U.S. v. Bowie
Decision Date | 27 May 1975 |
Docket Number | No. 74-1499,74-1499 |
Citation | 515 F.2d 3 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Paul Edward BOWIE, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Aaron E. Goodstein, Milwaukee, Wis., for defendant-appellant.
William J. Mulligan, U. S. Atty., David B. Bukey, Asst. U. S. Atty., Milwaukee, Wis., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before CUMMINGS and PELL, Circuit Judges, and CAMPBELL, Senior District Judge. *
In April 1973, a two-count indictment was returned against Paul Bowie, Carl Higgans and Houston Watkins concerning the robbery of the University National Bank in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, on October 31, 1972. The first count alleged that these three individuals took The evidence showed that three black males spent approximately five minutes robbing the bank of some $15,000 at 11 A.M. on October 31, 1972. They were wearing masks and were respectively described as tall, medium and short. The Government's theory was that Bowie was the shortest of the robbers, wore a mask only over the lower portion of his face and carried a gun when he went behind the tellers' cages to collect the money. When he reached down to pick up some of the money, his mask slipped somewhat from its original position just below his nose. The testimony does not make clear how much of his face was then visible, except that his moustache was exposed, while a small beard would not have been.
$15,845 from the bank "by force and violence and by intimidation" in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). The second count charged them with obtaining that sum by putting in jeopardy the lives of bank employees by using a revolver and sawed-off shotgun in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d). The trial court granted severance to all defendants. In Bowie's trial a jury returned a verdict of guilty as to Count II after the court had instructed the jurors that "If the Government has met its burden as to Count No. II, then you don't have to consider Count No. I." Thereafter the court granted the Government's motion to dismiss Count I of the indictment. Subject to 18 U.S.C. § 4208(a)(2), Bowie received an eight-year prison term.
On November 2, 1972, Exhibit 25, consisting of five black and white photos, was displayed to bank employees George Dearborn and Cindy Spoerl. Both of them selected photo 25.4, a picture of Bowie, as one of the bank robbers.
On January 11, 1973, the same witnesses were shown Exhibit 13, consisting of six color photos. They selected picture 13.1A, a later photograph of the defendant, as being the photograph most closely resembling one of the bank robbers.
On September 5, 1973, bank customer Cornell Westmoreland also selected photo 13.1A from the six photographs in Exhibit 13 as most closely resembling one of the robbers.
In September 1973, at the trial of co-defendant Carl Higgans, each of the foregoing bank employees was again shown the same photographic displays as before and testified as to their selections. A physical lineup of Bowie was never conducted.
Bowie first asserts that all testimony regarding pretrial photographic selection and all subsequent in-court identification should have been suppressed, claiming that the photographic identification procedure was "so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification." Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247. This issue is to be resolved only after an examination of the "totality of the circumstances" in the case. Simmons v. United States, supra at 383, 88 S.Ct. 967, 971; United States ex rel. Pierce v. Cannon, 508 F.2d 197, 200 (7th Cir. 1974).
As to the November 2, 1972, showing of five black and white photographs (Exhibit 25) to eyewitnesses Dearborn and Spoerl, Bowie complains that it was impermissibly suggestive because four of the persons portrayed were standing next to a height chart and only two of them were close in height to the shortest man involved in the robbery. 1 Actually, two of the photographs pictured subjects who were 5 earlier identifications.
not assert that the investigating agents allowed multiple witnesses to view simultaneously a display which included defendant's photo, so that the first to choose might influence the others, 2 nor does he contend the agents indicated to the witnesses that defendant's photo pictured the person the agents suspected was most likely to be the bank robber. Furthermore, under the circumstances of this display, where all persons pictured were of the same race, approximate age and body type, it was not necessary to include more than five photos in the display. See United States v. Gornick, 448 F.2d 566 (7th Cir. 1971), certiorari denied, 404 U.S. 861, 92 S.Ct. 161, 30 L.Ed.2d 103; United States v. Zeiler, 447 F.2d 993 (3d Cir. 1971); and United States v. Bennett, 409 F.2d 888 (2d Cir. 1969), certiorari denied, 396 U.S. 852, 90 S.Ct. 113, 24 L.Ed.2d 256, all of which involved spreads of six photos. Consequently, the initial showings to Spoerl and Dearborn were not suggestive.
Bowie assails both the January 11th showing of Exhibit 13 to Dearborn and Spoerl and its September 3rd showing to Westmoreland, stating that these displays did not fulfill any investigative need because Bowie had already been arrested and indicted when they took place. A prosecutor need not forego a presentation of a better quality and more recent display to witnesses who have already identified a defendant, nor a presentation of such a display to other witnesses, who have not yet identified anyone, simply because an indictment has been returned. Cf. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 93 S.Ct. 2568, 37 L.Ed.2d 619. Defendant has shown no improper motivation on the part of the prosecution in offering the color display to the witnesses after the indictment. The initial showing of the color display to Westmoreland was in all other respects, as well, proper.
Bowie's contention that the pretrial displays were unfair because they were not coupled with a lineup must be rejected. The failure to conduct a lineup does not invalidate such pretrial photographic identification. United States v. Evans, 484 F.2d 1178, 1186 (2d Cir. 1973).
Under the rationale of Simmons, upon which defendant relies so heavily, the initial identification by each witness is the crucial point. The risk described by Justice Harlan in Simmons is that an initial photographic misidentification, which was the product of improper It is also noteworthy that defendant's counsel fully explored the identification procedures before the jury while cross-examining the witnesses who had identified defendant. With each witness he explored all of the circumstances surrounding the prior photographic identification and specifically inquired whether the witnesses were able to identify defendant in court from memory of the actual robbery or from pictures which they had selected prior to trial. We realize that a verdict of guilty after wide-ranging cross-examination of identifying witnesses does not automatically dispose of a defendant's claim of impermissible suggestion in pretrial photographic displays. Where, however, defendant's counsel has on cross-examination explored and attacked each witness' basis for identifying the defendant, irreparable prejudice from pretrial photographic identification is not likely. In light of the "totality of the circumstances" involved in this case, the district court correctly admitted both the earlier photographic and the in-court identifications.
suggestions, might be perpetuated in any subsequent identification, including that made in court. This is so because a witness might tend to identify the defendant based on his memory of the photograph selected from the first, suggestive display, rather than from actual memory of the event. 3 If, however, the initial display is not improper and the witnesses make subsequent selections in some part from memory of the first photograph that they selected, the risk of misidentification is reduced, for the original selection was not a product of impermissible...
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