U.S. v. Bradshaw

• Decision Date: 30 June 1975
• Docket Number: No. 74-1778,74-1778
• Citation: 169 U.S.App.D.C. 129,515 F.2d 360
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellant, v. Michael J. BRADSHAW and Vance E. Robinson, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

Page 360

515 F.2d 360

169 U.S.App.D.C. 129

UNITED STATES of America, Appellant, v. Michael J. BRADSHAW and Vance E. Robinson, Appellee.

No. 74-1778.

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued Oct. 25, 1974.

Decided June 30, 1975.

Jeffrey T. Demerath, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Earl J. Silbert, U. S. Atty., John A. Terry, James F. Rutherford, and James F. McMullin, Asst. U. S. Attys., were on the brief for appellant.

Theodore J. Christensen, Washington, D. C. (appointed by this Court), for appellee Robinson.

Before BAZELON, Chief Judge, WRIGHT, Circuit Judge, and MERHIGE, ^* United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia.

Opinion for the Court filed by District Judge MERHIGE.

MERHIGE, District Judge.

The Government appeals from the District Court's order suppressing certain items guns, money, clothing and other relevant items seized by the metropolitan police without a warrant from a parked and occupantless car that had allegedly been used by appellee Robinson as the getaway car in a bank robbery. We conclude that the District Court was not clearly erroneous and affirm.

I.

On the 21st of March, 1974, at about 11:15 a. m., a branch of the American Security & Trust Company, a federally insured institution located at 822 East Capitol Street, N.E., Washington, D. C., was robbed by four black males. Moments later a witness, Ms. Eleanor Leary, who was in the process of parking her car near the intersection of 8th and A Streets, observed four black men trotting north on 8th Street in her direction. Two of them got into a two-toned tan luxury automobile (later identified as a Cadillac Eldorado) and departed the scene; one crossed the street and fled in a second vehicle; and the fourth continued his flight on foot. Alerted by the siren from a passing police car, Ms. Leary approached two policemen who had arrived on the scene and told them what she had seen. The police in turn relayed her information to the police communications office via their squad car radio. The officers next escorted Ms. Leary to the bank premises where she talked with several investigating detectives and then took her home.

At approximately 11:25 a. m., officers Schlueter and Perkins, who were on routine patrol at the intersection of 6th and K Streets, N. E., received a flash message over their squad car radio directing them to be on the lookout for a "tan luxury auto occupied by two Negro males, last seen heading north on 8th Street, N.E." The officers were told that the car was wanted in connection with a possible bank robbery. Almost simultaneously, the officers saw Robinson's tan Eldorado Cadillac pass in the opposite lane heading north. The officers turned their marked squad car around and followed the Eldorado to 7th and Orleans Streets where it pulled over to the left curb of the street and came to a halt. It was raining very hard that day and the two suspects remained in the Eldorado for a few moments before alighting. Robinson, the driver, got out, looked over at the officers, smiled at them and then reached into the back seat to get a coat which he put on. Robinson and the passenger, who had no coat, then began walking south toward Morton Place, N.E., where they met a third person. Robinson and this third person walked into a house at 1111 7th Street, while the passenger continued walking down Morton Place.

After the two suspects had departed, Officers Schlueter and Perkins drove around the block and came up behind the Eldorado where they noticed a cable wire hanging from the trunk, which they took to be indicative of the trunk having been closed in a hurry, so they decided to take a closer look. When they looked through a window of the Eldorado, they saw a bundle of clothing with a blue coat on top beneath the passenger seat. At some point they tried to open the doors of the Eldorado but found that they were locked. Thinking it odd that the passenger had walked out into a heavy rain without putting on a coat, they called for assistance, and parked in a nearby alley where they could keep the car in sight.

Within fifteen minutes, a Detective Fontana and several others arrived at the location of the vehicle. Detective Fontana testified that when he arrived there were "about ten" police officers in the vicinity of the car. (Tr. 14). Meanwhile, a Detective Kaclik and an F.B.I. agent picked up Ms. Leary at her home and drove her to Orleans Place where she positively identified the Eldorado as one she had seen earlier. This identification was made approximately forty-five to fifty-five minutes after the robbery. (Compare Tr. 18 with Tr. 107). Officer Fontana then called a Mobile Crime Lab for assistance in opening the vehicle. After the arrival of the Mobile Crime Lab, Detective Fontana did not call on the crime lab technician to open the doors of the vehicle, but enlisted instead the aid of a young passer-by and paid him a dollar to reach through a partially open window of the car and lift the lock. With the car unlocked, ¹ Officer Alford of the Mobile Crime Lab conducted a search of the passenger section and found money and a revolver beneath the front seat. The car was then taken to the Fifth District headquarters where the police opened the trunk and found a carbine, money and a large purse-type bag similar to one carried by the bank robbers. During his search of the car, Officer Alford discovered a registered letter bearing Robinson's name and a nearby address. Police officers went immediately to this address but found the apartment empty.

In an eight count indictment filed May 2, 1974, Robinson and a co-defendant were charged with armed bank robbery, bank robbery, armed robbery, robbery, assault with a dangerous weapon, and Robinson was additionally charged with two counts of carrying a dangerous weapon. Subsequently, on May 17, 1974, Robinson filed a motion to suppress the fruits of the automobile search.

On the basis of the facts just recounted, the District Court, after hearings held on June 21 and 24, 1974, granted Robinson's motion to suppress the evidence. While finding probable cause to search, it nevertheless held the Government had failed to prove sufficient exigency to justify the failure of the police to obtain a search warrant and suppressed the fruits of the automobile search.

II.

We start from the premise that law enforcement officers in order to obtain legal validation of their efforts must still comply with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment when conducting a search of an automobile. While the Supreme Court has permitted a relaxation of certain Fourth Amendment standards in the context of automobile searches and seizures, see Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 589-90, 94 S.Ct. 2464, 41 L.Ed.2d 325 (1974), the probable cause, neutral magistrate and warrant requirements still have force in the context of such a search. There is no case which establishes the proposition that law enforcement officers in "every conceivable circumstance" may dispense with the warrant requirement in the context of an automobile search. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 50, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970). "The word 'automobile' is not a talisman in whose presence the Fourth Amendment fades away and disappears." Coolidge v. New Hampshire,403 U.S. 443, 461-62, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2035, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971). Indeed, the Government concedes as much. Appellant's Brief at 9.

Nevertheless, the Fourth Amendment requirements have been relaxed somewhat in the specific situation where the police have probable cause to search a stopped automobile and circumstances make securing a warrant impracticable. The Court has endorsed this more permissive approach on two grounds. First, the cases delineate an "exigent circumstances" exception to the warrant requirement founded upon judicial awareness of an automobile's mobility and the often "fleeting" opportunity to conduct a search once probable cause has been obtained. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925); Dyke v. Taylor Implement Co., 391 U.S. 216, 221, 88 S.Ct. 1472, 20 L.Ed.2d 538 (1968); Chambers v. Maroney,399 U.S. 42, 51, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970). This Court has also recognized that it would often be unduly burdensome and unreasonably restrictive to require the police to post a guard and repair to the courthouse for a warrant once they have probable cause to search. United States v. Free,141 U.S.App.D.C. 198, 437 F.2d 631, 635 (1970). Hence, when obtainment of a warrant would unreasonably impair police efficiency by precluding the seizing of the "fleeting instant" or else unreasonably burden effective law enforcement by requiring the expenditure of valuable resources in immobilizing and watching a vehicle, the Fourth Amendment countenances an exception to the warrant requirement. Second, a different standard for automobiles has also been rationalized on the ground that individuals have a lessened expectation of privacy when traveling in autos a car travels in plain view on public thoroughfares and "has little capability for escaping public scrutiny" so that the search of an auto is far less intrusive than a search of a person or home. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590-91, 94 S.Ct. 2464, 41 L.Ed.2d 325 (1974) (Plurality opinion); United States v. Free,supra, at 635.

Fourth Amendment considerations may also vary depending upon whether the car is occupied or unoccupied. In general the "exigency" exception has most often been associated with an occupied car stopped on a highway. See United States v. Free, supra. In Chambers v. Maroney, supra, the Court said:

(Carroll v. United States) holds a search warrant unnecessary where there is probable cause to search an automobile stopped on the highway; the car is movable, the occupants are alerted, and the car's contents may never be found again if a warrant must be obtained. Hence an immediate search is constitutionally permissible. 399...