U.S. v. Battle
| Decision Date | 28 April 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 97-9027,97-9027 |
| Parties | 12 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 789 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Anthony George BATTLE, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
John R. Martin, Martin Brothers, P.C., Stephanie Kearns, Federal Defender Program, Inc., Atlanta, GA, for Defendant-Appellant.
William L. McKinnon, Jr., Janice K. Jenkins, Asst. U.S. Attys., Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.
Before HATCHETT, Chief Judge, and EDMONDSON and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
Defendant, Anthony George Battle, appeals his conviction and sentence of death for violating 18 U.S.C. § 1118 as a federal
inmate serving a life sentence who murdered a correctional officer. Because we find no error, we affirm.
In 1987, Battle entered the Marine base at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, and sexually assaulted and murdered his wife, a serving Marine. He was convicted of first-degree felony murder in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a), aggravated sexual abuse in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a), and second-degree murder in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1111. He was sentenced to life in prison.
Battle was moved around some and eventually transferred to the United States Penitentiary-Atlanta ("USP-A") in 1993. On 21 December 1994, a correctional officer at USP-A, D'Antonio Washington, was found lying on the floor in Cellhouse C with blood spurting out of his head. When prison employees rushed to the scene, they found Battle standing next to a nearby vending machine. His clothing was splattered with blood. A hammer with fresh blood, which was later determined to be Officer Washington's blood, was found behind the vending machine. Richard Boone, an inmate allowed to carry tools, had loaned the hammer to Battle to fix something in his cell. (Medical examiners later testified that Officer Washington was felled by three great blows to the head with a hammer.)
On the day of Washington's death, Battle made an incriminating statement, which was eventually suppressed; but he later confessed again to a correctional officer. Later, federal agents interrogated Battle; and he told them he was "frustrated" at USP-A and that he was "tired of being bossed around." Battle said that he took the hammer and decided to attack the first correctional officer he saw. Battle was charged with Officer Washington's murder.
In December 1995, Battle filed a notice to rely upon an insanity defense. The Government filed notice of its intention to seek the death penalty in July 1996. 1 In December 1996, the district court judged Battle competent to stand trial.
After 21 December 1994, but before trial, Battle had committed three separate incidents of violence, prompting serious safety concerns about the trial. The district court conducted a hearing, considered different restraints, and consulted with the United States Marshals. The district court then determined, in the light of Battle's specific history of violence, definite precautions were needed. Battle stood trial wearing leg shackles and a black velcro belt to restrain his hands. The tables for both parties were draped, however, to hide the shackles; and Battle was given a black sweater to camouflage the black velcro belt.
At trial Battle testified in his own defense and admitted to killing Officer Washington. Battle also testified about delusions and hallucinations, which formed the basis for his insanity defense. Battle was convicted of murder under section 1118, and the jury recommended a sentence of death. Battle filed a motion for a Judgment of Acquittal and New Trial. The district court denied the motion, and Battle appealed. 2
Battle contends that the district court's requirement that he appear wearing leg shackles and arm restraints in court during the trial--particularly when a less conspicuous "stun apparatus" was available--was inherently prejudicial. Battle also contends the district court at the least should have granted his wish not to be present in court. 3 We disagree. The district court's decisions were careful and informed judgments permitted by the Constitution.
About the restraints, in Elledge v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1439 (11th Cir.1987), we set out some guides for shackling a defendant in court. There, the court held the shackling of a defendant during the sentencing stage of trial unconstitutionally prejudicial where: (1) the defendant was not allowed a hearing to challenge the propriety of the shackles, and (2) the State did not consider alternative restraints. See id. at 1451-52.
In United States v. Brazel, 102 F.3d 1120 (11th Cir.1997), we again considered the shackling issue; this time, it was in the context of the guilt-innocence stage of trial. After hearing from both sides, listening to the United States Marshals, gauging the dangerousness of the defendants' behavior, and considering alternative solutions, the district court in Brazel concluded the best course of action was to shackle the defendants and put cloth around the table so the shackles would not be visible to the jurors. See id. at 1156-58. This decision--which is one "within the sound discretion of the trial court", United States v. Theriault, 531 F.2d 281, 284 (5th Cir.1976)--was upheld. See Brazel, 102 F.3d at 1158.
Our case is like Brazel. First, some kind of restraint was doubtlessly needed. Battle had committed not only two brutal homicides, but--since the last homicide--three separate attacks on correctional officers. He had attacked without warning. In two instances he attacked using a concealed, sharpened instrument. The district court judge in this case rightfully feared for the safety of her courtroom; but as in Brazel, the trial court conducted a hearing at which both attorneys were heard, considered alternative means (including the hidden stun apparatus) 4, and then took reasonable steps to hide the chosen restraints from the jury: among other things, cloth was draped from the table to hide the leg shackles, and Battle Second, for Battle's related claim that he waived his right to be present in court, we are confident that the district court handled this issue without reversible error. 5 At any rate, no prejudice arose given the precautions taken to disguise the safety restraints from the jury.
was given a black sweater to disguise the black arm restraints. We cannot say the district court abused its discretion.
Battle claims that it was improper for the trial court, on the eve of the sentencing proceedings, to allow the Government to amend its 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a) notice of intent to seek the death penalty. Battle claims that in doing so, the district court violated section 3593(a) as well as the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments to the Constitution. The Government counters that it only amended the notice to include specific evidence supporting an aggravating factor--future dangerousness--already in the original notice.
We agree with the Government; nothing in the federal statute or Constitution prevents such an amendment. Section 3593(a) requires the Government to submit notice of, among other things, the "aggravating factor or factors" it intends to rely on as grounds for the death penalty. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a)(2). If the Government wants to add additional aggravating factors to its list, "[t]he court may permit the attorney for the government to amend the notice upon a showing of good cause." Id. The term "aggravating factor" in the statute refers to section 3592 and its statutory and non-statutory aggravating factors. Notice of factors--which include things like heinousness of the killing, see id. § 3592(c)(6), or vulnerability of the victim, see id. § 3592(c)(11)--is different from notice of specific evidence. See id. § 3592(b)-(d); see also United States v. Nguyen, 928 F.Supp. 1525, 1545-46 (D.Kan.1996) ().
The Government is not required to provide specific evidence in its notice of intent. So, when it seeks to amend that notice to add only specific evidence--and not new "factors", it does not need to show good cause; if anything, the Government is helping the defendant some by forewarning him of the evidence to be used against him.
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that good cause is needed even when the Government seeks just to notify the defendant of additional evidence, the Government met that burden. At least one of the instances of violence added to the notice occurred after the filing of the original notice and certainly had a bearing on the factor of future dangerousness. Also, about lack of prejudice, the Government gave Battle thirty-days' notice of its intent to rely on these other acts of violence and gave him a list of witnesses. Good cause was shown. See United States v. Pretlow, 770 F.Supp. 239, 242 (D.N.J.1991) (applying
related statute and determining good cause shown where (1) new factors have plausible connection to facts, (2) no deliberate delay by Government, and (3) no prejudice to defendant).
Battle argues that the district court erred in permitting three prison guards to testify on the effects of Officer Washington's death on the particular prison and, also, the impact a death sentence would have at the prison. We have set out all the pertinent testimony in an appendix to this opinion, but Officer Layfield's testimony was representative of the officers' testimony:
Q. If the sentence that the jury renders [in this case] is a life without parole sentence, how do you think that would affect the inmates in the institution?
A. The inmates already have an attitude. Once they receive a...
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