U.S. v. Bolinger
Decision Date | 30 July 1991 |
Docket Number | No. 90-10305,90-10305 |
Citation | 940 F.2d 478 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert BOLINGER, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
David Taylor Shannon, Asst. Federal Public Defender, Phoenix, Ariz., for defendant-appellant.
Thomas L. Fink, Asst. U.S. Atty., Phoenix, Ariz., for plaintiff-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona; Robert C. Broomfield, District Judge, Presiding.
Before TANG, FARRIS and D.W. NELSON, Circuit Judges.
Robert Bolinger appeals his criminal sentence after pleading guilty to the charge of being a felon in possession of a firearm. Bolinger argues that the district court misapplied the sentencing guidelines and placed an impermissible condition on his supervised release. Bolinger's negotiated plea agreement expressly waived his right to appeal the sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3742. We hold the waiver enforceable and thus do not consider his claims that the guidelines were misapplied. We also affirm the conditions the district court set for his supervised release.
Bolinger was indicted on four counts: conspiracy to distribute cocaine, aiding and abetting in possession with intent to distribute cocaine, carrying a firearm during a drug trafficking crime, and being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm. As part of a plea bargain in which the government agreed to drop the first three counts, Bolinger pleaded guilty to the last count on March 20, 1990. On May 29, he was sentenced to 36 months incarceration and 36 months supervised release and ordered to pay a $3,000 fine. Part of his supervised release conditions included a prohibition on being involved in any motorcycle club activities.
The plea agreement contained two provisions relevant to this appeal. The first provision specifically waived the right to appeal the sentence:
5. Waiver of Defenses and Appeal Rights
Defendant hereby waives any right to raise and/or appeal any and all motions, defenses, probable cause determinations, and objections which defendant has asserted or could assert to this prosecution and to the court's entry of judgment against defendant and imposition of sentence under Title 18, United States Code, section 3742 (sentence appeals).
The second provision set forth the negotiated terms of the sentence:
Defendant may be sentenced to a period of incarceration which is not to exceed 36 months. The parties agree that the Court may depart upward or downward under the sentencing guidelines. The court may, at its discretion, sentence defendant to a period of incarceration of between zero and thirty-six months, including a sentence of probation.
The court applied the guidelines and found an offense level of 12 with a criminal history of category IV, yielding a range of 21-27 months. It then departed from the range and imposed a sentence of 36 months based on three reasons: 1) Bolinger's criminal history was under-represented; 2) the parties had stipulated in the plea agreement to a departure of up to 36 months; and 3) his connection to the drug transactions was a "close question."
Bolinger appeals his sentence, claiming that the district court improperly set out his offense level and then improperly departed from that level to 36 months. He also argues that he should not be prohibited from engaging in motorcycle club activities.
Whether the appellant waived his statutory right to appeal is a matter of law we review de novo. United States v. Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d 318, 320 (9th Cir.1990).
18 U.S.C. Sec. 3742(a)(2) permits the filing of a notice of appeal if the sentence was imposed "as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines." Bolinger expressly waived the section 3742 right to appeal in his plea agreement.
There is no constitutional right to appeal. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 3312, 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983). The right is purely statutory. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656, 97 S.Ct. 2034, 2038, 52 L.Ed.2d 651 (1977). We have held that an express waiver of the right to appeal in a negotiated plea of guilty is valid if knowingly and voluntarily made. United States v. Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d at 322.
Navarro-Botello recognized a narrow exception to waiver of the right to appeal. We noted that waiver of the right to appeal "would not prevent an appeal where the sentence imposed is not in accordance with the negotiated agreement." Id. at 321. Bolinger seeks to circumvent his waiver by arguing that his sentence did not accord with his plea agreement. Bolinger contends that, because the plea agreement specified that he be sentenced under the guidelines, the alleged misapplication of the guidelines renders the sentence outside the negotiated agreement, thereby providing a basis for appeal under the Navarro-Botello exception.
We understand but reject Bolinger's argument. The plain meaning of the plea agreement is that Bolinger waived his right to appeal the sentence under section 3742 unless he received a term of incarceration in excess of 36 months. The sentence does not exceed the 36 month cap; therefore, Bolinger has waived his right to appeal the application of the guidelines.
Were we to accept Bolinger's argument, his express waiver of the right to appeal the sentence would be a nullity. By his approach, any claim pursuant to section 3742 would provide a sufficient basis to bypass the appeal waiver under the Navarro-Botello exception. Neither the terms of this plea agreement nor our decision in Navarro-Botello support such an approach. 1
Because we enforce Bolinger's waiver of his right to appeal the sentence, we do not consider his underlying claims that the district court misapplied the guidelines.
As a special condition of Bolinger's supervised release, the district court directed that he "not participate in the activities, or be a member of any motorcycle clubs, including but not limited to the Dirty Dozen." Bolinger argues that this condition impermissibly restricts his freedom of association.
The sentencing judge has broad discretion in setting probation conditions, including restricting fundamental rights. United States v. Lowe, 654 F.2d 562, 567 (9th Cir.1981). The restriction on Bolinger's association rights is valid if: (1) primarily designed to meet the ends of rehabilitation and protection of the public and (2) reasonably related to such ends. United States v. Terrigno, 838 F.2d 371, 374 (9th Cir.1988).
The sentencing judge could properly have concluded that Bolinger was more likely to relapse into crime if he returned to his prior associations. Probation conditions may seek to prevent reversion into a former crime-inducing lifestyle by barring contact with old haunts and associates, even though the activities may be legal. Malone v. United States, 502 F.2d 554, 556-57 (9th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1124, 95 S.Ct. 809, 42 L.Ed.2d 824 (1975).
The condition barring Bolinger from associating with motorcycle clubs was not outside the sentencing judge's broad discretion.
AFFIRMED.
This case asks whether district courts may incorrectly apply the Sentencing Guidelines in plea agreements as long as they sentence under an agreed cap. Because a primary purpose of the Guidelines was to create uniformity in sentencing, see U.S.S.G. Ch. 1, Pt. A, intro. comment., I must respectfully dissent from Part II-A of a decision that allows such broad license to the district courts in contravention of the Sentencing Commission's intent.
I first think it important to note a few facts that the majority's opinion has omitted. The initial plea agreement into which the parties entered contained language stating, "The parties agree that the Sentencing Guidelines will not apply in this case." The district court, however, said that it could not permit such a statement to be included; the Guidelines, it said, could not be circumvented by plea. As a result, that sentence in the agreement was changed to the following: "The parties agree that the Court may depart upward or downward under the sentencing guidelines." (emphasis added). The agreement on sentencing thus read:
Defendant may be sentenced to a period of incarceration which is not to exceed 36 months. The parties agree that the Court may depart upward or downward under the sentencing guidelines. The court may, at its discretion, sentence defendant to a period of incarceration of between zero and thirty-six months, including a sentence of probation.
The court then found that the offense level should be 12 and the criminal history category IV, yielding a range of 21-27 months. It departed from the range and imposed a sentence of 36 months based on three reasons: 1) the defendant's criminal history was under-represented; 2) the parties had stipulated in the plea agreement to a departure of up to 36 months; and 3) the defendant's connection to the drug transactions was a "close question."
While there is no doubt that the plea agreement also contained a waiver of appeal, it is instructive to listen to what the district court said at sentencing:
Mr. Bolinger, you have waived appeal rights, including those set forth in 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3742. Out of an abundance of caution, to the full extent that that waiver is in any way not full and complete, I want to advise you that you may have certain limited rights to appeal under that statute.
(emphasis added). Bolinger now appeals his sentence, claiming that the district court improperly set out his offense level and then improperly departed from that level to 36 months. The majority agrees with the government that his appeal is barred by the waiver in the plea agreement. I do not.
As the majority explains, whether the appellant waived his...
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