U.S. v. Anderez, No. 80-5720

CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)
Writing for the CourtBefore RONEY, VANCE and RANDALL; VANCE
Citation661 F.2d 404
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Rolando ANDEREZ, Defendant-Appellee. . Unit B *
Docket NumberNo. 80-5720
Decision Date16 November 1981

Page 404

661 F.2d 404
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Rolando ANDEREZ, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 80-5720.
United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.
Unit B *
Nov. 16, 1981.

Page 405

Peter D. Isakoff, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., for plaintiff-appellant.

Paul Morris, Miami, Fla., for defendant-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

Before RONEY, VANCE and RANDALL, Circuit Judges.

VANCE, Circuit Judge:

Appellee Rolando Anderez was charged in a two count indictment with the violation of the misdemeanor provisions of the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act (Reporting Act), 31 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1 1058, 2 and the felony violation of the false statements statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1001. 3 A jury convicted Anderez of both counts. The district court, however, granted Anderez' posttrial motion for acquittal on the felony false official statements count. Anderez was fined and given a suspended sentence on the misdemeanor conviction. Challenging the acquittal under the false statements statute, the United States brings this appeal. 4

On January 18, 1980 Anderez arrived at Miami International Airport following a week-long stay in Lima, Peru. He went to the customs inspection point and presented a partially completed customs declaration form 5 to Customs Inspector Nerren. Nerren examined the form and returned it to Anderez, directing him to complete the form and sign it. On the form was a customs currency question, which asked whether the person entering the United States

Page 406

was carrying more than $5,000 in currency. 6 Anderez had not answered this question initially, but he checked the "no" box after being told to complete the form.

Nerren then began to inspect Anderez' luggage. He again asked Anderez whether he was carrying more than $5,000, and stated that it was not illegal to bring more money than that into the country, although it would necessitate completing another form. Anderez stated that he had only $1,800 with him. When Nerren returned to the inspection of Anderez' baggage he noticed several suspicious bulges around Anderez' waist. Anderez was taken to a personal search room where four packages of money containing $22,000 were found secreted on his person. After receiving Miranda warnings Anderez stated that he had brought the money into the country as a favor to a friend who wished to avoid taxes on it.

A jury convicted Anderez on both counts of the indictment. The district court, however, entered a judgment of acquittal on the felony count charging Anderez under the false statements statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1001. See United States v. Anderez, 502 F.Supp. 67 (S.D.Fla.1980). The district court concluded that because Congress had determined to punish Anderez' conduct as a misdemeanor under 31 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1058, it did not intend to create felony liability for the same conduct under the older, more general section 1001. The district court stated that there was nothing in the legislative history to indicate congressional intent to allow overlapping punishment under the different statutes. The court also stated that, because Congress had provided for multiple punishment in several other instances by explicitly incorporating the false statements statute into the newer laws, Title 31 would have specifically provided for cumulative penalties under that statute had Congress intended to allow double punishment. On appeal the government contends that the district court incorrectly concluded that Anderez could not be convicted under both counts. We agree and accordingly reverse the judgment of the district court.

I

In examining the scope of the different statutes under which Anderez was charged, the district court found the legislative history to be ambiguous concerning the question of multiple penalties. Consequently, it applied the rule of lenity to construe the Reporting Act as having supplanted the provisions of section 1001. In doing so, the court ignored a fundamental tenet of statutory construction. Our starting point in interpreting statutes must be the language of the statutes themselves. Absent "clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive." Albernaz v. United States, 449 U.S. ----, ----, 101 S.Ct. 1137, 1141, 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981) (quoting Consumers Product Safety Commission v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 109, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 2056, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 (1980)). Anderez was charged with two separate offenses contained in two distinct acts. Each provision is unambiguous on its face and imposes punishment for the violation of its distinct terms. There is nothing in either provision to suggest that its penal terms must be exclusive. Indeed, the Reporting Act suggests that Congress intended that the provisions of the false statements statute serve to complement the penal provisions of the Reporting Act. Title 31 U.S.C. § 1052(k) makes it clear that the failure to report currency may also result in a violation of the false statements statute:

For the purposes of section 1001 of Title 18 the contents of reports required under any provision of this chapter are statements and representations in matters within the jurisdiction of an agency of the United States.

Page 407

Given the clarity with which Congress spoke, only the starkest manifestation of contrary intent in the legislative history of the two acts would lead us to find that sections 1101 and 1058 are the sole source of punishment for Anderez' conduct. See Albernaz v. United States, 449 U.S. at ----, 101 S.Ct. at 1143. That clear manifestation is absent from the legislative record. Section 1001 is a broad statute designed to reach material misrepresentations of any sort that would pervert the authorized functions of government. There is nothing to suggest that the reach of section 1001 should be tempered by the existence of other statutes. See United States v. Gilliland, 312 U.S. 86, 93, 61 S.Ct. 518, 522, 85 L.Ed. 598 (1941). Similarly, the legislative history of the Reporting Act fails to disclose any intent to make the penal provisions of the Act exclusive. The district court makes much of a short exchange between Senator Proxmire and a former United States Attorney during the hearings on the Reporting Act. 7 The cited passage, however, merely states that sections 1101 and 1058 will aid in controlling illegal currency shipments. There is nothing to suggest that the Reporting Act must necessarily be the sole basis for prosecuting persons who mislead customs inspectors. Indeed, throughout the legislative history there is nothing to suggest that a violation of the Reporting Act cannot also amount to a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. 8

The district court also suggests that it would be illogical for Congress to provide a specific misdemeanor penalty for a violation of the Reporting Act, yet inevitably allow for felony punishment under 18 U.S.C. § 1001. This conclusion is contrary to precedent as well as flawed in logic. First, courts have consistently read section 1001 broadly and allowed for prosecution under its terms even when a defendant could have been prosecuted under a more specific misdemeanor provision with lesser penalties. See United States v. Gilliland, 312 U.S. 86, 61 S.Ct. 518, 85 L.Ed. 598 (felony prosecution under section 1001 not precluded by Hot Oil Act reporting provision providing for less severe penalty); United States v. Carter, 526 F.2d 1276 (5th Cir. 1976) (heavier penalties of section 1001 may be imposed for conduct also punishable under 15 U.S.C. § 645(a)); United States v. Chakmakis, 449 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1971) (section 1001 may be imposed instead of misdemeanor provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 408(c)). 9 Second, it is quite logical for Congress to have decided that section 1001 should supplement the Reporting Act provisions on occasion. Each statute is aimed at a slightly different form of misconduct lying to a federal officer is not the same as failing to file a currency report and Congress could easily have determined that two provisions should operate independently to chill certain conduct even if they overlapped in many instances.

Page 408

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29 practice notes
  • U.S. v. Woodward, No. 81-1140
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)
    • February 29, 1984
    ...to file prevents section 1058 from containing all elements necessary for an 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1001 conviction. United States v. Anderez, 661 F.2d 404, 408 n. 12 (5th Cir.1981). But the Fifth Circuit's seeming assumption in Anderez that a section 1001 conviction requires some affirmative misrep......
  • U.S. v. Rodriguez-Rios, RODRIGUEZ-RIO
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)
    • February 11, 1994
    ...from perversion which might result from this kind of deceptive practices which are prohibited."). 11 See United States v. Anderez, 661 F.2d 404, 409 (5th Cir. Unit B Nov. 1981) ("The exculpatory no doctrine developed because this court believed that Congress intended section 1001 to punish ......
  • U.S. v. Duncan, No. 80-1459
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)
    • December 3, 1982
    ...of these cases addressed the statutory considerations which in my view should properly control the issue. See United States v. Anderez, 661 F.2d 404, 408 n. 13 (5th Cir.1981) (citing Moore as Ninth Circuit authority on statutory issue, but acknowledging that our circuit has not confronted t......
  • United States v. Gimbel, No. 84-CR-10.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 7th Circuit. United States District Court of Eastern District of Wisconsin
    • March 12, 1985
    ...cannot be evaluated according to its plain meaning, a court may look to legislative history for guidance. See United States v. Anderez, 661 F.2d 404, 406 (5th Cir.1981); United States v. Wander, 601 F.2d 1251, 1257 n. 3 (3d 632 F. Supp. 724 The Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 was, in part, a react......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
29 cases
  • U.S. v. Woodward, No. 81-1140
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)
    • February 29, 1984
    ...to file prevents section 1058 from containing all elements necessary for an 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1001 conviction. United States v. Anderez, 661 F.2d 404, 408 n. 12 (5th Cir.1981). But the Fifth Circuit's seeming assumption in Anderez that a section 1001 conviction requires some affirmative misrep......
  • U.S. v. Rodriguez-Rios, RODRIGUEZ-RIO
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)
    • February 11, 1994
    ...from perversion which might result from this kind of deceptive practices which are prohibited."). 11 See United States v. Anderez, 661 F.2d 404, 409 (5th Cir. Unit B Nov. 1981) ("The exculpatory no doctrine developed because this court believed that Congress intended section 1001 ......
  • U.S. v. Duncan, No. 80-1459
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)
    • December 3, 1982
    ...of these cases addressed the statutory considerations which in my view should properly control the issue. See United States v. Anderez, 661 F.2d 404, 408 n. 13 (5th Cir.1981) (citing Moore as Ninth Circuit authority on statutory issue, but acknowledging that our circuit has not confronted t......
  • United States v. Gimbel, No. 84-CR-10.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 7th Circuit. United States District Court of Eastern District of Wisconsin
    • March 12, 1985
    ...cannot be evaluated according to its plain meaning, a court may look to legislative history for guidance. See United States v. Anderez, 661 F.2d 404, 406 (5th Cir.1981); United States v. Wander, 601 F.2d 1251, 1257 n. 3 (3d 632 F. Supp. 724 The Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 was, in part, a react......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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