U.S.A. v. Almanza

• Decision Date: 30 August 2000
• Docket Number: No. 99-1560,99-1560
• Parties: (7th Cir. 2000) United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Guadalupe Almanza, Defendant-Appellant
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 845

225 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2000)

United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Guadalupe Almanza, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 99-1560

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

Argued April 25, 2000

Decided August 30, 2000

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Western Division. No. 97 CR 50049--Philip G. Reinhard, Judge.

Before Posner, Easterbrook, and Evans, Circuit Judges.

Posner, Circuit Judge.

The defendant was convicted of conspiring with two other men to possess cocaine with intent to distribute it, and was sentenced to 78 months in prison. The only issue that warrants discussion is whether the judge should have given him a 4-level sentencing discount for being a minimal participant, rather than the 2-level discount for being a minor participant that the judge did give him.

Almanza's coconspirators, the Santoyo brothers, arranged to purchase six kilograms of cocaine from a person who, to their misfortune, turned out to be a government informant. They brought Almanza with them, but in what capacity is unclear, though there was sufficient evidence to convict him of having joined the conspiracy. He admitted knowing that the Santoyos were drug dealers, he accompanied them to a storage locker at which they picked up the money for the purchase of the cocaine, and when the three of them were arrested at the site of the transaction he was carrying $5,000 in cash bundled together in the same way as the $102,000 in cash found in one of the two cars in which the three conspirators had driven to the site, which was the agreed purchase price of the cocaine.

Section 3B1.2 of the federal sentencing guidelines provides that if the defendant was a "minimal participant" in the offense, his offense level should be dropped 4 levels but if he was a "minor participant" it should be dropped 2 levels and "in cases falling between" 3 levels. The guidelines define a minimal participant as one who is "plainly among the least culpable of those involved in the conduct of a group," and a minor participant as one who is "less culpable than most other participants." U.S.S.G. sec. 3B1.2, Application Notes 1-2. These are not illuminating definitions, and we must consider the purpose of this discounting scheme. The purpose derives from the extraordinary severity with which the law regards participation in a conspiracy. Anyone who agrees to join a criminal undertaking is a conspirator, and he is liable for all the criminal acts of the conspiracy that are foreseeable to him, e.g., Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 646-47 (1946); United States v. Hach, 162 F.3d 937, 951 (7th Cir. 1998), regardless of how large or small his own role is. E.g., United States v. Hardin, 209 F.3d 652, 665 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Goines, 988 F.2d 750, 759-60 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v. Hendrick, 177 F.3d 547, 551 (6th Cir. 1999). The result is that a minor participant in a major conspiracy is potentially subject to very severe punishment. One purpose of the discounting scheme in section 2B1.2 of the sentencing guidelines is to reduce the rigidity of this punishment scheme by differentiating the liability of the major and minor participants. If the defendant is charged just with the transaction in which he personally participated and if--an essential qualification--the separate transactions of his coconspirators are not counted as his relevant conduct for sentencing purposes, U.S.S.G. sec. 1B1.3 and Application Note 2; United States v. Lampkins, 47 F.3d 175, 180-81 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Goines, supra, 988 F.2d at 775; United States v. Caballero, 936 F.2d 1292, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1991), then he is not subject to disproportionately severe punishment and therefore, in this circuit at least, is not entitled to any discount. E.g., United States v. Hamzat, 217 F.3d 494, 497-99 (7th Cir. June 26, 2000); United States v. Isienyi, 207 F.3d 390 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Beltran, 109 F.3d 365, 370-71 (7th Cir. 1997). The other circuits that have confronted this issue, with the exception only of the Ninth, agree with this position. See, e.g., United States v. Roberts, 223, F.3d 377 (6th Cir.2000); United States v. Rodriguez de Varon, 175 F.3d 930, 942-44 (11th Cir. 1989) (en banc); United States v. James, 157 F.3d 1218 (10th Cir. 1998). The contrary Ninth Circuit cases are United States v. Ruelas, 106 F.3d 1416, 1419 (9th Cir 1997), United States v. Demers, 13 F.3d 1381 (9th Cir. 1994). Two other cases that have language indicative of disagreement with our position, United States v. Isaza-Zapata, 148 F.3d 236, 241-42 (3rd Cir. 1998), and United States v. Snoddy, 139 F.3d 1224, 1231 (8th Cir. 1998), are distinguishable because all they hold is that the fact that the conduct of coconspirators was not included in the charge against the defendant does not bar...