U.S. v. Bramlett, 96-6453
| Decision Date | 10 July 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 96-6453,96-6453 |
| Citation | 116 F.3d 1403 |
| Parties | 11 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 131 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Allan Rickey BRAMLETT, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
Steven M. Reynolds, U.S. Attorney, Montgomery, AL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Ronald Wayne Wise, William M. Bowen, Montgomery, AL, for Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama.
Before BLACK, Circuit Judge, and FAY and ALARCON *, Senior Circuit Judges.
Appellant United States challenges the district court order granting Appellee Allan Rickey Bramlett's "renewed" motion for a new trial following his federal arson conviction. The district court denied Bramlett's initial motion for a new trial, but our decision in United States v. Denalli, 73 F.3d 328 (11th Cir.), amended on reh'g in part, 90 F.3d 444 (11th Cir.1996), evidently persuaded the court that its jury instructions had understated the requisite nexus with interstate commerce under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i), the federal arson statute. The United States contends that the district court abused its discretion by granting Bramlett's renewed motion for a new trial because it premised its decision upon a misapprehension of the interstate commerce nexus required in the business property context. We decline to address these underlying substantive issues because we conclude the district court lacked jurisdiction to grant the renewed motion for a new trial.
In January of 1993, Appellee Bramlett worked for Vinyl Wholesalers, Inc. ("Vinyl Wholesalers"), a corporation that sold vinyl siding for installation on homes and other buildings. On January 13, 1993, Vinyl Wholesalers employee Bill Hendrix arrived for work at the Montgomery showroom shortly after 7 a.m. As he drove into the parking lot, Hendrix observed Appellee Bramlett's truck already parked near the showroom, nearly one hour earlier than Bramlett ordinarily arrived. When Hendrix left his vehicle, he observed Appellee Bramlett emerging from the showroom. Hendrix attempted to enter the showroom, but Bramlett intercepted him and initiated a conversation regarding a problem with the parking lot fence. Appellee Bramlett then escorted Hendrix to the parking lot to discuss the problem further. Shortly thereafter, Appellee Bramlett indicated that he saw smoke emanating from the showroom building and directed Hendrix's attention to a small fire burning within the showroom building. Hendrix started to run toward the backdoor of the showroom, but Appellee Bramlett stopped him, explaining that he had smelled kerosene while inside. Hendrix then drove to a nearby service station to summon the fire department.
The Montgomery Fire Department arrived within minutes and managed to subdue the blaze. Appellee Bramlett explained to one of the firefighters that he had been in the building prior to the fire, but exited after smelling smoke and kerosene. Investigators for the Fire Department discovered that the fire had been confined to a single office in the center of the building. After the showroom had closed on the previous day, it appeared that someone had moved boxes full of records into that office. The investigators determined that the records and the remainder of the room had then been doused in kerosene and ignited using an open flame, such as a match or a cigarette lighter.
On April 11, 1995, a federal grand jury indicted Appellee Bramlett for starting the fire that damaged the Vinyl Wholesalers showroom. Specifically, the indictment charged that Bramlett had "maliciously damag[ed] and attempt[ed] to damage and destroy by means of fire and explosive materials, [a building] used in an activity affecting interstate commerce, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 844(i)." On January 18, 1996, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama commenced a jury trial on the arson charge. On January 23, 1996, the jury returned a guilty verdict.
On January 26, 1996, Appellee Bramlett filed a motion for a new trial. The district court denied the motion by stamped order issued on January 31, 1996. On March 25, 1996, Bramlett petitioned the district court for reconsideration of his motion for a new trial. The United States filed a memorandum in response on April 4, 1996. By order dated April 23, 1996, the district court granted Appellee Bramlett's renewed motion for a new trial. After reviewing this Court's decision in United States v. Denalli, 73 F.3d 328 (11th Cir.1996), the district court became convinced that its jury instructions had understated the quantum of proof necessary to establish the interstate commerce element of the crime defined by 18 U.S.C. § 844(i). The district court interpreted the Denalli decision to require a substantial effect on interstate commerce. As the court had instructed the jury that a "minimal effect on interstate commerce" sufficed when considering business-related property, the district court decided that it would grant the renewed new trial motion in the interest of justice. The United States filed a timely notice of appeal on May 8, 1996.
Although the parties did not raise the issue, we initially must consider whether the district court had jurisdiction to grant Appellee Bramlett's "renewed" motion for a new trial. Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
The court on motion of a defendant may grant a new trial to that defendant if required in the interest of justice.... A motion for a new trial based on the ground of newly discovered evidence may be made only before or within two years after final judgment, but if an appeal is pending the court may grant the motion only on remand of the case. A motion for new trial based on any other grounds shall be made within 7 days after verdict or finding of guilty or within such further time as the court may fix during the 7-day period.
The time limits imposed by Rule 33 are jurisdictional. See, e.g., United States v. DiBernardo, 880 F.2d 1216, 1223 (11th Cir.1989); United States v. Hall, 854 F.2d 1269, 1272 (11th Cir.1988); United States v. Brown, 587 F.2d 187, 189 (5th Cir.1979). District courts therefore lack jurisdiction to grant a new trial using the "interest of justice" standard unless the motion is filed within seven days after return of the guilty verdict or within any extension granted by the trial judge within the seven-day period. DiBernardo, 880 F.2d at 1223; accord United States v. Coleman, 811 F.2d 804, 806-07 (3d Cir.1987); United States v. Dukes, 727 F.2d 34, 38 (2d Cir.1984); United States v. Hazeem, 679 F.2d 770, 774 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 848, 103 S.Ct. 106, 74 L.Ed.2d 95 (1982); United States v. Fontanez, 628...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Lewis v. City of Union City
... ... on the Wednesday [July 7] or [to] hear from the doctor on Wednesday or for her to bring us something on Wednesday to say here is where we are at or here is where we need to go or ... there ... ...
-
Lewis v. City of Union City
... ... on the Wednesday [July 7] or [to] hear from the doctor on Wednesday or for her to bring us something on Wednesday to say here is where we are at or here is where we need to go or ... there ... ...
-
United States v. Bowen
...that a later, untimely motion cannot relate back to, amend, or renew an original, timely motion. See, e.g., United States v. Bramlett, 116 F.3d 1403, 1405 (11th Cir.1997) (concluding that district courts have no power to construe an untimely motion for a new trial as a renewal of a timely m......
-
U.S. v. Stewart
...on September 30, 2003, are untimely, and any amendments or supplements to those motions are also untimely.6 Cf. United States v. Bramlett, 116 F.3d 1403, 1405 (11th Cir.1997) (holding that renewed motion for a new trial is barred, when made outside the post-verdict 7-day period and outside ......