U.S. v. Bucaro, 89-3483

• Citation: 898 F.2d 368
• Decision Date: 01 March 1990
• Docket Number: No. 89-3483,89-3483
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America v. Nancy BUCARO, Larry Lawrence, George Jose Turner, Andre Rashid Kirby and Monica Johnson. Appeal of Andre KIRBY, Appellant. . Submitted Under Third Circuit Rule 12(6)
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Page 368

898 F.2d 368

UNITED STATES of America v. Nancy BUCARO, Larry Lawrence, George Jose Turner, Andre

Rashid Kirby and Monica Johnson.

Appeal of Andre KIRBY, Appellant.

No. 89-3483.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Submitted Under Third Circuit Rule 12(6)

March 1, 1990.

Decided March 14, 1990.

Rehearing and Rehearing In Banc Denied April 11, 1990.

Carl Max Janavitz, Pittsburgh, Pa., for appellant.

Charles D. Sheehy, Acting U.S. Atty., Paul J. Brysh, Asst. U.S. Atty., Pittsburgh, Pa., for appellee.

Before HUTCHINSON and COWEN, Circuit Judges, and LECHNER, District Judge ^*.

OPINION OF THE COURT

HUTCHINSON, Circuit Judge.

In this appeal, we must decide whether a criminal defendant's prior adjudications of juvenile delinquency under Pennsylvania law can be taken into account under the federal sentencing guidelines. The guidelines expressly allow consideration of prior adjudications of juvenile delinquency. Appellant Andre Rashid Kirby (Kirby) contends that the guideline directing their consideration is a violation of the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws and, on this record, also a violation of his due process rights. We reject Kirby's arguments and hold that it was not improper for the district court to consider this criminal defendant's juvenile record in determining his sentence range under the federal guidelines. Consequently, we will affirm the sentence given by the district court.

I.

Kirby was arrested in November 1988 and then indicted by a federal grand jury on three felony counts: under 21 U.S.C.A. Sec. 846 for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and distribution of 3-methyl fentanyl (commonly known as "China white"); under 21 U.S.C.A. Sec. 841(a)(1) for possession with intent to distribute and distribution of 3-methyl fentanyl; and under 21 U.S.C.A. Sec. 841(a)(1) for possession with intent to distribute and distribution of cocaine. Kirby pled guilty to all three felonies. The district court sentenced him to a six-year sentence of incarceration and to concurrent five-year sentences of supervised release on the three counts. Kirby appealed to this Court.

On appeal, Kirby asserts that the district court should not have considered two adjudications of juvenile delinquency that remained on his Pennsylvania state record in determining his sentence range under the sentencing guidelines. ¹ Section 4A1.2(d)(2) of the guidelines specifically requires consideration of juvenile delinquency adjudications. Nevertheless, Kirby argues that application of this guideline section to him violates article I, section 9, clause 3 of the United States Constitution's prohibition against ex post facto laws as well as the Fifth Amendment's due process clause.

Kirby starts with the propositions that Pennsylvania's juvenile justice alternative to the criminal justice system is solely rehabilitative and that a necessary corollary to rehabilitation is a prohibition against the use or consideration of juvenile adjudications during any later criminal proceedings. He intimates that a suggestion to this effect during his Pennsylvania juvenile proceedings influenced the adjudications that were considered by the district court in sentencing him for these federal crimes. Thus, he argues that Sec. 4A1.2(d)(2) of the federal guidelines is an ex post facto law as to him and, presumably, as to any defendant who was adjudicated a delinquent under juvenile laws similar to those in Pennsylvania before Sec. 4A1.2(d)(2) became effective. He also says that the guideline violates due process because it allows a district court to consider prior juvenile adjudications while sentencing a criminal defendant, even if the defendant had no notice that juvenile adjudications could later be used against him in this way.

The district court had subject matter jurisdiction in Kirby's case pursuant to 18 U.S.C.A. Sec. 3231 (West 1985). We have appellate jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 18 U.S.C.A. Sec. 3742(a)(1) (West 1985). Since the question of whether Kirby's prior adjudications of juvenile delinquency can be considered during sentencing is a question of law, we exercise plenary review.

II.

It is not disputed that the district court took Kirby's prior adjudications of juvenile delinquency into consideration during sentencing. The district court initially assigned Kirby an offense level of 25 for sentencing purposes, after taking into account the base offense level, Kirby's supervisory role in the crime and his acceptance of responsibility. By factoring in three points for Kirby's juvenile delinquency record, the court calculated his criminal history category as II. This combination of offense level and criminal history category produced a sentence range under the guidelines of 63 to 78 months. The court chose a sentence of six years, or 72 months, imprisonment. Without the juvenile delinquency adjudications, Kirby would have had a criminal history category of I and the appropriate sentence range would have been 57 to 71 months.

It is clear that under the federal sentencing guidelines, the district court properly factored Kirby's prior juvenile delinquency adjudications into its calculation of his criminal history category. Section 4A1.2(d)(2) of the guidelines states that for offenses committed before age eighteen, a sentencing court should:

(A) add 2 points [to the criminal history category calculation] for each adult or juvenile sentence to confinement of at least sixty days if the defendant was released from such confinement within five years of his commencement of the instant offense;

(B) add 1 point [to the criminal history category calculation] for each adult or juvenile sentence imposed within five years of the defendant's commencement of the instant offense not covered in (A).

III.

Kirby does not argue that the district court misapplied the instructions in this section in calculating his criminal history category. Instead, he asserts that the district court was prohibited from taking his juvenile record into consideration at all during sentencing because Sec. 4A1.2(d)(2) is unconstitutional as applied to him. We will address each of the two theories Kirby advances in support of this contention.

A.

Kirby first says that Sec. 4A1.2(d)(2) of the guidelines is an ex post facto law prohibited by article I, section 9, clause 3 of the United States Constitution. He states that "[i]t is repulsive to our system of justice for a person to be penalized ... for conduct which, at the time of its occurrence, was not illegal." Brief for Appellant at 12.

Kirby's underlying premise is flawed. An ex post facto law is a law that punishes for conduct that was not criminal at the time it occurred or that increases the punishment for an act after the act is done. See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch.) 87, 3 L.Ed. 162 (1810) (ex post facto law is one that makes an act punishable in a manner in which it was not punishable when committed); Government of the Virgin Islands v. Civil, 591 F.2d 255, 258 (3d Cir.1979) (same). ² Kirby is not now being punished for his juvenile conduct. The sentence he received in federal district court was for his involvement in a conspiracy to possess and distribute China white and for his role in the distribution of cocaine. These actions were criminal at the time they were committed, and the guideline that took his prior conduct into account was in effect when he committed the criminal offenses for which the district court imposed the sentence he now attacks. ³ Kirby has not been given a sentence greater than that prescribed by law in effect at the time he committed these crimes. When Kirby committed the federal offenses for which he was sentenced, the sentencing guidelines had already clearly provided that prior adjudications of juvenile delinquency were a relevant factor during sentencing.

Thus, there is no basis to Kirby's ex post facto argument. See McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311, 312, 21 S.Ct. 389, 390, 45 L.Ed. 542 (1901) (increasing punishment for felony when defendant had prior convictions does not violate ex post facto clause because punishment is for the new crime only); Schramm v. United States Parole Comm'n, 767 F.2d 509, 512-13 (8th Cir.1985) (Parole Commission's practice of considering prior misdemeanor and felony convictions in evaluating prisoner's situation does not violate ex post facto clause because Commission is not increasing the punishment for the prior convictions themselves). Cf. Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 732, 68 S.Ct. 1256, 1258, 92 L.Ed. 1683 (1948) (fact that one of the convictions entering into determination that criminal defendant was within Pennsylvania's Habitual Criminal Act occurred before the Act was passed does not make the Act invalidly retroactive, since the sentence under the Act was simply a stiffened penalty for the latest crime and not an additional penalty for the earlier crime). ⁴

B.

Kirby's second theory, that Sec. 4A1.2(d)(2) of the guidelines violates due process because it permits the district court to increase his sentence range even though this is inconsistent with the nature of juvenile proceedings under Pennsylvania law, also fails. He asserts that Pennsylvania's Model Juvenile Court Act, 42 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. Secs. 6301 et seq. (Purdon 1982 & Supp.1989), provides that juvenile proceedings are not to be used against individuals in later criminal proceedings. According to Kirby, when the district court applied the federal guidelines to consider his state juvenile adjudications, it circumvented the intent of Pennsylvania's Juvenile Act and was so inconsistent with the assurances he was given during his juvenile proceedings that his consent to those adjudications was not knowingly given. ⁵ He argues that since the federal guidelines were not in effect during the juvenile proceedings, he could not have had notice that the adjudications could later be used against him in criminal proceedings.

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