U.S. v. Arias

• Decision Date: 20 September 2005
• Docket Number: No. 04 CR. 411 GEL.,04 CR. 411 GEL.
• Citation: 409 F.Supp.2d 281
• Parties: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. Angelo ARIAS, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

409 F.Supp.2d 281

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. Angelo ARIAS, Defendant.

No. 04 CR. 411 GEL.

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

September 20, 2005.

Paul S. Brenner, New York, NY, for Defendant Angelo Arias.

Julian Schreibman, Assistant United States Attorney (David N. Kelley, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, of counsel), New York, NY, for the United States of America.

OPINION AND ORDER

LYNCH, District Judge.

On April 19, 2005, Angelo Arias purported to enter a plea of guilty to an indictment charging him with conspiring to distribute 50 grams and more of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841. Arias allocuted that he "knowingly conspire[d] with other persons to distribute a controlled substance in violation of the narcotic laws of the United States." (4/19/05 Tr. 48.) On further questioning, Arias acknowledged that he worked with other people to "sell some kind of ... illegal drug," and that he knew at the time that he was acting in violation of the law. (Id.) The Government did not object to the validity of Arias's plea, specifically advising the Court that there was "[no]thing else ... necessary for a factual predicate for the plea" (id.), and the Court accepted the plea. The Government now moves the Court to withdraw its acceptance of the defendant's plea. (Letter of AUSA Julian D. Schreibman to the Court, dated April 26, 2005 ("Schreibman Letter").) Arias opposes the motion, arguing that his plea was validly entered. (Letter of Paul S. Brenner, Esq., to the Court, dated May 10, 2005.) This unusual spectacle — a defendant insisting that he has been validly convicted of a crime, while the Government equally fervently insists that he should still be presumed innocent — is the culmination of a confusing series of plea bargaining maneuvers. For the reasons set out below, the Government's motion is granted, the Court's acceptance of Arias's guilty plea is withdrawn, and the attempted plea is rejected as insufficient.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On April 28, 2004, Arias was indicted and charged with conspiring to distribute more than 50 grams of methamphetamine. Because of the quantity and nature of the controlled substance allegedly involved, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii) provides for a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years' imprisonment, and a potential maximum sentence of life imprisonment. If the quantity of methamphetamine involved in the alleged transaction had been smaller, the penalties would be lower: for an amount between 5 and 50 grams, the statutory sentencing range provides for five to forty years of incarceration, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(viii); for an amount less than five grams, the statute provides for no mandatory minimum, and a twenty year maximum sentence in prison, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). If the drug distributed was something other than methamphetamine, the statutory scheme provides for a penalty based on other quantitative calculations; indeed, if the drug was marijuana, and the quantity was small enough, the statute provides for a maximum penalty of five years in prison, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(D). These differing penalties provide the backdrop for the disputed legal issues in this case.

I. The Proposed Bench Trial

Within a relatively short time after arraignment, on August 26, 2004, Arias indicated to the Court that he expected to enter a plea of guilty, and protracted negotiations with the Government ensued. Apparently, Arias was willing to admit that he was guilty of conspiring to distribute methamphetamine,¹ but disputed the quantity attributed to him in the indictment. The parties disputed not only the facts, but how the facts were to be determined — whereas the Government insisted that it need only prove the disputed quantity by a preponderance of the evidence to the Court at sentencing, Arias contended that the Government must prove the quantity beyond a reasonable doubt to the jury at trial. As is often the case, the parties' critical practical concern was not the effect of drug quantity on the statutory maximum (since neither side apparently expected that a sentence beyond ten years would be imposed), but the drug quantity's effect on the mandatory minimum sentence, which would likely control the actual sentence imposed by the Court.

Although a date for entry of a plea was set, and later adjourned, the parties ultimately proved unable to work out a disposition satisfactory to both sides, and a trial date was set. Eventually, Arias and the Government suggested to the Court the possibility of a bench trial, and sought a pre-trial ruling concerning the elements of the offense that the Government must prove at trial, and the Government's corresponding burden of proof. (4/6/05 Tr. 8.) Neither party disputed that the Government bore the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Arias conspired to distribute a controlled substance, and that if the Government could not sustain that burden of proof, Arias must be acquitted altogether of the charge against him.

In addition to challenging the Government's proof of guilt, however, Arias proposed to argue that even if the Government could prove that he conspired to distribute methamphetamine, it could not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he conspired to distribute in excess of 50 grams of the substance. The parties appeared to contemplate the possibility of a finding that the Government had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Arias conspired to distribute the drug, but had proved that the conspiracy involved the required 50-gram amount only by a preponderance of the evidence — not beyond a reasonable doubt.² The parties disagreed as to the legal effect of such a finding.

The Government argued that if it proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Arias conspired to distribute the drug, but proved that the conspiracy involved the 50-gram amount only by a preponderance of the evidence, the Court should return a verdict of guilty, and sentence Arias to a term of imprisonment between 10 and 20 years. The Government contended that the offense charged is the unitary offense of "conspiring," in violation of § 846, to "distribute ... a controlled substance," in violation of § 841(a), and that the Government's burden of proving guilt is satisfied if it establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that Arias committed that offense. The Government's argument rested on its view that Congress intended the nature and quantity of the controlled substance involved to be mere "sentencing factors," that need only be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. According to the Government's theory, Congress intended that after a finding at trial (beyond a reasonable doubt, by a jury unless the defendant waived a jury trial) that a defendant was guilty of conspiracy to distribute drugs, the Court would determine at sentencing (by a preponderance of the evidence, and without a right to jury determination) whether the amount and nature of the substance involved was sufficient to trigger the enhanced sentencing ranges under §§ 841(b)(1)(A) and (B). On the Government's view, Congress intended that where the Government could prove beyond a reasonable doubt only that a defendant conspired to engage in one sale of three grams of methamphetamine, but could prove an additional sale of 47 grams by a preponderance of the evidence, the defendant would be subject to a sentence as long as life imprisonment, and in any event no less than ten years.

The Government conceded that, under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), the statute, as Congress purportedly intended it to be read, is partially unconstitutional: absent a jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt of 50 grams of methamphetamine, it would be unconstitutional for the Court to sentence a defendant to any prison term beyond the maximum sentence of twenty years applicable to any methamphetamine sale. However, the Government argued that under Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 122 S.Ct. 2406, 153 L.Ed.2d 524 (2002), it is constitutionally permissible for Congress to require the imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence of imprisonment based on facts found by the Court alone, applying a preponderance of the evidence standard of proof. Hence, while § 841(b)(1)(A)'s maximum sentence of life imprisonment (rather than 20 years under § 841(b)(1)(C)) could not be applied without a jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt of the required drug quantity, the same provision's mandatory minimum sentence of ten years (as opposed to the absence of a mandatory sentence under § 841(b)(1)(C)) could be constitutionally imposed based on a preponderance of the evidence finding by the judge alone.

Arias vigorously disagreed. According to Arias, Congress never intended that the drug quantities and amounts set out in § 841(b) would constitute mere "sentencing factors." Rather, he contended, Congress created a number of distinct drug offenses, with different elements. As to methamphetamine, Arias argued, Congress created three distinct offenses — in effect distribution of methamphetamine in the first, second, and third degrees — with corresponding sentencing ranges of ten years to life, five to forty years, and zero to twenty years, respectively. According to Arias's view of Congress's scheme, the nature and quantity of the drugs are elements of each distribution offense. If the Government fails to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the requisite quantity of the drug to establish guilt of the most serious offense, the defendant must be acquitted of that offense, and convicted (if at all) of the appropriate lesser-included offense. Under this interpretation, there is nothing whatever unconstitutional about the statute. The critical practical difference is that a jury (if demanded) rather than a judge, must find that threshold drug quantity was present, beyond a reasonable doubt, before the mandatory minimum sentence applicable to that...