U.S. v. Atkins, 79-5211

• Decision Date: 05 June 1980
• Docket Number: No. 79-5211,79-5211
• Citation: 618 F.2d 366
• Parties: 6 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 166 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert ATKINS, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 366

618 F.2d 366

6 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 166

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert ATKINS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 79-5211.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

June 5, 1980.

Robert Dane Smith, Thomas G. Murray, Miami, Fla., for defendant-appellant.

Ronald G. Woods, John M. Potter, Asst. U. S. Attys., Houston, Tex., for plaintiff-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.

Before JONES, GEE and REAVLEY, Circuit Judges.

GEE, Circuit Judge:

The central issue in this rather close case is whether the record evidence, viewed as it must be on this appeal in the light most favorable to the guilty verdict, ¹ is sufficient to sustain that verdict. Our inquiry, of course, is not whether we sitting as a jury would conclude that defendant Robert Atkins is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt but whether in our judgment a reasonable-minded jury could do so.

The critical evidence in the case focuses on Atkins' relationship with one Andy Inglet, a resident of Houston and a member of a cocaine conspiracy. ² It is not disputed here that Inglet was in the cocaine "business" and that one of his associates in crime was Garland Atkinson, a witness at Atkins' trial, of whom more later. Nor is it disputed that Atkins was a long-time friend of Inglet, that he knew Inglet was a cocaine dealer, and that whenever Inglet visited Miami to obtain cocaine from his source there he stayed with Atkins at his residence. All of the above was admitted by counsel for Atkins either in his opening statement to the jury or in his summation, most of it in both. It was Atkins' contention that despite this he was not involved in Inglet's crimes and, of course, the above while reflecting severely on his taste in friends does not show that Atkins was a criminal.

At trial, the prosecution sought to bridge the gap between Atkins' mere presence, knowledge and friendship with Inglet and his claimed participation in Inglet's crimes with evidence of several taped telephone conversations between the two during a two-week period in late November and early December of 1977. Before examining these conversations in detail, we note a few other items of relevant evidence that bear upon them. The record indicates that Inglet processed, or "cooked" his cocaine in a microwave oven, which had the effect of converting it from a powder into a rock-like cake. For some reason this increased its value and merchantability. Garland Atkinson, a confederate of Inglet who turned state's evidence, testified that within the conspiracy this process was referred to as "taking pictures," and the cake so produced was the "picture." He also testified that "weather" was a code term for cocaine. Finally, the evidence indicates that when Inglet visited Miami and stayed with Atkins, he customarily notified Atkins of his times of arrival, was met by him at the airport and returned by him to it at the end of his visit, and was usually the recipient of a follow-up call or calls from Atkins on his return to Houston. With this background, we turn to the taped conversations and their context, set out at length in the margin. ³

Examining this sequence of conversations in the context of their relationship to Inglet's cocaine-procuring trips to Florida, we conclude that the jury could reasonably have believed that they establish Atkins' participation in Inglet's cocaine scheme.

Despite their veiled language and Delphic references, a clear pattern emerges from these conversations of Atkins' concern with Inglet's goings and comings, with how his activities progressed after he returned with cocaine, and with the reaction of persons dealing with Inglet. Particularly revealing is Atkins' expression of regret in the conversation of November 28 that he had not "kept some" since it was so good, an indication that Atkins at one time had dominion over what Inglet received, with the right to retain what he wished. If the jury believed witness Atkinson's glossary of code terms, as under Glasser we presume they did, doubt vanishes: when "weather" refers to cocaine, "taking pictures" to cooking it to hardness, and so forth, the conversations become frank discussions of drug trafficking. ⁴

In addition to attacking the sufficiency of the evidence, Atkins raises numerous other challenges to his conviction. He charges that the court below erred in failing to suppress certain wiretap evidence and coconspirators' statements, in refusing to admit allegedly exculpatory statements contained in Inglet's prior testimony and in letters written to him by Inglet, and in refusing to give the jury an instruction he requested. He also attacks his sentence as unfairly severe in comparison with those given others convicted of the conspiracy.

The Motion to Suppress Wiretap Evidence

The defendant filed a pretrial motion to suppress evidence of the telephone conversations monitored by authority of a federal district court wiretap order in Houston. He also moved to adopt his codefendants' motions to suppress conversations monitored by authority of a Florida state court wiretap order. The motions were denied. Defendant argues on appeal that his suppression hearing was impermissibly curtailed. He also argues that because much of the probable cause for the Houston (federal) wiretap was supplied by information resulting from the Jackson (state) wiretap, he is entitled to attack the validity of the state wiretap. Atkins further contends that the state and federal wiretaps were infirm because investigative techniques other than the wiretap were not pursued.

The scope of cross-examination in evidentiary hearings is committed to the trial court's discretion. United States v. Brunson, 549 F.2d 348, 360 (5th Cir. 1977); and the decision of the judge below to curtail some of the defendant's cross-examination during the four-day suppression hearing was not an abuse of discretion denying him a "meaningful opportunity to be heard."

In holding the wiretap evidence admissible, the judge below ruled that the validity of the Florida wiretap was determined by Florida law, provided that the statutory authorization comported with constitutional standards, including probable cause. He therefore followed the decision of the Florida judge authorizing the wiretap order in finding that the statutory requirements had been met. He also ruled that the federal wiretap order was valid.

We agree with the trial judge's evaluation of the wiretaps' legality. The Florida wiretap law has been held to be constitutional by this court. United States v. Hyde, 574 F.2d 856, 862 n. 3 (5th Cir. 1978). The Florida judge correctly found that the affidavit supporting the Florida wiretap order supplied probable cause: the affidavit included detailed information as to the suspected conspirator "Eddie," whose phone was to be tapped, as well as information based on a tip from a confidential informant and verified by subsequent police investigation. Moreover, the affidavit avowed, and the trial judge found, that investigative techniques such as surveillance, further use of confidential informants, immunity for known conspirators, and interviews with known associates of Eddie were likely to be unsuccessful in uncovering the rest of the conspirators. The "other investigative procedures" requirement was thus met. This requirement is to be read in a common-sense fashion and is intended simply to assure that law enforcement officers do not resort to wiretapping in situations where traditional investigative techniques would adequately expose the crime. See United States v. Hyde, 574 F.2d at 867 (interpreting "other investigative procedures" requirement of federal wiretap statute).

Courts will not invalidate a wire-tap order simply because defense lawyers are able to suggest post factum some investigative technique(s) that might have been used and (were) not. It is enough if the affidavit explains the prospective and retrospective failure of several investigative techniques that reasonably suggest themselves.

Id. The Florida state court order and supporting affidavits indicate that the feasibility of other investigative techniques was examined and establish the validity of the Florida wiretap.

Much the same analysis and the same result applies to the federal wiretap order. The federal wiretap statute, too, has been held constitutional by this court. United States v. Sklaroff, 506 F.2d 837, 840 (5th Cir. 1975). The wiretap order complied with the requirements of this statute. An affidavit, submitted by DEA Agent Gospadarek, relied in part on the information uncovered by the Florida wiretap and established probable cause. Moreover, the DEA agents used other investigative techniques, including surveillance, a pen register on Inglet's phone, and drug purchases by undercover agents. Therefore, defendant's attack on the denial of his motions to suppress wiretap evidence is without merit.

Admission Of Coconspirators' Statements

The introduction of coconspirators' statements in this case is governed by the rule of United States v. Apollo, 476 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1973), and United States v. Oliva, 497 F.2d 130, 132-33 (5th Cir. 1974), because United States v. James, 590 F.2d 575 (5th Cir. 1979) (en banc), was handed down after the trial and was made prospective in application. The applicable case law required the government to prove prima facie, by evidence independent of the hearsay statements of coconspirators, the existence of a conspiracy and the defendant's knowledge and participation in its before admitting hearsay statements by coconspirators. The independent evidence in the present case, as we have held above, was sufficient to support admission of coconspirators' statements. The taped conversations between defendant Atkins and defendant Inglet sufficiently established the existence of a drug conspiracy and Atkins' participation in it.

Refusal To Admit Inglet's Prior Testimony And Letters

After...