U.S. v. Boone
| Decision Date | 05 May 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 91-8417,91-8417 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Samuel Randolph BOONE, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
Charles T. Erion, Erion & Exum, Macon, Ga., for defendant-appellant.
Paul C. McCommon, III, Asst. U.S. Atty., Macon, Ga., for plaintiff-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia.
Before FAY and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges, and ATKINS *, Senior District Judge.
This appeal arises from the conviction of the defendant-appellant, Samuel Randolph Boone, in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia. The defendant challenges his convictions under the Federal Kidnapping Act and the Dyer Act, arguing that his federal prosecution was barred by prosecutorial delay in the state courts of Georgia and that his actions did not violate the Federal Kidnapping Act. For the reasons that follow, we AFFIRM IN PART, REVERSE IN PART, and REMAND for a new trial.
On July 31, 1985, Jonathan Mark Wood left his home in Scottsboro, Alabama to look for work in Jacksonville, Florida. His wife expected him home on either August 1 or August 2. During his stay in Jacksonville, however, Wood met defendant-appellant Samuel Randolph Boone. As a result of this encounter, Wood never made it back to his home and family.
Wood met Boone in Jacksonville on August 1, 1985. According to statements Boone made to authorities, the two men drank together and used drugs during that afternoon and evening. Boone further revealed that he again encountered Wood on the following day, after seeing Wood asleep in his maroon Toyota Corolla. Boone admitted that he then induced Wood to travel with him to Georgia, falsely telling Wood of a marijuana patch in Georgia. The two men left for Georgia and the nonexistent marijuana patch, Boone having taken the wheel of Wood's Toyota.
On their way to the marijuana patch, Boone and Wood stopped for fuel and beer on Interstate 10. Boone again took the wheel. The car trip continued across the Florida-Georgia line and came to an end in a remote rural location outside of Fargo, Georgia, not far from Boone's father's residence. Boone and Wood proceeded on foot into the surrounding wooded area where Boone "borrowed" Wood's lock blade Case knife. After walking some distance into the woods, Wood realized that he had been deceived into believing that a marijuana patch existed. Boone then stabbed Wood in the chest two times and slit Wood's throat. While Wood was still alive, Boone tied Wood's hands and feet, leaving him to die where it was unlikely that he would be found.
After fatally wounding Wood and tying him up, Boone returned to Wood's parked car with Wood's personal possessions. He then drove to his father's nearby trailer home, bathed, got his hair cut, and left tools and a tool belt that belonged to Wood. Shortly thereafter, Boone was back in Wood's car, driving to North Carolina. 1
On August 16, 1985, Boone was arrested in Nash County, North Carolina on charges unrelated to this case. He was carrying Wood's lock blade Case knife and wallet. Among other things, the wallet still contained photographs of Wood's wife and son, Wood's credit cards, and receipts for fuel that had been purchased after August 3, 1985 with Wood's credit cards.
On September 16, 1985, Boone informed authorities in Nash County, North Carolina of the locations where Wood's body and automobile could be found. Although a search soon recovered Wood's Toyota, the initial search for Wood's body failed to uncover anything in the densely wooded area near Fargo. Boone then spoke to his father by telephone and described the specific location of Wood's body. With that information, Boone's father was able to lead authorities to Wood's remains.
On October 1, 1985, Boone gave a sworn statement to the Nash County Sheriff's Department in the presence of his mother. In that statement, Boone recounted the events surrounding the death of Jonathan Mark Wood.
On March 6, 1986, a grand jury of the Superior Court of Clinch County, Georgia indicted Samuel Randolph Boone for two state offenses: the murder of Jonathan Mark Wood and the accompanying thefts by taking. Shortly thereafter, the District Attorney for the Alapaha Judicial Circuit filed a detainer against defendant Boone with the North Carolina Department of Corrections. 2
Due to this detainer, Boone requested that Georgia authorities bring him to trial on the Clinch County, Georgia indictment. That request, received by the district attorney on May 5, 1986, activated the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, see O.C.G.A. § 42-6-20, and required that Boone stand trial in Georgia by October 5, 1986. Failure to comply with the Act's deadline would result in a dismissal of the indictment with prejudice.
Despite these consequences, Boone was not brought to trial within the prescribed time period. The Georgia authorities obtained a superseding indictment against Boone on March 16, 1987, but the two state court indictments were dismissed with prejudice on February 28, 1989 in an "Order of Nolle Prosse." On May 3, 1989, the North Carolina Department of Corrections removed the detainer against Boone.
The record reveals that the United States first learned of Boone's acts in December of 1989. A federal investigation ensued, and on June 28, 1990, a federal grand jury returned a two count indictment charging Boone with a violation of the Federal Kidnapping Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (), and a violation of the Dyer Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2312.
Boone filed a Motion to Dismiss Indictment, claiming that the federal indictment was barred by the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, 18 U.S.C. App. II, and the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. That motion was denied. In addition, both the defendant and the government filed motions focussing on the legal requirements of the Federal Kidnapping Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1201. The district court granted the government's Motion in Limine and denied the defendant's Request to Charge.
On February 26, 1991, Boone was tried and convicted by a jury on both counts of the federal indictment. On May 7, 1991, Boone received a life sentence on Count I (kidnapping) and a five-year sentence on Count II (transporting a stolen vehicle in interstate commerce). The five-year sentence for Count II was to run consecutively to the life sentence for Count I. On May 13, 1991, Boone filed a timely notice of appeal.
On appeal, Boone argues that the district court committed error when it denied his Motion to Dismiss Indictment. Boone also contends that the district court erred in its interpretation of the Federal Kidnapping Act, thereby committing a number of errors requiring the reversal of his conviction. 3
Boone argues that the federal indictment which led to his conviction should have been dismissed in accordance with the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act and the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. His argument rests on the delay of Georgia authorities in bringing him to trial after the initial March 6, 1986 indictment was returned against him in the Superior Court of Clinch County, Georgia. He contends that the pendency of the state court indictment and the delay by Georgia authorities should prevent a subsequent federal prosecution arising from the same events.
Under these circumstances, however, the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act has not been violated or circumvented by federal authorities. Boone has never been tried in the state courts of Georgia, and he has never been convicted of violating Georgia law. Instead, he was tried in the United States District Court for violations of federal law. The Georgia indictments brought within the Act have been properly dismissed with prejudice, thereby safeguarding Boone from a later prosecution under Georgia law for the capital offense of murder and for the thefts accompanying that murder. The dismissal of those indictments, however, does not prevent a subsequent federal prosecution. The Act does not create consequences beyond those accompanying the dismissal with prejudice of the particular indictment that was subject to the Act's time constraints. In other words, the Act does not prevent subsequent indictments that would not be barred by the protections against double jeopardy. Furthermore, there have been no allegations that the United States independently violated the Act in its prosecutorial efforts against Boone.
Similarly, the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments do not bar the federal prosecution against Boone. Any arguably improper or unconstitutional delay in the prosecution of Boone was occasioned solely by Georgia authorities. There is no basis here for imputing Georgia's dilatory conduct to the United States or to the federal prosecution. On the contrary, the United States appears to have proceeded in an expedient and timely fashion once it learned of Boone and his actions in December of 1989. The government indicted him on June 28, 1990 and brought him to trial on February 26, 1991. The government acted within the statute of limitations period, and there has been no showing that any delay was the result of federal authorities seeking advantage.
Under these circumstances, we reject Boone's challenges to his federal indictment and affirm the district court's denial of the Motion to Dismiss Indictment.
Boone next challenges his conviction on the basis of the district court's interpretation of the Federal Kidnapping Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1201. In pertinent part, this statute provides for the following:
Whoever unlawfully seizes, confines, inveigles, decoys, kidnaps, abducts, or carries away and holds for ransom or reward or otherwise any...
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