U.S. v. Armijo

Decision Date07 September 1993
Docket NumberNos. 90-30408 and 91-30034,s. 90-30408 and 91-30034
Citation5 F.3d 1229
Parties38 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1264 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant, v. Victor Manuel Lee ARMIJO, Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Charles S. Dorn and Patrick K. Stiley, Stiley & Kodis, Spokane, WA, for defendant-appellant-cross-appellee.

Ronald W. Skibbie, Asst. U.S. Atty., Spokane, WA, for plaintiff-appellee-cross-appellant.

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington.

Before: SKOPIL, ALARCON and BEEZER, Circuit Judges.

SKOPIL, Circuit Judge:

Victor Manuel Lee Armijo appeals his conviction following a jury trial for distribution of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sec. 841(a)(1) (1988). He contends that the district court erred by (1) admitting evidence of a witness' prior inconsistent statement; (2) admitting an English transcript of a recorded Spanish conversation; and (3) denying admission of a letter allegedly written by one witness to another witness. The government cross-appeals Armijo's sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines, assigning as error the reduction in his base offense level for acceptance of responsibility. We affirm.

FACTS AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

Armijo's conviction resulted from a Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) sting operation in which Jose Contreras sold a kilogram of cocaine to undercover agents. Contreras disclosed his supplier as Armijo. Contreras and his girlfriend, Michelle Massengale, engaged Armijo in two recorded telephone conversations that disclosed his involvement in the transaction. The DEA obtained search warrants for Armijo's home, vehicles, and his parents' home. At trial, the evidence against Armijo consisted primarily of Contreras' testimony against Armijo, the recorded conversations, and pager records reflecting that Armijo received an extraordinary number of messages each month. The defense theory was that Contreras identified Armijo as his source in order to protect the true source, Contreras' uncle, Santiago Avina. The jury found Armijo guilty of distribution of cocaine.

DISCUSSION
1. Admission of Out of Court Statement
a. Hearsay

Armijo argues that the district court erred by failing to give a limiting instruction regarding Michelle Massengale's prior statement that Armijo had admitted to her that he supplied the cocaine delivered by Contreras. On direct examination, Massengale denied that she had previously identified Armijo as the cocaine supplier. The government asked Massengale about her previous written statement in which she had identified Armijo as the source for the cocaine. She testified that the written statement was incorrect. Massengale's written statement was admitted as an exhibit and was also introduced in the testimony of two FBI agents. One of the agents testified that he had read the written statement to Massengale, allowed her to review it, and gave her an opportunity to make changes. Both agents testified that Massengale had previously identified Armijo as the source of the cocaine.

Armijo contends that the district court committed plain error by failing to give a limiting instruction informing the jury that evidence of Massengale's prior inconsistent statement could be used only to impeach her character for truthfulness and could not be used as evidence of Armijo's guilt. A prior inconsistent statement is not hearsay and may be admitted as substantive evidence if the declarant testifies at trial subject to cross examination and the statement was given under oath at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition. Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(1)(A); United States v. Vargas, 933 F.2d 701, 705 (9th Cir.1991). Massengale's prior inconsistent statement was inadmissible under Rule 801(d)(1)(A), however, because it was not given under oath. Since Armijo did not request a limiting instruction, see Fed.R.Evid. 105, the question is whether the district court committed plain error in failing to give sua sponte the instruction. See United States v. Hoac, 990 F.2d 1099, 1108 (9th Cir.1993); see also Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b).

We have authority to correct the error here only if it is "plain" and "affect[s] substantial rights." United States v. Olano, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1778, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (quoting Rule 52(b)). We are not to exercise our discretion to correct a plain forfeited error affecting substantial rights unless it "seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings." Id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 1779 (quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160, 56 S.Ct. 391, 392, 80 L.Ed. 555 (1936)). Improper jury instructions will rarely justify a finding of plain error. Hoac, 990 F.2d at 1108; United States v. Bustillo, 789 F.2d 1364, 1367-68 (9th Cir.1986).

Armijo argues that United States v. Ragghianti, 560 F.2d 1376, 1379-81 (9th Cir.1977), controls this case. In Ragghianti, the defendant was charged with aiding and abetting a bank robbery. The defendant was never seen during the robbery but was observed with the bank robber in the back seat of the defendant's car, some 15 or 20 minutes later. Id. at 1377-78. Two witnesses including the bank robber corroborated the defendant's alibi that he was shopping when the bank was robbed. The defendant's claim of alibi was his sole defense. One of the corroborating witnesses testified that she did not remember making statements to FBI agents. An FBI agent testified, without objection about statements made by the witness that contradicted her testimony as well as the defendant's testimony about his alibi. The court ruled that admission of hearsay evidence of the witness' prior inconsistent statements without limiting instructions was plain error. Id. at 1381.

We first note that our ruling in Ragghianti on the prior inconsistent statement was dictum and is therefore not binding. We stated that our reversal was based on the failure to give an alibi instruction, and we discussed the prior inconsistent statement issue "in the interest of an error-free retrial." Id. at 1377. Furthermore, our ruling was based on the fact that the sole contested issue was the defendant's claim of alibi, which had to "stand or fall on the question of credibility." Id. at 1381. Because the witness' prior inconsistent statement in Ragghianti was apparently the only evidence that contradicted the defendant's and the witness' testimony, the error was likely so prejudicial that it tainted the jury verdict. See Hoac, 990 F.2d at 1108. Here, in contrast, as discussed below, there was other evidence presented that did not depend on Massengale's credibility that the jury could have relied on to convict Armijo.

Moreover, the precedential value of Ragghianti is questionable because the Supreme Court has recently clarified the review for plain error. Olano, --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 1776-81. First, there must be a forfeited error rather than a waiver. Id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 1777. Second, the error must be "plain" in that it was clear under current law. Id. Third, the error must affect substantial rights. Id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 1777-78. The defendant bears the burden of persuading us that the error was prejudicial, that is, that it affected the outcome of the district court proceedings. Id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 1778. If the forfeited error is plain and affects substantial rights, we have authority to exercise our discretion but we are not required to do so. Id. We should exercise our discretion when the error " 'seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.' " Id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 1779 (quoting Atkinson, 297 U.S. at 160, 56 S.Ct. at 392).

In this case, there was a forfeited error rather than a waiver and that error was "plain" under current law. Hearsay is admissible as substantive evidence only as provided by the Federal Rules of Evidence. United States v. Tafollo-Cardenas, 897 F.2d 976, 979 (9th Cir.1990). Thus, our focus is on the third limitation on our authority to correct the error, whether the error affected substantial rights. See Olano, --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 1777-78.

In light of the other evidence presented at trial, we conclude that Armijo did not meet his burden of making a specific showing of prejudice to satisfy the "affecting substantial rights" prong of Rule 52(b). See Olano, --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 1778. When Contreras was arrested, he told the agents that Armijo was his source of cocaine, and he testified to that fact at trial. Grant Kasselder, a friend of Armijo's, was arrested with Contreras and was found carrying a gun. Armijo admitted at trial that the "grips" on that gun were his and that he had placed them on the gun.

In a recorded telephone conversation between Contreras and Armijo, Armijo disclosed his knowledge of the transaction and expressed concern for his identity. Without prior references by Contreras, Armijo expressed knowledge and concern over the gun, asked whether Kasselder had had "anything on him," asked if Contreras was "in that guy's room or what," asked whether "they [the police] took they [sic] guy away with all the shit," and asked whether they busted him "with the stuff." Armijo also asked Contreras if he had said "anything about me" and whether "they [the police] think it's somebody else." After Armijo realized that the police were listening to the conversation, he said "Well, I didn't give you NOTHING."

In a recorded conversation between Massengale and Armijo, Armijo expressed further concern that the police knew of his involvement. He asked "Do you think they're watching me?" and said "I don't know if they got are [sic] on to me or not." Armijo also asked "But they are looking for someone else?" and asked whether the police said "anything like they had an arrest for me too." Armijo told Massengale to tell Contreras "not to worry...

To continue reading

Request your trial
36 cases
  • United States v. Hayat
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • 13 Marzo 2013
    ...exception to the hearsay rule of which the district court was undoubtedly aware. Fed.R.Evid. 803(3); see, e.g., United States v. Armijo, 5 F.3d 1229, 1232 (9th Cir.1993) (finding plain error where trial court admitted witness' prior inconsistent statement without a limiting instruction that......
  • Griffin v. Harrington
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Central District of California
    • 7 Noviembre 2012
    ...to the notions of fairness on which our legal system is founded.” (footnote omitted)). 4.But see United States v. Armijo, 5 F.3d 1229, 1237–39 (9th Cir.1993) (Alarcon, J., dissenting) (“To label the failure to swear an essential witness against a defendant in a criminal case an ‘irregularit......
  • United States v. Gadson
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • 19 Agosto 2014
    ...error in not considering sua sponte whether sufficient steps were taken to ensure the statements' accuracy. Cf. United States v. Armijo, 5 F.3d 1229, 1234 (9th Cir.1993) (considering various factors regarding the accuracy of a transcription translating recorded telephone calls from Spanish ......
  • United States v. Voris
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • 7 Julio 2020
    ...plain because Ladner clearly establishes that one gunshot can support only one assault conviction under § 111. See United States v. Armijo , 5 F.3d 1229, 1233 (9th Cir. 1993) ("[T]he error must be ‘plain’ in that it was clear under current law."). In addition, the multiplicitous conviction ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
8 books & journal articles
  • Witnesses
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Archive Trial Evidence Foundations - 2017 Contents
    • 31 Julio 2017
    ...on the stand rather than to language experts who should take the standard oath for witnesses under Rule 603. See United States v. Armijo, 5 F.3d 1229 (9th Cir. 1993). ȗřŘŚǯŚȱ InabilityȱorȱUnwillingnessȱtoȱTakeȱOath Rule 603 requires that before testifying: “[A] witness must give an oath or ......
  • Child, spouse & Misc.
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Trial Evidence Foundations Witnesses
    • 5 Mayo 2019
    ...on the stand rather than to language experts who should take the standard oath for witnesses under Rule 603. See United States v. Armijo, 5 F.3d 1229 (9th Cir. 1993). WITNESSES 3-33 CHILD, SPOUSE & MISC §324.4 §324.4 Inability or Unwillingness to Take Oath Rule 603 requires that before test......
  • Witnesses
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Archive Trial Evidence Foundations - 2018 Contents
    • 31 Julio 2018
    ...on the stand rather than to language experts who should take the standard oath for witnesses under Rule 603. See United States v. Armijo, 5 F.3d 1229 (9th Cir. 1993). §324.4 Inability or Unwillingness to Take Oath Rule 603 requires that before testifying: “[A] witness must give an oath or a......
  • Hearsay Issues Most Relevant in Antitrust Cases
    • United States
    • ABA Antitrust Library Antitrust Evidence Handbook
    • 1 Enero 2016
    ...368, 372 (8th Cir. 2000) (defendant could not admit prior statement because defendant did not testify at trial); United States v. Armijo, 5 F.3d 1229, 1234 (9th Cir. 1993) (admission of declarant’s prior statement was proper because declarant was present as witness and was cross-examined). ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT