U.S. v. Anvari-Hamedani, No. 3:04CR786.

CourtUnited States District Courts. 6th Circuit. United States District Court of Northern District of Ohio
Writing for the CourtCarr
Citation378 F.Supp.2d 821
PartiesUNITED STATES, Plaintiff v. Mohammad ANVARI-HAMEDANI, Defendant
Docket NumberNo. 3:04CR786.
Decision Date25 July 2005
378 F.Supp.2d 821
UNITED STATES, Plaintiff
v.
Mohammad ANVARI-HAMEDANI, Defendant
No. 3:04CR786.
United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Western Division.
July 25, 2005.

Page 822

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Page 823

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Page 824

Thomas A. Karol, Office of the U.S. Attorney, Northern District of Ohio, Toledo, OH, for United States of America, Plaintiff.

Mohammad Anvari-Hamedani, Pro Se.

John Czarnecki, Cooper & Walinski, Toledo, OH, for Mohammad Anvari-Hamedani, Defendant.

ORDER

CARR, Chief Judge.


This is a criminal case in which the government has charged an Iranian-American

Page 825

doctor with various offenses relating to his transfer of money and equipment to Iran.

Pending are the defendant's motions to dismiss. For the following reasons, defendant's motions shall be denied.

Introduction

The defendant, Mohammed Anvari-Hamedani, is a doctor of Iranian descent practicing in Fostoria, Ohio. The indictment alleges that during the period May, 2001 — March, 2002, the defendant engaged in a series of transactions involving unlawful transfers of approximately $4 million in funds and equipment to Iran.

The indictment alleges that, as to some of the funds, the defendant directed Merrill Lynch to transfer funds from his account with that firm to intermediary banks in Dubai, United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) and Hong Kong. Those funds were then allegedly forwarded to a bank in Iran.

Other transfers allegedly were made directly to Iran from foreign bank accounts held by the defendant. In addition, the defendant is asserted to have caused transfers of certificates of deposit totaling approximately 1.8 million British pounds to Iran.

The indictment further alleges that the defendant also engaged in "Hawala" transfers of funds. Hawala transfers, as described in the indictment, do not involve physical or electronic transfers of funds. Such transfers, the government charges, involve payment of monies to a "hawaladar" in this country. The recipient of those funds arranges, in turn, for funds located in another country to be paid to a designated recipient.

In addition to causing the transfer of funds, the defendant, the indictment charges, caused water purifying equipment and diesel engine parts to be shipped to Iran.

After some of those acts came to the government's attention following the filing by Merrill Lynch of a Suspicious Financial Activity Report, the government began the investigation leading to the indictment. As returned by the grand jury, the indictment charges the defendant with violating presidential directives issued under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA)1 and federal money laundering laws.

The defendant moves to dismiss the indictment. He claims the indictment must be dismissed because, according to him: 1) the presidential regulations adopted under IEEPA violate the non-delegation doctrine, which limits the ability of Congress to delegate legislative authority to the Executive; 2) the IEEPA regulations are void-for-vagueness, because they cannot be understood by a person of common intelligence, and thus do not give adequate notice of the conduct that might expose one to charge and conviction; and 3) the indictment is multiplicitous, in that it charges separate crimes for conduct constituting only a single offense, thus exposing the defendant to being convicted twice for the same acts in violation of the double jeopardy clause.

For the reasons that follow, the motion to dismiss shall be overruled. I conclude that the regulations at issue neither contravene the non-delegation doctrine nor are impermissibly vague. I also conclude

Page 826

that the indictment charges separate crimes for the defendant's alleged acts, so that conviction of the defendant would not violate the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment. In addition, I find that defendant's selective prosecution claim fails because he has not shown that his prosecution serves a discriminatory effect and has a discriminatory intent.

Discussion

Defendant has moved to dismiss the IEEPA and money laundering charges because: 1) criminalization of the defendant's conduct under the IEEPA violates the non-delegation doctrine; 2) the regulatory scheme implemented under the IEEPA is void for vagueness; 3) the money laundering counts are multiplicitous; and 4) the defendant has been subjected to selective prosecution.

1. IEEPA

The IEEPA is an outgrowth of the Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917 (TWEA), 40 Stat. 411, as amended, 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b), a statute which grants the Executive Branch broad authority. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 671, 101 S.Ct. 2972, 69 L.Ed.2d 918 (1981). The IEEPA grants the President power, through "regulations ... instructions, licenses, or otherwise" to:

(A) investigate, regulate, or prohibit —

(i) any transactions in foreign exchange,

(ii) transfers of credit or payments between, by, through, or to any banking institution, to the extent that such transfers or payments involve any interest of any foreign country or a national thereof,

(iii) the importing or exporting of currency or securities,

by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States;

(B) investigate, block during the pendency of an investigation, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States ...

50 U.S.C. § 1702.

Congress limited the President's power to act under this section "to deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat" in times of declared "national emergency." 50 U.S.C. § 1701.2 The statute also provides that: "[w]hoever willfully violates, or willfully attempts to violate, any license, order, or regulation issued under this chapter shall ... be fined not more than $50,000, or ... may be imprisoned for not

Page 827

more than ten years, or both...." 50 U.S.C. § 1705.

Presidents have invoked their authority under the IEEPA to impose a variety of sanctions against foreign countries, including Iran. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12735, 55 Fed.Reg. 48587; (order issued by President Bush on November 16, 1990, declaring a national emergency with respect to the threat to national security imposed by the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons); Exec. Order No. 12170, 3 C.F.R. 457 (1980) (order issued by President Carter declaring a national emergency on November 14, 1979, and blocking the removal or transfer of "all property and interests in property of the Government of Iran, its instrumentalities and controlled entities and the Central Bank of Iran which are or become subject to the jurisdiction of the United States...."). At issue in this case are Executive Orders issued by President Clinton, Nos. 12957, 12959, and 13059.3

Executive Order 13059 prohibits "any new investment by a United States person in Iran or in property, including entities, owned or controlled by the Government of Iran...." Exec. Order No. 13059 § 2(c), 31 C.F.R. § 560.207. The term "investment" is broadly defined as "a commitment or contribution of funds or other assets" or "a loan or other extension of credit, made after the effective date of Executive Order 12957 as to transactions prohibited by that order, or otherwise made after the effective date of Executive Order 12959." Exec. Order No. 13059 § 4(f), 31 C.F.R. § 560.316.

A. Non-Delegation Doctrine

Defendant contends that the IEEPA violates the non-delegation doctrine because the congressional delegation of authority to the Executive Branch to take emergency action under the IEEPA lacks an adequate "intelligible principle" to constrain Executive Branch authority. Section 1705(b) delegates legislative authority to the Executive Branch to criminalize "willful" violations of orders or regulations, and thus, defendant argues the IEEPA is an unlawful "delegation to the President to criminalize previously lawful conduct." (Doc. 25 at 2.)

In the alternative, defendant argues, even if this court finds an intelligible principle, that the executive branch exceeded its authority in Executive Orders 12959 and 13059 by defining "new investment" in such a manner as to criminalize "the mere transfer of funds." (Doc. 25 at 6.)

The non-delegation doctrine is based in Article I, § 1, of the Constitution, which vests "[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted ... in a Congress of the United States." Generally, our system of government does not permit a delegation of those powers. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472, 121 S.Ct. 903, 149 L.Ed.2d 1 (2001) (citing Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 771, 116 S.Ct. 1737, 135 L.Ed.2d 36 (1996)).

The Supreme Court has recognized, however, that the separation-of-powers principle and the nondelegation doctrine do not prevent Congress from obtaining assistance from its coordinate branches of government where Congress "lay[s] down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to

Page 828

[act] is directed to conform." Mistretta v. U.S., 488 U.S. 361, 372, 109 S.Ct. 647, 102 L.Ed.2d 714 (1989) (citing J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409, 48 S.Ct. 348, 72 L.Ed. 624 (1928)).

The Supreme Court's jurisprudence in this area has largely "been driven by a practical understanding that in our increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives." Id. (citations omitted). Accordingly, the Court has upheld the delegation of legislative authority so long as "Congress...

To continue reading

Request your trial
7 practice notes
  • Reid Machinery, Inc. v. Lanzer, Case No. 3:07 CV 2866.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 6th Circuit. United States District Court of Northern District of Ohio
    • 30 avril 2009
    ...need only provide fair warning of the nature of the proscribed conduct to survive a vagueness challenge. U.S. v. Anvari-Hamedani, 378 F.Supp.2d 821, 830 (N.D.Ohio 2005). Here, the body of knowledge necessary to obtain a driver's license (or commercial driver's license) is the same body of k......
  • U.S. v. Amirnazmi, No. 10–1198.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit)
    • 13 mai 2011
    ...05–CR–0255, 2006 WL 163025, at *4, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1839, at *11–12 (N.D.Ill. Jan. 17, 2006); United States v. Anvari–Hamedani, 378 F.Supp.2d 821, 829–30 (N.D.Ohio 2005). 19. The Constitution vests the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations in the hands of Congress. U.S. Const......
  • U.S. v. Dhafir, Docket No. 05-4770-cr.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (2nd Circuit)
    • 24 août 2006
    ...Cr. 0255, 2006 WL 163025, at *11 (N.D.Ill. Jan.17, 2006) (upholding constitutionality of the IEEPA); United States v. Anvari-Hamedani, 378 F.Supp.2d 821 (N.D.Ohio 2005) (upholding constitutionality of the The Supreme Court has also upheld particular delegations of authority to define crimin......
  • United States v. Akova, CRIMINAL ACTION NO.: 1:12-cr-00220-ELR-JKL-2
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 11th Circuit. United States District Courts. 11th Circuit. Northern District of Georgia
    • 28 octobre 2016
    ...at *8 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2014) (holding that IEEPA does not violate the non-delegation doctrine); United States v. Anvari-Hamedani, 378 F. Supp. 2d 821, 829-30 (N.D. Ohio 2005) (same); see also, e.g., United States v. Vaghari, Crim. A. No. 08-693-01-02, 2009 WL 2245097, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Jul......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
7 cases
  • U.S. v. Dhafir, Docket No. 05-4770-cr.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (2nd Circuit)
    • 24 août 2006
    ...Cr. 0255, 2006 WL 163025, at *11 (N.D.Ill. Jan.17, 2006) (upholding constitutionality of the IEEPA); United States v. Anvari-Hamedani, 378 F.Supp.2d 821 (N.D.Ohio 2005) (upholding constitutionality of the The Supreme Court has also upheld particular delegations of authority to define crimin......
  • Reid Machinery, Inc. v. Lanzer, Case No. 3:07 CV 2866.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 6th Circuit. United States District Court of Northern District of Ohio
    • 30 avril 2009
    ...need only provide fair warning of the nature of the proscribed conduct to survive a vagueness challenge. U.S. v. Anvari-Hamedani, 378 F.Supp.2d 821, 830 (N.D.Ohio 2005). Here, the body of knowledge necessary to obtain a driver's license (or commercial driver's license) is the same body of k......
  • U.S. v. Amirnazmi, 10–1198.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit)
    • 13 mai 2011
    ...05–CR–0255, 2006 WL 163025, at *4, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1839, at *11–12 (N.D.Ill. Jan. 17, 2006); United States v. Anvari–Hamedani, 378 F.Supp.2d 821, 829–30 (N.D.Ohio 2005). 19. The Constitution vests the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations in the hands of Congress. U.S. Const......
  • United States v. Akova, CRIMINAL ACTION NO.: 1:12-cr-00220-ELR-JKL-2
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 11th Circuit. United States District Courts. 11th Circuit. Northern District of Georgia
    • 28 octobre 2016
    ...at *8 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2014) (holding that IEEPA does not violate the non-delegation doctrine); United States v. Anvari-Hamedani, 378 F. Supp. 2d 821, 829-30 (N.D. Ohio 2005) (same); see also, e.g., United States v. Vaghari, Crim. A. No. 08-693-01-02, 2009 WL 2245097, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Jul......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT