U.S. v. Barker

• Decision Date: 25 April 1975
• Docket Number: No. 74-1604,74-1604
• Citation: 514 F.2d 1077
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. William H. BARKER and Donnie L. Reed, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 1077

514 F.2d 1077

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. William H. BARKER and Donnie L. Reed, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 74-1604.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued Feb. 24, 1975.

Decided April 25, 1975.

Roger J. Kiley, Jr., Vincent J. Getzendanner, Jr., Chicago, Ill., for defendants-appellants.

James R. Thompson, U. S. Atty., Gary L. Starkman and James I. Marcus, Asst. U. S. Attys., Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before CASTLE, Senior Circuit Judge, and SWYGERT and STEVENS, Circuit Judges.

SWYGERT, Circuit Judge.

William H. Barker and Donnie L. Reed were convicted for violations of the Civil Rights Conspiracy Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 241, in connection with their activities during the March 21, 1972 primary election in Chicago, Illinois. ¹ This statute prohibits any "conspiracy to stuff the ballot box at an election for federal officers, and thereby dilute the value of votes of qualified voters." Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 226, 94 S.Ct. 2253, 2263, 41 L.Ed.2d 20 (1974). Defendants contend that the Government failed to prove the existence of a conspiracy specifically aimed at interfering with the election of candidates for federal offices, and that their convictions must be reversed. Defendant Reed was also convicted of knowingly submitting false information concerning his residence for the purpose of establishing his eligibility to vote, in violation of section 11(c) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973i(c). He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. Our review of the evidence in this case convinces us that the jury could have found the existence of the charged conspiracy and of a knowing submission of false information to be established beyond any reasonable doubt, and we therefore affirm both convictions.

I

The testimony was highly conflicting. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, the jury could reasonably have found the following facts.

Barker and Reed were good friends and close associates. Both worked as precinct organizers for the Chicago Democratic organization in the first precinct of the twenty-second ward in the primary election on March 21, 1972, and both had taken similar roles in that precinct in previous elections. In the 1972 primary Barker and Reed worked together in an effort to deliver a high turnout for the Democratic Party. The party was particularly interested in the outcome of the races for nominations for Governor of Illinois and State's Attorney of Cook County, although candidates were also selected in this primary for United States Senator and President.

During the weeks preceding the election Barker helped to organize a canvass of the first precinct. As a part of the canvass workers went through neighborhoods in the precinct checking mailboxes and talking to the people in the area to determine whether previously registered voters had moved out of the precinct and thus become ineligible to vote in that precinct in the March 21, 1972 primary election. When it was determined that a previously registered voter had moved, a red line would be drawn through the name of that voter. Two women who were canvassing at the specific request of Barker followed the red line procedure and excised several names from the book of registered voters. After the second day of the canvass the women were met by a car containing Barker and two other election workers. The women entered the car and, after a short conversation, Barker took the book from the workers, examined it, and told the workers that they had crossed off names of persons who still lived in the precinct. He directed that certain names be reinstated, including the names "Donnie Reed" and "Donnie L. Reed." Barker knew that these two names referred to the same person, and that Reed did not live at the address indictated in the book.

On the day of the election both Reed and Barker were "in and out" of the polling place. During the morning both defendants took a number of blank ballot applications and left the polling place, returning with the applications completed. Barker and Reed each entered a number of votes on the voting machines when the applications were returned. This procedure was repeated in the afternoon with Barker and Reed entering more votes on the machines. At the end of the day the public counter on the outside of the voting machines was checked against the ballot application totals and Barker indicated in the presence of Reed and others that the numbers on the machine did not balance with the paperwork. Reed and the other election judges thereupon voted again.

In all, Reed and Barker cast forty-five illegal votes and the other election judges added ten illegal votes. The records of the Chicago Board of Election Commissioners showed that in the first precinct of the twenty-second ward, 241 Democratic and four Republican ballot applications had been filled out. In the federal contests, 205 votes were cast in the United States Senate race and 175 in the race for President.

These facts clearly support a finding that Barker and Reed conspired to cast and cause to be cast numerous false votes in the March 21 primary election. The controlling question is whether the evidence in this case is sufficient to show that the conspiracy "contemplated the casting of false votes for all offices at issue in the election," Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 225, 94 S.Ct. 2253, 2263, 41 L.Ed.2d 20 (1974), or at least for one of the federal offices. The jury was instructed that in order to convict the defendants the evidence would have to establish and the jury would have to conclude "beyond a reasonable doubt that it was a part of the specific plan and purpose of the conspiracy and its members, in order to promote its objectives, to interfere with the rights of voters to have their votes for federal offices counted at their full value and effect."

We believe that such a conclusion is fully supported by the record. The election board figures establish that 241 Democratic ballots were applied for on the day of the election and that 205 of these ballots contained votes cast in the race for United States Senate. Since Barker and Reed together cast approximately forty-five illegal votes, and since only thirty-six ballots in the first precinct did not include votes in the Senate race, some of the votes cast by Barker and Reed themselves must have been for candidates in the Senate contest. Moreover, Reed testified that the most disputed races were for State's Attorney and Governor; the jury could have inferred from this that many of the thirty-six ballots which did not contain votes in the United States Senate race were those of ordinary citizens rather than Barker and Reed. Once it was established that some of the Barker-Reed votes were cast in the Senate race it was a permissible inference that such votes were at least contemplated by both of these men when they agreed to tamper with the election results. Their convictions on the conspiracy indictment are therefore affirmed.

II

Reed was also convicted of violating section 11(c) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973i(c) by filling out a false ballot application on March 21, 1972 for the purpose of voting in the primary election. Our research indicates no reported opinion construing section 1973i(c) or defining its reach. The section provides:

(c) Whoever knowingly or willfully gives false information as to his name, address, or period of residence in the voting district for the purpose of establishing his eligibility to register or vote, or conspires with another individual for the purpose of encouraging his false registration to vote or...