U.S. v. Arguedas

Citation86 F.3d 1054
Decision Date01 July 1996
Docket NumberNo. 94-5344,94-5344
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Antonio ARGUEDAS, Defendant-Appellant. Non-Argument Calendar.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (11th Circuit)

Sheryl Lowenthal, Coral Gables, FL, for Appellant.

William A. Keefer, Nina Stillman Mandel, Linda Collins Hertz, Madeleine R. Shirley, Carol Herman, U.S. Attys., Miami, FL, for Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

Before ANDERSON, BIRCH and CARNES, Circuit Judges.

CARNES, Circuit Judge:

Antonio Arguedas was charged in a 20-count indictment with conspiracy to commit mail fraud, wire fraud, interstate transportation of stolen property, and money laundering, for his role in a fraud scheme involving two Miami, Florida churches. Prior to trial, Arguedas pleaded guilty to all counts. The district court sentenced him to two 108 month terms of imprisonment, and a term of 60 months imprisonment, all of which are to be served concurrently. The court also ordered that the imprisonment was to be followed by a three-year term of supervised release, and ordered restitution in the amount of $125,457.00.

Arguedas appeals his sentence, contending that the district court erred by: (1) enhancing his sentence based on a finding that Arguedas targeted "vulnerable victims"; (2) enhancing his sentence for obstruction of justice; and (3) refusing to reduce his sentence for acceptance of responsibility after he pleaded guilty on all counts. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm Arguedas's sentence.

I. BACKGROUND
A. Facts

In 1991, Antonio Arguedas and his wife had known the Reverend Francisco Ramos, pastor of Iglesia Betania, a Miami church, for several years. They had developed a fairly close personal relationship. Knowing that Ramos's wife needed open heart surgery, Arguedas's wife posed as a cardiologist, in an effort to nurture the trusting relationship between the two couples. Arguedas's wife promised that she could take care of the surgery free of cost.

In late 1991, Arguedas and his wife invited Ramos and his family to visit them at their home in Delaware. Arguedas asked Ramos about the financial condition of Iglesia Betania Church and inquired whether the church was a tax-exempt organization under the Internal Revenue Code. Arguedas advised Ramos that he would apply for tax-exempt status for the church. In the course of doing this "favor" for Ramos, Arguedas convinced Ramos that his church owed approximately $20,000 in back taxes because it was not tax-exempt. Arguedas put Ramos on the telephone with codefendant Jim Estrada, who posed as an IRS employee. Estrada convinced Ramos to give Arguedas $6,452.61 to pay the back taxes, a reduced amount that Estrada said the IRS would accept because of Estrada's friendship with Arguedas. Arguedas also convinced Ramos to incorporate his church in Delaware and to pay Arguedas the fees and expenses he said were associated with the transfer of the incorporation.

In September 1992, Arguedas told Ramos that he had learned of a program known as the "Pro Religion Development Fund," which he said was sponsored and operated by the United States Department of State. Arguedas told Ramos that the fund provided multi-million dollar grants to churches for charitable purposes and that once Iglesia Betania Church had received its tax-exempt status and had paid certain fees, the church would be eligible to receive a $1.5 million grant. Over the next few months, Arguedas provided documentation to Ramos, including correspondence purporting to be between Arguedas and the president of the fund.

Arguedas initially convinced Ramos and board members of the church to pay $25,000 toward the fund application. In December 1992, after Arguedas convinced Ramos and church members that the church would be entitled to an increased grant of $3 million, the church paid Arguedas an additional $35,000 toward their application. Arguedas even introduced Ramos to a church builder who discussed designs for a new church, which was to be built with the proceeds of the fund.

Throughout 1993, Arguedas had various telephone conversations with Ramos, during which Arguedas asked for additional monies in increments of $4,000 to $5,000, which he said were to pay for legal fees, closing costs, and other expenses association with the grant. In all, Ramos's church paid approximately $100,000 to Arguedas during the fraud scheme.

In September of 1993, while the scheme was ongoing and Ramos was expecting his $3 million grant, Arguedas asked Ramos to recommend other churches that might be good candidates to receive similar grants from the Pro Religion Development Fund. Ramos recommended the Iglesia Cristiana Church, in Miami. Arguedas met with Reverend Perez, the pastor of that church, in October 1993 and discussed a $500,000 grant for the church, which later was increased to approximately $1 million. In October and December 1993, Perez sent Arguedas two checks, totalling $25,000, as payment toward the grant application. From January to May 1994, Arguedas and other codefendants had additional telephone conversations with Perez concerning additional monies which would have to be paid to obtain the grant. Of course, neither church ever received any grant money.

B. Pre-Sentencing Investigation Report

Arguedas pleaded guilty to the scheme discussed above. A Pre-Sentencing Investigation Report was prepared. Both the government and Arguedas filed objections to the PSI. Arguedas objected that he was entitled to a reduction in offense level based upon his acceptance of responsibility, because he had made a written statement of contrition to the probation officer (after the PSI had been prepared).

The government objected that Arguedas should receive a two-level upward adjustment, under the United States Sentencing Guidelines § 3A1.1 for targeting an unusually vulnerable or susceptible victim. The government also objected that Arguedas should receive a two-level upward adjustment for obstruction of justice, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 (1994). Finally, the government objected that Arguedas was not entitled to a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 (1994), because, although Arguedas pleaded guilty, he never fully admitted his culpability and also had obstructed justice.

In response to Arguedas's objection, the probation officer decided that his initial position had been correct: Arguedas was not entitled to an acceptance of responsibility reduction. In response to the government's objections, the probation officer changed some of the initial PSI recommendations. He agreed that the victims were unusually vulnerable or susceptible so that Arguedas's offense level should be enhanced by two levels for that reason. The probation officer also agreed with the government that Arguedas had obstructed justice by providing numerous written proffers after his plea directed at falsely exculpating his codefendants. As a result, he determined that Arguedas's offense level should be enhanced by two levels for obstruction of justice.

C. Sentencing Hearing

At the sentencing hearing, Arguedas contended that he should not receive a two-level upward adjustment for targeting vulnerable victims, arguing that his victims were not particularly vulnerable and that his scheme was "just a run of the mill fraud." The district court disagreed, stating, "I see this as a profoundly egregious fraud...." The court found that Arguedas "did, indeed, nurture a close relationship with the pastor and his wife." The court also found that:

Reverend Ramos was plainly inexperienced in matters of financial affairs and tax matters, and, indeed the church was particularly vulnerable in terms of financial wherewithal of the church. And I think the defendant plainly played on his knowledge of the victims' weaknesses, plainly played on the knowledge that they were unusually vulnerable ... because of their role in the church and the relationship that had been engendered.

With that explanation, the district court applied the vulnerable victim enhancement.

The government then asked the district court for a two-level upward adjustment based on Arguedas's obstruction of justice, pointing out that, after Arguedas had pleaded guilty, he had made several contradictory statements to law enforcement officers. Arguedas had attempted to falsely exonerate codefendant Smith, or at least play down Smith's involvement; and Arguedas had falsely stated that his wife was innocent.

In response, Arguedas denied that his false statements had impeded the government's investigation. His attorney explained that Arguedas "initially may have attempted to mitigate his wife's circumstances. He was torn between love for wife and his own responsibilities...." The district court found that Arguedas had obstructed justice, and accordingly enhanced his sentence two levels. The court remarked: "There is no question in this record ... that the defendant's account has changed like the wind," and concluded, "I am convinced that [Arguedas] lied to me in this courtroom and that he provided materially false information to a Judge or Magistrate."

Arguedas contended that he was entitled to a two- or three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, because he had pleaded guilty and had accepted responsibility for his acts. The government opposed the reduction because of Arguedas's obstruction of justice. The district court concluded that, because of his obstruction, Arguedas had not accepted responsibility and was not entitled to the reduction.

II. DISCUSSION
A. The Vulnerable Victim Adjustment

Section 3A1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines provides for a two-level upward adjustment to a defendant's offense level:

If the defendant knew or should have know that a victim of the offense was unusually vulnerable due to age, physical or mental condition, or that a victim was otherwise particularly susceptible...

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