U.S. v. Baker
| Decision Date | 25 January 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 93-7139,93-7139 |
| Citation | 45 F.3d 837 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Leroy BAKER, Respondent-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
ARGUED: George Alan DuBois, Jr., Asst. Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, NC, for appellant. Barbara Dickerson Kocher, Sp. Asst. U.S. Atty., Raleigh, NC, for appellee. ON BRIEF: Janice McKenzie Cole, U.S. Atty., Raleigh, NC, for appellee.
Before RUSSELL, WIDENER, and HALL, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge RUSSELL wrote the majority opinion, in which Judge HALL joined. Judge WIDENER wrote a dissenting opinion.
The Judicial Conference of the United States has chosen the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina to partake in a pilot program involving the conduct of commitment hearings using video conferencing. In this test case, the respondent Leroy Baker appeals from the district court's entry of a judgment of commitment following a hearing at which he remained at his place of incarceration and was in contact with the government attorney and the district judge in Raleigh only by the use of video cameras, microphones and televisions. Baker claims the procedure followed violated his constitutional due process rights and his statutory rights under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 4247(d). We reject these contentions and affirm.
In March of 1993, the Judicial Conference of the United States authorized the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina to conduct a pilot project using video conferencing. Under the project, it was anticipated that the mental competency hearings required under 18 U.S.C. Secs. 4245 and 4246 would be conducted by means of video conferencing.
The statutory provision under which the government proceeded in the instant case, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 4245, allows for the involuntary commitment of inmates to prison psychiatric facilities. In order to justify involuntary commitment under section 4245, the government must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the respondent inmate is currently suffering from a mental disease or defect which requires "custody for care or treatment in a suitable facility." 18 U.S.C. Sec. 4245(a). Commitment under section 4245 lasts until the government certifies that the inmate is no longer in need of treatment or until the inmate's sentence expires, whichever is earlier. Id. Sec. 4245(d), (e). 1
On July 22, 1993, the government filed a motion, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 4245, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina to determine the present mental condition of Leroy Baker, an inmate at the Federal Correctional Institution at Butner, North Carolina ("FCI-Butner"). 2 The United States requested that the requisite hearing be conducted by video transmission. The district court granted this request by Order dated July 30, 1993. The court also appointed counsel to represent Baker. Baker, by counsel, filed a memorandum stating his objections to the use of video conferencing at the hearing.
Baker's commitment hearing was conducted, using video conferencing, on August 13, 1993. Following presentation of evidence, the district court found that the government had established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Baker suffered from a mental disease or defect as a result of which he was in need of custody for care or treatment.
Immediately following the competency portion of the hearing, the district court afforded both sides the opportunity to be heard on the validity of video conferencing. Respondent there introduced documentary and testimonial expert evidence as to the potential dangers resulting from the use of the procedure in the context at hand. By Order dated October 19, 1993, the district court determined that the video conference violated neither Baker's constitutional rights nor his statutory rights. United States v. Baker, 836 F.Supp. 1237 (E.D.N.C.1993). Baker appeals.
The evidence presented by the government at Baker's commitment hearing tended to establish the following facts, which are not disputed on appeal. Baker, who was serving a 15-year sentence for bank robbery, was initially transferred to FCI-Butner for voluntary psychiatric treatment. While there, Baker, diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic, began refusing all medication. He required "continual seclusion due to inappropriate behaviors and florid psychosis." J.A. 10. The FCI-Butner mental health staff determined that Baker was in need of placement in a suitable facility where involuntary treatment proceedings could begin.
The district court found that the government had established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Baker suffered from a mental disease or defect as a result of which he was in need of custody for care or treatment. Again, Baker's appeal does not challenge this determination.
Prior to the hearing, Baker was brought to a conference room within FCI-Butner where the video conference equipment had been installed. With Baker in the conference room were Baker's appointed attorney, Assistant Public Defender Alan DuBois; the government's witness; two security officers; Baker's unit counsellor; and various observers from the prison and the United States Attorney's Office. In the courtroom in Raleigh were District Judge Britt; Assistant United States Attorney ("AUSA") Linda K. Teal; the court reporter; the deputy clerk of court; Federal Public Defender Elizabeth Manton; and spectators.
The FCI-Butner conference room had been equipped with one 25-inch television monitor and two cameras. One camera was focused upon Baker and his attorney, the other upon the chair where witnesses testifying would sit; the camera focused upon Baker and his attorney could be made to zoom in on Baker. The Raleigh courtroom was equipped with two television monitors and two cameras. One monitor, with a 25-inch screen faced the judge; the other, featuring an 18-inch screen, faced AUSA Teal, Manton and the spectators. In order to see the monitor, Public Defender Manton had to sit at the prosecution table. With regard to the two cameras installed, one was focused upon the district judge and the other upon the AUSA.
The equipment installed allowed the monitors at each location to display only what one of the two cameras at the other location saw at any given time. One remote control device allowed one person to choose which camera's output would be displayed on the monitor(s) at each location. At the FCI-Butner location, Baker's attorney controlled this device, while the district judge retained control over the counterpart device in the courtroom.
The government called only one witness: Dr. Rushton Backer. Dr. Backer testified from FCI-Butner. Direct examination was conducted by AUSA Teal from the courtroom in Raleigh. Complains Baker:
... In order to follow this examination in a normal manner, Mr. Baker and his attorney were required to continually shift their focus from Ms. Teal's image on the video monitor to Dr. Backer who was present with them at Butner. To note the judge's reaction to Dr. Backer's testimony, Mr. Baker's attorney had to switch the image on the monitor with the remote control. Mr. Baker's attorney then would switch back to Ms. Teal or return his attention to Dr. Backer. Thus, there was an almost constant shifting between live and video images.
When Mr. Baker's attorney switched to the judge, the witness could not see the person questioning him.... Similarly, if the judge focused on Mr. Baker, Ms. Teal could not see the witness she was examining until the judge switched back to the witness stand. Moreover, the court reporter could often not see the person speaking if the camera was focused elsewhere.
On cross-examination, the judge could not view Mr. Baker and his attorney and the witness simultaneously. The court was required to mechanically switch back and forth between the lawyer, respondent and witness with the remote control. The judge did not switch between these parties with every question but would often linger for some time on either the defense table or the witness stand.... In order for Mr. Baker's attorney to note the reaction of the judge to the cross-examination, he was required to shift his attention from the live witness to the video monitor which was set up at approximately a 90 degree angle from the witness stand.
Appellant's Br. 8-9 (citations omitted).
Following the completion of Dr. Backer's testimony, Baker made a brief statement from the defense table. Because of the camera's limitation, he had to remain seated in order to be visible. The court then heard arguments from AUSA Teal in Raleigh and from Baker's attorney at FCI-Butner.
With regard to the quality of the video transmission, Baker asserts:
The quality of the video transmission during the hearing was not great.... It was not comparable to television broadcast quality. Though each participant was recognizable, there was a fuzziness and jerkiness to the video image. The participants' movements did not appear completely smooth and natural. The sound quality was comparable to a long-distance phone call.
Appellant's Br. 10 (citation omitted). The district court, by contrast, found, as matters of fact:
1. "Ms. Tomawski, the court reporter, transcribed the full proceedings with no apparent difficulty." 836 F.Supp. at 1237.
2. "The court had no difficulty hearing and understanding the questions of Mr. DuBois or the testimony of Dr. Backer." Id.
3. "The court had no difficulty hearing Mr. Baker." Id.
4. "[T]he court had no difficulty hearing and understanding the [closing arguments] of the attorneys." Id.
5. ...
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