U.S.A. v. Alvarez, Jr.
| Decision Date | 07 August 2001 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 00-1285,00-1286,s. 00-1285 |
| Citation | 266 F.3d 587 |
| Parties | (6th Cir. 2001) United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Eliseo Caldera Alvarez, Jr. (00-1285); Raul Santiago Gonzales-Garcia (00-1286), Defendants-Appellants. Argued: |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan at Grand Rapids. No. 98-00110; Gordon J. Quist, District Judge. [Copyrighted Material Omitted]
[Copyrighted Material Omitted] John C. Bruha, ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Grand Rapids, Michigan, for Appellee.
Christopher P. Yates, FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDERS OFFICE, Grand Rapids, Michigan, for Eliseo Caldera Alvarez, Jr.
Lawrence J. Phelan, Grand Rapids, Michigan, for Appellants.
Before: SUHRHEINRICH and SILER, Circuit Judges; HOOD, District Judge.*
This combined appeal from the Western District of Michigan raises five distinct challenges to the appellants' convictions and sentences under 21 U.S.C. § 846, 21 U.S.C. § 841, 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A), and 18 U.S.C. § 2. For the reasons stated in this Opinion, we AFFIRM the district court.
Arriving home from their son Eric's little league baseball game on June 20, 1996, Debra and Edward Perez were met in their driveway by the two appellants. The appellants went into the house and discussed the weather with Edward Perez, who offered them some beer. After a few minutes, Edward Perez and the two appellants went out to the barn on the Perez property. About twenty minutes later, Alvarez came up to the sliding glass door at the house to ask Mrs. Perez where the family dog was. Max, a dog known for his mean disposition, was in the house with Mrs. Perez. Alvarez closed the door and walked off the home's back porch.
When Mrs. Perez went to bed at about midnight, the barn lights were still on. She woke up at about 1:30 a.m. and walked out to the barn to determine why her husband had not returned to the house. On her way to the barn, she realized that the appellants' car was no longer in her driveway. Mrs. Perez found her husband in the back room of the barn, handcuffed and bloody, lying face-down on the floor.
The autopsy showed that Edward Perez had facial injuries consistent with a knife having been drawn across his nose, chin, and mouth. He had a two-inch bruise on his cheek, and various other blunt force injuries to his face. The palm of his right hand had a stab wound in an L-shape, possibly indicating that the knife had been twisted. The left hand also had a stab wound that cleanly severed two metacarpal bones. Perez was stabbed in the left arm, received four blunt force injuries to the lower chest in a precise rectangular pattern, and had four similarly-patterned lacerations to the back of the head, a fractured skull, and a fatal stab wound to the left chest. He was pronounced dead at the scene.
Trial testimony indicated that Edward Perez's sole source of income came from the sale of marijuana, which was purchased from Alvarez. Gonzales-Garcia had met with Perez on at least two other occasions before his death on June 20, 1996. In April of 1996, Gonzales-Garcia accompanied Alvarez to collect money from Perez. Over Memorial Day weekend, 1996, Alvarez and Gonzales-Garcia arrived once again, looking for Edward Perez as the Perez family was moving into a new home. Testimony indicates that Perez owed a large amount of money to the defendants for unpaid shipments of marijuana.
On March 11, 1999, a grand jury in the Western District of Michigan returned a two-count superseding indictment against the appellants and two other defendants. Count One charged the appellants with conspiring to distribute marijuana from 1991 to July 1996. Count Two alleged that the appellants intentionally killed Edward Perez on June 20, 1996, in the course of the conspiracy to distribute marijuana. The appellants were tried separately, and both were convicted. Gonzales-Garcia was sentenced to the statutory maximum of 240 months imprisonment on Count One, and life imprisonment on Count Two. Alvarez was sentenced to two concurrent life sentences for the convictions on Counts One and Two. Both Defendants have filed a timely notice of appeal.
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the direct appeal of criminal convictions and sentences, pursuant to Title 18 U.S.C. § 3742(A) and Title 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
The appellants raise five separate claims of error. The first claim of error involves the assertion that the district court erred by excluding out-of-court statements made by an individual who claimed that Perez also owed him money for shipments of marijuana. In situations such as this, the court reviews the district court's evidentiary ruling on the admissibility of a hearsay statement under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Price, 134 F.3d 340, 345 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v. Hilliard, 11 F.3d 618, 619 (6th Cir. 1993).
The second and third claims of error emanate from the district court's instructions to the juries. Gonzales-Garcia alleges that the district judge's failure to instruct the jury regarding Alvarez's relevant conduct is reversible error. A district court's refusal to give a specifically requested jury instruction is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Fisher v. Ford Motor Co., 224 F.3d 570, 575 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v. Baker, 197 F.3d 211, 218 (6th Cir. 1999); United States v. Frost, 914 F.2d 756, 764 (6th Cir. 1990). Also, both defendants allege that the district court's jury instructions elucidating the term "intentional killing" constituted reversible error. Where the formulation of jury instructions required the district court to engage in statutory construction as a matter of law, the Court reviews the conclusions de novo. See United States v. Chowdhury, 169 F.3d 402, 405 (6th Cir. 1999); United States v. Buckley, 934 F.2d 84, 87-88 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Brown, 915 F.2d 219, 223 (6th Cir. 1990).
The fourth and fifth claims of error involve the district court's determination that the amount of marijuana involved in this conspiracy exceeded 1,000 kilograms, and that said amount could be utilized to calculate the sentences for both Appellants. Gonzales-Garcia claims that there was insufficient evidence to conclude that he can be held responsible for over one-thousand kilograms of marijuana trafficking. The trial judge denied his request for acquittal on Count One. When reviewing a district court's denial of a motion for acquittal, "the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); United States v. Landham, 251 F.3d 1072, 1083 (6th Cir. 2001). Appellant Gonzalez-Garcia claims that the district court incorrectly interpreted the statute governing this offense, and erred when concluding that the appellant could be held personally liable for that amount of marijuana. "Statutory interpretation is a question of law which this Court reviews de novo." United States v. Health Possibilities, P.S.C., 207 F.3d 335, 338 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v. Cassidy, 899 F.2d 543, 545 (6th Cir. 1990); In re Vause, 886 F.2d 794, 798 (6th Cir. 1989).
The fifth and final issue involves the application of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), to the case at bar. The Sixth Circuit has previously held that "Apprendi explicitly applies only in those situations where a factual determination made under a lesser standard of proof than the reasonable doubt standard 'increases the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory maximum.'" United States v. Garcia, 252 F.3d 838, 842 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490).
Each of these issues will be addressed in turn.
Alvarez attempted to establish that Edward Perez owed money to other individuals. This evidence was pursued in order to present the jury with the theory that Alvarez and Gonzales-Garcia were not the only people with a motive to kill Perez. Alvarez's attorney tape recorded a conversation with a drug dealer from Texas named Geraldo Lucio. However, at trial, Lucio invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination in response to all questions about his involvement with Edward Perez. Therefore, Alvarez attempted to enter the previously tape recorded statements into evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3). The district court ruled that these statements were not sufficiently against Lucio's penal interest and could not be admitted under Rule 804. Alvarez appeals this finding by the district court.
This finding is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Price, 134 F.3d 340, 345 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v. Hilliard, 11 F.3d 618, 619 (6th Cir. 1994). Rule 804(b)(3) allows a party to admit certain statements made by a witness unavailable to testify at trial, if those statements were against said witness' interest at the time they were made. When the statement is offered "to exculpate the accused in a criminal case," Rule 804(b)(3) "imposes three threshold admissibility requirements: (1) the declarant is unavailable to testify; (2) the statement subjects the declarant to real criminal liability; and (3) corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement." Hilliard, 11 F.3d at 619 (citing Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3)); United States v. Arthur, 949 F.2d 211, 216 (6th Cir. 1991).
Alvarez's attorney, when meeting with Lucio, stated that "I will do everything I can to not hurt you" and that Alvarez and his attorney didn't "have any interest [in] getting you [Lucio] in trouble." Joint Appendix at p. 75-76. The appellant's...
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