U.S. v. Branch

Decision Date29 July 1992
Docket NumberNo. 91-5407,91-5407
Citation970 F.2d 1368
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jonathan BRANCH, a/k/a Jamal Jamal, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

Judith Lenore Fitzgerald, Baltimore, Md., for defendant-appellant.

James G. Warwick, Asst. U.S. Atty., Baltimore, Md. (Richard D. Bennett, U.S. Atty., on brief), for plaintiff-appellee.

Before WILKINSON and WILKINS, Circuit Judges, and CHAPMAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

WILKINS, Circuit Judge:

Jonathan Branch appeals his convictions for conspiracy to distribute and distribution of heroin and cocaine, see 18 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West 1969); 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 841, 846 (West 1981 & Supp.1992), and for attempting to evade or defeat income taxes, see 26 U.S.C.A. § 7201 (West 1989). Although Branch raises numerous allegations of error, he primarily argues that the district court erred by conducting an in camera hearing addressing the authenticity of tape recordings of conversations in which Branch and his co-conspirators participated and by not requiring the Government to offer sufficient evidence before the jury to support a finding of authenticity. Finding no error, we affirm.

I.

Branch and his co-conspirators were suspected of heroin and cocaine distribution activities in Baltimore, Maryland. The Government began an investigation into these activities and, subsequently, obtained authorization to place wiretaps on certain telephone lines. Over 80 conversations relating to the conspiracy were recorded as a result of the wiretaps.

Before trial the Government requested an in camera hearing to present testimony that it proposed would establish the authenticity of these tape recordings. The district court conducted the hearing, during which the Government presented the testimony of 26 government agents who monitored the recording of the conversations. These monitors verified the proper operation of the recording devices, their own competence to operate the recorders, the accuracy of the tapes, the improbability of any additions or deletions, and the absence of any inducement by the government that would have encouraged the conversations. Branch objected to authentication of the tapes at the in camera hearing, claiming that this procedure prevented the jury from properly evaluating their accuracy and genuineness. The district court concluded that the Government presented sufficient authenticating evidence and assured Branch that, although the Government would not have to present the testimony of all of the monitors, it would require the Government to lay a proper foundation for admission of the tapes before the jury.

During the nine-day trial, the Government presented testimony from Agent Thompson, the FBI supervisor of the wiretap operations in Baltimore. Thompson identified many of the voices in the recorded conversations and explained how he prepared extracts from the original tape recordings. Earlous Tripp, a co-conspirator who had participated in many of the conversations, also testified to the accuracy of the recordings and provided additional voice identifications. Further, Detective Walter Akers, who participated in the investigation and prepared transcripts of the tapes, identified voices on the tapes. The Government, however, did not present testimony from the monitors. The district court admitted the tapes into evidence over Branch's objection that the Government had failed to present sufficient evidence to allow the jury to find that the tapes were authentic.

II.

Branch argues that the district court conducted an in camera hearing in lieu of requiring the Government to present sufficient evidence at trial to support a finding that the tape recordings were authentic. This procedure, he contends, prevented the jury from properly assessing their authenticity. His argument misconstrues the procedure followed by the district court and evinces a misunderstanding of the showing the Government must make in order to properly authenticate tape recordings.

A.

In order to be relevant and admissible, evidence must have a "tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Fed.R.Evid. 401; see Fed.R.Evid. 402. Authentication "represent[s] a special aspect of relevancy," Fed.R.Evid. 901(a) advisory committee's note, in that evidence cannot have a tendency to make the existence of a disputed fact more or less likely if the evidence is not that which its proponent claims, United States v. Sliker, 751 F.2d 477, 497-99 (2d Cir.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1058, 105 S.Ct. 1772, 84 L.Ed.2d 832, and 471 U.S. 1137, 105 S.Ct. 2679, 86 L.Ed.2d 697 (1985). "The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims." Fed.R.Evid. 901(a).

Resolution of whether evidence is authentic calls for a factual determination by the jury, Sliker, 751 F.2d at 497-99, and admissibility, therefore, is governed by the procedure set forth in Federal Rule of Evidence 104(b) "relating to matters of conditional relevance generally." 5 Weinstein & Berger, Weinstein's Evidence p 901(a), at 901-26 (1991) [hereinafter Weinstein's Evidence ]; see also In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 284-85 (3d Cir.1983), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). 1 Before admitting evidence for consideration by the jury, the district court must determine whether its proponent has offered a satisfactory foundation from which the jury could reasonably find that the evidence is authentic. See Fed.R.Evid. 104(b) advisory committee's note; see also Fed.R.Evid. 901(a) advisory committee's note; see generally 2 Saltzburg & Martin, Federal Rules of Evidence Manual 476-81 (5th ed. 1990). Although the district court is charged with making this preliminary determination, because authentication is essentially a question of conditional relevancy, the jury ultimately resolves whether evidence admitted for its consideration is that which the proponent claims. See id.

Because the ultimate resolution of authenticity is a question for the jury, in rendering its preliminary decision on whether the proponent of evidence has laid a sufficient foundation for admission, the district court must necessarily assess the adequacy of the showing made before the jury. 5 Weinstein's Evidence p 901(a), at 901-27. An in camera hearing addressing authenticity does not replace the presentation of authenticating evidence before the jury; the district court must revisit this issue at trial. Thus, even though the district court may have ruled during an in camera proceeding that the proponent had presented sufficient evidence to support a finding that a tape recording was authentic, evidence that would support this same ruling must be presented again, to the jury, before the tape recording may be admitted.

This is not to say that an in camera hearing to assess the authenticity of evidence may not be appropriate. This procedure insures that the jury will not be tainted by hearing prejudicial evidence--or learning of its existence--until the proponent has demonstrated that it will be able to provide an adequate foundation for admission. Moreover, in deciding the admissibility of tape recordings district courts must consider the statutory requirements imposed by 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2510-21 (West 1970 & Supp.1992) and will often be required to rule on hearsay objections to co-conspirators' statements, see generally Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 107 S.Ct. 2775, 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987). In camera consideration of the admissibility of tape recordings is particularly appropriate under these circumstances. The district court, therefore, did not err in conducting an in camera hearing to address the authenticity of the tape recordings; indeed, this practice may be preferable. 2

...

To continue reading

Request your trial
55 cases
  • Pettiford v. City of Greensboro
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of North Carolina
    • May 30, 2008
    ...the report is third hand and these deficiencies render Flinchum's affidavit inadmissible. Fed.R.Evid. 901(b)(5); United States v. Branch, 970 F.2d 1368, 1371-72 (4th Cir.1992)." Captain Hastings' affidavit suffers from similart flaws. While Hastings lays a sufficient foundation for recogniz......
  • Sublet v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • April 23, 2015
    ...resolves whether evidence admitted for its consideration is that which the proponent claims.”Id., quoting United States v. Branch, 970 F.2d 1368, 1370–71 (4th Cir.1992) (footnotes omitted).41 “The rule preventing impeachment of a witness by extrinsic evidence on a collateral matter is aimed......
  • John Beaudette, Inc. v. Sentry Ins. a Mut. Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts
    • November 2, 1999
    ...policies or some combination thereof constitute the complete and accurate version of the actual policies. See United States v. Branch, 970 F.2d 1368, 1370-1371 (4th Cir. 1992); Ladson v. Ulltra East Parking Corporation, 878 F.Supp. 25, 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); see also Advisory Committee Notes, ......
  • Sublet v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • April 23, 2015
    ...resolves whether evidence admitted for its consideration is that which the proponent claims." Id., quoting United States v. Branch, 970 F.2d 1368, 1370-71 (4th Cir. 1992) (footnotes omitted). 41. "The rule preventing impeachment of a witness by extrinsic evidence on a collateral matter is a......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles
  • Beyond the Bar
    • United States
    • South Carolina Bar South Carolina Lawyer No. 31-6, May 2020
    • Invalid date
    ...is what its proponent claims." See Fed. & S.C. Rs. Evid. 104(b) (conditional relevancy doctrine). See also United States v. Branch, 970 F.2d 1368, 1370-72 (4th Cir. 1992). • Rule 901(b)(1) illustrates one such method of authentication, namely by testimony that a person with knowledge shows ......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT