U.S. v. Banks, 90-7578
Decision Date | 30 September 1991 |
Docket Number | No. 90-7578,90-7578 |
Citation | 942 F.2d 1576 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Samuel BANKS, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
John A. Lentine, Sheffield, Sheffield & Sheffield, P.C., Birmingham, Ala., for defendant-appellant.
Frank W. Donaldson, U.S. Atty., Harwell G. Davis, III, and Adolph J. Dean, Jr., Asst. U.S. Attys., Birmingham, Ala., for plaintiff-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama.
Before BIRCH, Circuit Judge, DYER, Senior Circuit Judge, FULLAM *, Senior District Judge.
Appellant stands convicted of obstruction of justice, 18 U.S.C. § 1503. His appeal questions the sufficiency of the evidence, the adequacy of the court's charge to the jury, and the manner in which the sentencing guidelines were calculated and applied in determining his sentence.
The facts may be briefly summarized: In October 1987, appellant entered a plea of guilty in an Alabama state court to a charge of trafficking in marijuana, after he attempted to sell 20 pounds of that substance to an undercover agent. At his sentencing hearing in December 1987, appellant testified under oath that he had obtained the marijuana from one Curtis Motley. Appellant was sentenced to a term of 20 years.
Two years later, after a lengthy investigation into drug-related activities in the northern Alabama area, federal prosecutors sought to obtain an indictment against Curtis Motley, whom they suspected of being a leader of a large-scale drug organization. Appellant was interviewed by an assistant U.S. attorney, and was called as a witness before the grand jury, but refused to provide any information, on the stated ground that to do so would endanger his own life and the lives of members of his family.
Eventually, in February 1990, appellant was granted use-immunity and was ordered to testify before the grand jury. He continued to refuse, and was prosecuted and sentenced for civil contempt of court. While serving his contempt sentence, appellant was indicted in this case, for obstructing justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503. He was convicted after a two-day jury trial, and was sentenced to a term of 34 months, consecutive to his 20-year state sentence and an unrelated 5-year federal sentence. This appeal followed.
There is no contention that appellant used force or threats; the issue is whether he can be said to have "corruptly" influenced, obstructed or impeded the due administration of justice, or endeavored to do so, merely by refusing to testify before the grand jury. If we were writing on a clean slate, it would be possible, applying an ejusdem generis analysis, to suppose that Congress intended the word "corruptly" merely to encompass bribery and related conduct. But it is at least equally reasonable to conclude that Congress intended to proscribe any intentional effort to impede the due administration of justice, regardless of the means employed, and that is the direction the law has taken, as established by the decisions of all courts which have considered the matter.
It is clear that the knowing destruction or concealment of documentary evidence can constitute a violation of § 1503, U.S. v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157, 102 S.Ct. 1031, 71 L.Ed.2d 315 (1982); U.S. v. Walasek, 527 F.2d 676, 680-81 (3d Cir.1975). As stated by the Rasheed court:
In U.S. v. Griffin, 589 F.2d 200, 204 (5th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 825, 100 S.Ct. 48, 62 L.Ed.2d 32 (1979), Judge Wisdom cogently observed:
"By falsely denying knowledge of events and individuals when questioned about them, [defendant] hindered the grand jury's attempts to gather evidence of [criminal] activities as effectively as if he refused to answer the questions at all." 589 F.2d at p. 204.
We thus have no difficulty in concluding that a person who, by refusing to testify before a grand jury, seeks to impede the proper functioning of the grand jury--the "due administration of justice"--by withholding pertinent information, may properly be convicted of violating § 1503. Since the evidence viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution--as it must be when reviewing denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal--permitted a rational factfinder to find appellant guilty of doing just that, the motion for judgment of acquittal was properly denied. 2
A more substantial issue presented by this appeal is whether a person who, in refusing to give testimony before a grand jury, is motivated solely by legitimate and well-founded fear for his own safety and that of members of his family, can be said to have "corruptly" endeavored to impede the due administration of justice. It is, of course, well-established that a person may properly be ordered to testify before a grand jury, notwithstanding his fears of reprisal, and may be prosecuted for contempt of court for disobeying such a court order. U.S. v. Gomez, 553 F.2d 958 (5th Cir.1977). See, also, Piemonte v. U.S., 367 U.S. 556, 559 n. 2, 81 S.Ct. 1720, 6 L.Ed.2d 1028 (1961); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 509 F.2d 1349, 1350 (5th Cit.1975); Latona v. U.S., 449 F.2d 121, 122 (8th Cir.1971). But all that is required to sustain a contempt conviction is proof that the defendant was aware of the court's order, and knowingly refused to comply; his motive is irrelevant. To establish a violation of § 1503, on the other hand, the government must prove that the defendant acted "corruptly".
We conclude, therefore, that a defendant charged with obstructing justice for refusing to testify may, within a narrow range of unusual and extreme circumstances, be entitled to acquittal upon proof that his refusal was based solely upon a realistic and reasonable perception that giving testimony would result in imminent harm to the safety of the witness or members of his family.
We recognize that many witnesses in criminal cases, both before grand juries and at trials, would prefer not to testify, and can articulate some basis for apprehension about the consequences of their testimony. Moreover, law-enforcement efforts are largely dependent upon the ability of prosecutors to extract relevant testimony from persons involved in criminal activities, most of whom could probably articulate a plausible basis for fear of reprisals....
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