a continuous transaction and therefore a single crime") (emphasis added). It can also refer to "the charging of a single offense in several counts." 1 Charles A. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure Sec. 142, at 469 (2d ed. 1982); LaFave & Israel, Criminal Procedure Sec. 19.2(e), at 457; United States v. Segall, 833 F.2d 144, 146 (9th Cir.1987). Allen, however, does not challenge so much his indictment, as his convictions and sentences. Both in his briefs, see, e.g., Appellant's Br. at 12, 17, 18, 19; Reply Br. at 1, and at argument, Allen's counsel contended that Allen made only one false statement 3 and therefore could not be punished under both section 287 and section 1001. This is more properly understood as a classic double jeopardy claim.

It has long been established that a defendant may be tried, convicted and sentenced for two separate offenses, even though he committed a single act. See, e.g., Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 344-45 n. 3, 101 S.Ct. 1137, 1145 n. 3, 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981) ("It is well settled that a single transaction can give rise to distinct offenses under separate statutes without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause.") (citations omitted). In Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), the defendant was sentenced to two consecutive five-year terms for a single sale of morphine hydrochloride. The sale violated sections 1 and 2 of the Harrison Narcotic Act: section 1 prohibited sales of morphine not made from a stamped package, and section 2 prohibited sales not made pursuant to a written order from the purchaser. A unanimous Supreme Court held that "where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not." Id. at 304, 52 S.Ct. at 182; see also Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 862, 105 S.Ct. 1668, 1672, 84 L.Ed.2d 740 (1985) (question is whether proof of each offense "necessarily" requires proof of the other offense). Because section 1 required proof that the sale was not made from a stamped package (and section 2 did not), and because section 2 required proof that the sale was not made pursuant to a written order (and section 1 did not), the Court held that two offenses had been committed and, as a consequence, that the defendant could lawfully be convicted and punished under both statutes.

The Supreme Court has steadfastly adhered to the Blockburger analysis when determining whether the legislature intended to authorize multiple punishments for a particular act, see, e.g., Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366, 103 S.Ct. 673, 678, 74 L.Ed.2d 535 (1983) ("With respect to cumulative sentences imposed in a single trial, the Double Jeopardy Clause does no more than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than the legislature intended."); Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 344, 101 S.Ct. at 1144 (same), with only the slight modification that, because the analysis is only a "rule of statutory construction," Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 691, 100 S.Ct. 1432, 1437, 63 L.Ed.2d 715 (1980), it "should not be controlling where ... there is a clear indication of contrary legislative intent." Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 340, 101 S.Ct. at 1143; accord Hunter, 459 U.S. at 367, 103 S.Ct. at 678.

Analyzing sections 1001 and 287 under Blockburger, it is evident that in enacting these two provisions, Congress did create two distinct offenses. See United States v. Johnson, 284 F.Supp. 273, 277-78 (W.D.Mo.1968), aff'd, 410 F.2d 38 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 822, 90 S.Ct. 63, 24 L.Ed.2d 72 (1969). Section 287 requires proof that a false claim was made against the government, a fact that section 1001 does not require, because not every false statement to government officials comprises a claim against the government for money or services. Similarly, section 1001 requires proof of a false statement, a fact that section 287 does not require, because a false claim against the government can be made without making a false statement--such as by endorsing and cashing a check to which one is not entitled, see, e.g., United States v. Branker, 395 F.2d 881, 889 (2d Cir.1968), cert. denied sub nom. Lacey v. United States, 393 U.S. 1029, 89 S.Ct. 639, 21 L.Ed.2d 573 (1969); Dimmick v. United States, 116 F. 825 (9th Cir.1902), cert. denied, 189 U.S. 509, 23 S.Ct. 850, 47 L.Ed. 923 (1903) (holding that demand upon a bill already paid or unauthorized demand upon unpaid bill constitutes a false claim even though bill itself contains no false statement); see also United States v. Lopez, 420 F.2d 313, 314 (2d Cir.1969). Because it appears from the language of the statutes that Congress intended to create two distinct offenses in sections 287 and 1001, Allen can only prevail on his double jeopardy claim if Congress elsewhere clearly manifested an intention not to authorize multiple punishments. 4

We can find no manifestation of such an intent. The predecessor to sections 1001 an...

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