U.S. v. Bradford, 06-CR-12-LRR.

• Decision Date: 02 June 2006
• Docket Number: No. 06-CR-12-LRR.,06-CR-12-LRR.
• Citation: 433 F.Supp.2d 1001
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Steven BRADFORD, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa

433 F.Supp.2d 1001

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Steven BRADFORD, Defendant.

No. 06-CR-12-LRR.

United States District Court, N.D. Iowa, Cedar Rapids Division.

June 2, 2006.

Charles J. Williams, U.S. Attorney's Office, Cedar Rapids, IA, for Plaintiff.

Thomas P. Frerichs, Frerichs Law Office PC, Waterloo, IA, Webb L. Wassmer, Simmons Perrine Albright Ellwood, Cedar Rapids, IA, for Defendant.

ORDER

READE, District Judge.

                TABLE OF CONTENTS
                I.  INTRODUCTION....................................................1002
                 II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW..............................................1002
                III.  OBJECTION.......................................................1002
                 IV.  PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND...............................1003
                  V.  THE MERITS......................................................1003
                 VI.  CONCLUSION......................................................1007
                

I. INTRODUCTION

Before the court is the government's Objection ("Objections") (docket no. 28) to Chief Magistrate. Judge John A. Jarvey's Report and Recommendation (docket no. 26) granting Defendant's Motion for Specific Performance of Plea Agreement and Motion to Dismiss (docket no. 10).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court judge must make a de novo determination of those portions of a magistrate judge's report or recommendation to which a party objects. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see, e.g., United States v. Lothridge, 324 F.3d 599, 600 (8th Cir. 2003). The judge may accept, reject or modify, in whole or in part, the magistrate judge's findings and recommendations. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Because the government has made timely and specific objections in this case, the following de novo review is required. Id.

III. OBJECTION

The government objects to the legal conclusion in the Report and Recommendation that the government breached its December 12, 2005 plea agreement with Defendant when the grand jury charged him in the instant one-count Indictment. Specifically, the government contends that Magistrate Judge Jarvey (1) improperly reasoned that the phrase "arising from" is broader than the phrase "based upon" and (2) ignored the language in the plea agreement which provides: "If this office becomes aware of evidence of additional crimes warranting criminal prosecution, all information in our possession could be used in such a prosecution." For these reasons, the government objects to Magistrate Judge Jarvey's recommendation to order specific performance of the plea agreement and to dismiss the Indictment.

IV. PROCEDURAL & FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Neither party objects to Magistrate Judge Jarvey's factual findings or his recitation of the procedural history of this case. The court has independently reviewed the record and finds the Report and Recommendation accurately sets forth the facts of the case and the prior proceedings up until the time of the filing of the Report and Recommendation. The court, therefore, accepts the procedural history and factual findings as set forth in the Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see, e.g., Lothridge, 324 F.3d at 600.

After Magistrate Judge Jarvey filed the Report and Recommendation on May 18, 2006, the government filed the instant Objections on May 19, 2006. Defendant filed a Response on the same date.

V. THE MERITS

As noted in the Report and Recommendation, the plea agreement at issue in this case contained the following statement:

The U.S. Attorney's Office for this District ..., will file no additional Title 21 drug-related criminal charges based upon or arising from information now in our possession. If this office becomes aware of evidence of additional crimes warranting criminal prosecution, all information in our possession could be used in such a prosecution.

(Emphasis added.) The italicized portion of this excerpt was handwritten into the plea agreement by Defendant. Neither party objects to Magistrate Judge Jarvey's legal conclusion "that December 12, 2005 is the applicable date for determining what information was in the government's possession." United States v. Bradford, No. 06-CR12, 2006 WL 1390401, at *4 (N.D.Iowa May 18, 2006).

The December 12, 2005 plea agreement is a contract between Defendant and the government. Margalli-Olvera v. INS, 43 F.3d 345, 351 (8th Cir.1994). Ordinary contract principles apply. United States v. Norris, 439 F.3d 916, 919 (8th Cir.2006). To interpret the plea agreement, the court must apply the federal common law of contracts, which is informed by federal cases, state cases and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, insofar as such jurisprudence fairly typifies the general law of contracts. See United States v. Andreas, 216 F.3d 645, 663 & 663 n. 5 (7th Cir.2000) (applying federal common law to interpret an immunity agreement and relying on state cases, federal cases and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts).

The court agrees with Magistrate Judge Jarvey's conclusion that the phrase "arising from" is broader than the phrase "based upon." In the federal common law of contracts, "arising from" is a broad contractual phrase that encompasses almost any causal connection or relationship. See Interface Group-Nevada, Inc. v. Freeman Decorating Co., 222 Ga.App. 44, 473 S.E.2d 573, 575 (1996) (concluding that the phrase "arising from" in contracts "has been held to encompass almost any causal connection or relationship" (internal quotation omitted)); see also Acceptance Ins. Co. v. Syufy Enters., 69 Cal.App.4th 321, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 557, 561 (1999) ("California courts have consistently given a broad interpretation to the terms `arising out of' and `arising from' in various kinds of insurance provisions .... [This language] connotes only a minimum causal connection or incidental relationship."); cf. Youn v. Track, Inc., 324 F.3d 409, 419 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding the "arising from" requirement in test for specific personal jurisdiction is satisfied "`if the cause of action is `related to' or `connected with' the defendant's forum contacts.'" (quoting Third Nat'l Bank in Nashville v. WEDGE Group, Inc., 882 F.2d 1087, 1091 n. 2 (6th Cir.1999)); Hamilton v. United Healthcare of La., Inc., 310 F.3d 385, 391 (5th Cir.2002) (construing "arising out of for purposes of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act as "in short, `incident to, or having connection with'" and commenting that the phrase is "of much broader significance than `caused by'" (quoting Red Ball Motor Freight, Inc. v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. of Wis., 189 F.2d 374, 378 (5th Cir.1951)); Meade v. Ries, 642 N.W.2d 237, 243 (Iowa 2002) (defining "arises out of' for purposes of workers' compensation statute as "a causal connection"); Galloway v. Hardison, 166 Tenn. 135, 60 S.W.2d 155, 157 (1933) (holding that "arising from partnership transactions" in a will referred to "all obligations growing out of such a business connection and association; whatever accounts were incident to the partnership relationship"). To the contrary, the phrase "based upon" is a narrower phrase that implies "a degree of closeness ... that is considerably greater than common law causation requirements."<sup>1</sup> See Transatlantic Shiffahrtskontor, GmbH v. Shanghai Foreign Trade Corp., 204 F.3d 384, 390 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 357, 113 S.Ct. 1471, 123 L.Ed.2d 47 (1993)); see also Nelson, 507 U.S. at 358, 113 S.Ct. 1471 (holding that "[t]he only reasonable reading of [the term "based upon"] calls for something more than a mere connection with ... or relation to"); cf. BP Chems. Ltd. v. Jiangsu Sopo Corp., 285 F.3d 677, 682 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that a claim is "based upon" events in the United States, for purposes of Foreign Services Immunities Act, "`if those events establish a legal element of the claim'" (quoting Santos v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 934 F.2d 890, 893 (7th Cir.1991)); Minn. Assn of Nurse Anesthetists v. Allina Health Sys. Corp., 276 F.3d 1032, 1045-47 (8th Cir.2002) (holding allegations in qui tam suit are "based upon" public disclosure "whenever the allegations in the suit and in the disclosure are the same"). But see Mount Vernon Fire Ins. Co. v. Creative Housing Ltd., 88 N.Y.2d 347, 645 N.Y.S.2d 433, 668 N.E.2d 404, 406 (1996) ("There is no significant difference between the meaning of the phrases `based on' and `arising out of in the coverage or exclusion clauses of an insurance policy."), answer to certified question conformed to, 93 F.3d 63, 66 (2d Cir.1996).

With this understanding of the language in the plea agreement, the court also agrees with Magistrate Judge Jarvey that the instant one-count Indictment is a Title 21 drug-related criminal charge "arising from" information in the government's possession on December 12, 2005. Therefore, the court also agrees that the instant Indictment should be dismissed to uphold the government's promise in the plea agreement. The instant prosecution "arises from" information in the possession of the government on December 12, 2005. Count 1 of the Indictment charges Defendant with "knowingly and intentionally distribut[ing] a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of heroin, a Schedule I Controlled Substance, to J.H. [on June 10, 2004], resulting in the death of J.H. from use of the controlled substance," in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C). Count 1 "arises from" the following information in the possession of the government on December 12, 2005:

1. J.H. died of a heroin overdose on June 11, 2004;

2. Rachel Hoskins and James Callanan were with J.H. at the time of his death and were aware of some of the circumstances surrounding his purchase of the heroin that killed him;

3. According to Hoskins, J.H. went into an unidentified house around Seventeenth Street SE and Eighth Avenue SE to purchase heroin;

4. According to Callanan's initial statements to law enforcement personnel, J.H. went into an alley around Fifteenth Street SE and Fifth Avenue SE to purchase heroin from "a...