U.S.A v. Bronzino
| Decision Date | 16 March 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 08-1532.,08-1532. |
| Citation | 598 F.3d 276 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America,Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Vincenzo BRONZINO, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
ARGUED: Carl J. Marlinga, Marlinga Law Group, PLLC, Clinton Township Michigan, for Appellant. Kathleen Moro Nesi, Assistant United States Attorney Detroit, Michigan, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Carl J. Marlinga, Marlinga Law Group, PLLC, Clinton Township, Michigan, for Appellant. Kathleen Moro Nesi Assistant United States Attorney, Detroit Michigan, for Appellee.
Before: MARTIN, ROGERS, and McKEAGUE, Circuit Judges.
Defendant Vincenzo Bronzino was found guilty in a bench trial of aiding and abetting money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2 and § 1956(a)(l)(A)(i) and (B)(ii). He was sentenced to two years' probation and required to pay a $2500 fine. On appeal, Bronzino does not deny that money laundering took place, but contends the prosecution's evidence was insufficient to prove he aided and abetted the offense. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
The evidentiary facts are largely undisputed. On October 22, 2003, defendant Vincenzo Bronzino gave $15,000 worth of lawfully obtained Greektown Casino chips to codefendant Peter Messina in partial payment of an unlawful gambling debt.
Tape-recorded telephone conversations between the two men on October 22, 2003 show that Messina was initially reluctant to accept the chips in payment. Messina doubted that he would be able to cash them in without signing for them. In both conversations, Bronzino reassured Messina that he would be able to cash the chips in without showing identification or signing for them as long as he cashed them in in multiple transactions involving less than $10,000 each.1 It took two conversations, but Bronzino eventually prevailed upon Messina to overcome his reluctance. Later that day, Messina, with the assistance of two associates, cashed in the chips at the Greektown Casino in a manner designed to avoid the applicable currency transaction reporting requirement. Because the chips, in Messina's hands, represented proceeds of unlawful gambling, the intentional structuring of the transaction so as to avoid the reporting requirement constituted unlawful money laundering.
On March 1, 2006, the grand jury in the Eastern District of Michigan returned a thirteen-count indictment, charging fifteen defendants with various racketeering conspiracy, illegal gambling conspiracy, and money laundering offenses. Based on the above conduct, defendant Bronzino was charged in a single count with aiding and abetting money laundering. After a oneday bench trial on July 9, 2007, Bronzino was found guilty. The district court issued an opinion explaining the verdict on August 14, 2007. United States v. Bronzino, 2007 WL 2324978 (E.D.Mich. Aug. 14, 2007) (unpublished). The district court's analysis is summed up rather succinctly:
Bronzino was the teacher and Messina was the pupil. To put it another way, Bronzino was the director and Messina was the actor. Messina was fully aware of the fact that the chips were to be used to pay his gambling debt, only if Messina could cash them in a way that did not cause a report to the IRS to be generated. Initially, Messina did not know how to accomplish this. Once instructed by Bronzino, however, he was able to do so. This is a classic case of an aider and abetter to money laundering, and for these reasons Bronzino is guilty of the crime charged.
Bronzino first contends the verdict is not supported by sufficient evidence. When a defendant challenges his conviction after a bench trial based on insufficiency of the evidence, we must determine "whether after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Caseer, 399 F.3d 828, 840 (6th Cir.2005) (quoting United States v. Bashaw, 982 F.2d 168, 171 (6th Cir.1992)). See also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (same). Every reasonable inference is drawn in favor of the government. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781; Caseer, 399 F.3d at 840.
Again, Bronzino does not argue that the charged money laundering did not occur; only that he was not shown to haveaided and abetted it. To prove aiding and abetting, the government was required to establish two elements: (1) an act by Bronzino that contributed to the commission of the crime; and (2) the intent to aid in the commission of the crime. United States v. Gardner, 488 F.3d 700, 714 (6th Cir.2007). Bronzino contends the evidence presented fails to make out either element (1) because his advisement of how Messina could structure the transaction was a matter of common knowledge and represented minimal contribution to the money laundering; and (2) because he did not join in Messina's intent to commit money laundering.
Bronzino likens his participation to that of defendant Dr. Matthew Piatt in Morei v. United States, 127 F.2d 827 (6th Cir.1942), whose conviction for aiding and abetting the distribution of heroin was reversed. Piatt did nothing more than provide the would-be heroin purchaser with the name and address of a potential supplier. Piatt was not paid anything for his information, was not otherwise involved in the putative transaction, and did not expect to receive anything from the transaction. Id. at 831-32. The court reversed the conviction, concluding that Piatt had not incited or encouraged the commission of the crime, and did not engage in a "purposive association with the venture" or "share in the criminal intent or purpose of the principal." Id. Like Piatt, Bronzino contends he merely provided Messina with information, did not participate in the actual cashing in of the chips, and did not intend to advise Messina on money laundering.
The government argues, however, and the district court agreed, that Bronzino's involvement was more akin to that of defendant Russell Winston in United States v. Winston 687 F.2d 832 (6th Cir.1982). Winston had facilitated a cocaine purchase by setting up the meeting place, introducing the would-be purchaser to the supplier, and accompanying him during the transaction. Id. at 833-34. Though there was no showing that Winston had a personal stake in the transaction, the court held the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, was sufficient to sustain the conviction for aiding and abetting. The court observed that, although Winston never touched or possessed the subject cocaine, he was no mere "knowing spectator, " but was an active participant. Id. at 834-35. Winston was shown to be "the catalyst who put this transaction together." Id. at 835. "He clearly knew what was going on, and he intended by his actions to make the illegal venture succeed." Id.
Similarly here, as the government contends, and the district court found, Bronzino was the catalyst behind Messina's structuring of the transaction to avoid the currency transaction reporting requirement. It is evident that Messina was reluctant to accept the chips because he did not want to have to identify himself to Greektown Casino personnel in cashing them in. Yet, Bronzino, knowing the chips were offered in payment of his unlawful gambling debt, and wanting Messina to accept them, persuaded Messina in two different conversations that he could safely cash them in himself and explained how to do it. It is evident that, but for Bronzino's urgings and encouragement, Messina would not have accepted the chips in payment and would not have structured the cashing-in transaction in such a way as to avoid the reporting requirement.2 Hence, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the government, it is apparent that Bronzino's involvement in and contribution to the unlawful activity, as "teacher" or "director, " is more analogous to Winston's role as "catalyst, " than to Dr. Piatt's role as disinterested provider of information. We thus conclude that the first element of aiding and abetting was established by sufficient evidence.
Bronzino insists that he had no intent specifically to aid Messina in money laundering. The structuring of the transaction served Messina's purpose of avoiding the triggering of the currency transaction reporting requirement. However Bronzino contends that purpose was distinctly Messina's business, a purpose in which he did not join. He simply wanted to persuade Messina to accept the chips in satisfaction of this gambling debt. To be found guilty of aiding and abetting, Bronzino contends, the government was required to prove that he had "the same mental state as that necessary to convict a principal of the offense." United States v. Searan, 259 F.3d 434, 444 (6th Cir.2001). Because his purpose for structuring the transaction was different from Messina's, Bronzino contends they did not have the same mental state.
Bronzino does not deny that money laundering occurred. The particular form of money laundering Bronzino was accused of aiding and abetting is defined at 18 U.S.C. § 1956 as follows:
(a)(1) Whoever, knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction represents the proceeds of...
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