U.S. v. Bradford, 679
Citation | 645 F.2d 115 |
Decision Date | 19 March 1981 |
Docket Number | D,No. 679,679 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. William S. BRADFORD, Appellant. ocket 80-1380. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
F. Mac Buckley, Hartford, Conn., for appellant.
Holly B. Fitzsimmon, Asst. U. S. Atty., Bridgeport, Conn. (Richard Blumenthal, U. S. Atty., D. Connecticut, Michael Plantamura Before MOORE, MANSFIELD and MULLIGAN, Circuit Judges.
Law Student Intern, Bridgeport, Conn., of counsel), for appellee.
This appeal raises the question of the extent to which a sentencing judge may take into consideration the defendant's refusal to cooperate with law enforcement authorities by providing incriminatory information with respect to others. We hold that the sentencing judge properly took into consideration this factor among others.
William S. Bradford appeals from a judgment of the District Court for the District of Connecticut entered on September 11, 1980, by Judge Jose A. Cabranes upon his plea of guilty to three counts of an information charging use of a telephone to facilitate distribution of a controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. § 843(b), and unlawful possession of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. § 844(a). Bradford was sentenced to serve consecutive terms of imprisonment totalling six years and to pay a $30,000 fine. His two co-defendants, Ulysses Jose Orduz and William Edward Moran, Jr., who pleaded guilty to similar informations, received substantially lesser sentences.
The guilty pleas were entered after three days of trial upon indictments charging the three defendants with violations of federal narcotics laws, for which the informations to which they pleaded guilty were substituted. The record reveals that Bradford was arrested when he attempted to sell a pound of cocaine to undercover agents pursuant to negotiations made by the co-defendants, two college students, as the front men. Upon the agents' identifying themselves, Bradford fled the scene, discarding a shoulder bag containing the cocaine, and was apprehended in a nearby field. Prior to imposing sentence Judge Cabranes received a very substantial amount of data bearing on the sentence to be imposed, including a 38-page memorandum from a psychiatrist, numerous letters on Bradford's behalf, and a pre-sentence report from the probation office.
At the sentencing hearing the trial judge noted various factors considered by him as bearing on the sentence to be imposed, including that Bradford, 47 years old, had a "strong motivation for greed," that he had "corrupted" and "victimized" his two younger co-defendants, that he was the source of the cocaine and "the person with the most to gain from the plot," and that he had "refused to assist the Government's efforts to detect and prosecute the perpetrators of such large-scale criminal activity." Judge Cabranes further stated that it was "appropriate ... to take into account this (latter) factor, along with the other relevant considerations" in sentencing Bradford.
In an addendum to the pre-sentence report Bradford had stated with reference to his failure to cooperate that his source was "not a very active dealer," that the source had "been a friend ... and always treated me with respect and honesty," and that Bradford did not want to furnish the supplier's name because
After sentence was imposed, Bradford's counsel stated:
(Tr. 53).
However, at no time, before or after sentence, did Bradford offer to furnish evidence or details, in camera or otherwise, in support of his statement.
Bradford contends that the sentencing judge here erred in taking into consideration his refusal to cooperate, at least after he had stated to the court his reasons for not doing so. Subject to the caveats noted below, we disagree. A defendant's cooperation may, of course, be taken into consideration by a sentencing judge as a mitigating factor tending to evidence his potential for rehabilitation. United States v. Sweig, 454 F.2d 181 (2d Cir. 1972). On the other hand, a sentence may not, because of a defendant's refusal to cooperate, be increased or additional punishment imposed beyond what would otherwise have been meted out. DiGiovanni v. United States, 596 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1979).
United States v. Ramos, 572 F.2d 360, 363 n.2 (2d Cir. 1978).
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State v. Angel M.
...cooperation with the authorities and administering additional punishment because of a refusal to cooperate. United States v. Bradford, 645 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1981). I do not share the majority's view that this distinction is 'somewhat illusory,' though I acknowledge that doubts about the mat......
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State v. Angel M.
...cooperation with the authorities and administering additional punishment because of a refusal to cooperate. United States v. Bradford , 645 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1981). I do not share the majority's view that this distinction is ‘somewhat illusory,’ though I acknowledge that doubts about the ma......
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State v. Angel M.
... ... would be acknowledging the very distinction that the ... defendant would have us reject. Under that rule, then, it ... would appear that a court would be barred from granting ... cooperate. United States v. Bradford , 645 F.2d 115 ... (2d Cir. 1981). I do not share the majority's view that ... this ... See, ... e.g. State v. Darden , 171 Conn. 677, 679-80, 372 ... A.2d 99 (1976) (‘‘the [state] constitution ... assigns to the ... ...
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US v. Rogers
...silence has committed no additional offense.'" United States v. Stratton, 820 F.2d 562, 564 (2d Cir.1987) ((quoting United States v. Bradford, 645 F.2d 115, 117 (2d Cir.1981)) (quoting United States v. Ramos, 572 F.2d 360, 363 n. 2 (2d Cir.1978))); see also Damiano v. Gaughan, 770 F.2d 1, 3......