U.S. v. Bush

• Citation: 47 F.3d 511
• Decision Date: 08 February 1995
• Docket Number: No. 329,D,329
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Gary BUSH, Defendant-Appellant. ocket 93-1842.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (2nd Circuit)

Page 511

47 F.3d 511

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Gary BUSH, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 329, Docket 93-1842.

United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.

Argued Oct. 31, 1994.

Decided Feb. 8, 1995.

David A. Lewis, The Legal Aid Soc., New York City, for defendant-appellant.

Mark W. Lerner, Asst. U.S. Atty., Brooklyn, NY (Zachary W. Carter, U.S. Atty., Brooklyn, NY, of counsel), for appellee.

Before: MINER, McLAUGHLIN, and CABRANES, Circuit Judges.

McLAUGHLIN, Circuit Judge:

Gary Bush was convicted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Edward R. Korman, Judge ) of armed bank robbery and related charges, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Secs. 371, 2113(a), 924 and 922(g). Bush testified at trial. At the end of his re-direct examination, jurors asked Bush questions to clarify his testimony. Bush's counsel did not object to the questioning.

On appeal, Bush now claims that direct juror questioning of a criminal defendant constitutes per se reversible error. Because Bush cannot demonstrate plain error, and because the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm the conviction.

Additionally, the government concedes that, although it will not affect the amount of prison time Bush will serve, we should vacate and remand solely to reduce the sentence on the conspiracy count to the statutory maximum.

BACKGROUND

Defendant was indicted for armed bank robbery and related charges, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Secs. 371, 2113(a), 924 and 922(g). At trial, he testified that, while he drove the getaway car, he did not know that his passenger had just robbed a bank. He explained that on his way to a car dealership he had parked in a lot near the bank. While walking to the dealership, he heard a noise near his car. When he returned to his car, he saw Morris Fillyaw sitting in the car. Fillyaw offered Bush money for a ride. Bush accepted the offer, got into his car, and drove away with Fillyaw.

During Bush's testimony, Juror # 2 blurted out that he was confused and that he had a question for Bush. The judge told Juror # 2 to write down his question, adding that, if the juror was still confused at the end of Bush's testimony, he could write the judge a note, and the judge would ask Bush the question. Defense counsel did not object.

Upon completion of Bush's cross-examination, the judge asked Juror # 2 if his question had been answered. The juror said "yes," adding:

I was unclear about how--when he came out of the bank and he was walking, that portion there where the cars were relatively parked, I couldn't quite follow that.

The judge asked defense counsel to pursue the matter on re-direct.

When defense counsel concluded the re-direct and with the defendant still on the stand, counsel himself initiated a dialogue with Juror # 2:

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Does that answer your question, sir?

JUROR # 2: Yes.

Now several other jurors entered the lists:

ALTERNATE # 1: Where was the other car parked?

DEFENDANT: Excuse me?

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Where were the other cars parked?

DEFENDANT: Oh, the other cars?

DEFENSE COUNSEL: On this road [referring to a diagram of the crime scene].

DEFENDANT: Okay. There were cars parked here, which I passed to get into this space. There was cars along here, all along in here. Not necessarily bumper to bumper, but there was cars in here. All on this side here was cars.

THE COURT: Is that where we're referring to 134th?

DEFENDANT: 134th Road.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: 134th Road.

JUROR # 3: After you initially parked, you went to see the--

DEFENDANT: Yeah.

JUROR # 3: --car--then you walked back on the sidewalk to the back parking lot?

DEFENDANT: Not exactly. After I parked I came back to go to the car dealer, okay? Same way I came in I walked out, okay?

Now, when I got here, I heard noises, when I was about here. Okay, now, after I heard the noises, they must have been I'll say right around here somewhere, okay? They had already--because my back was to them.

Okay. Now when I heard the noises I turned here, okay? Now, they was right around in here somewhere. They proceeded this way. They was walking fast, however. Okay. I turned around, noticing--you know, the bag and all this stuff, right. I walked slowly back this way, okay?

I seen one of the witnesses over here. There were some more cars over here, okay? I stopped briefly, then I walked all the way up, then I stopped here, then I looked.

I didn't see anybody at first, and I notice they were by my car. Then I saw the defendant's head in my car--not supposed to be in there. But nevertheless, then I immediately went to my car. That's when I ran into Fillyaw.

THE COURT: One more question.

JUROR # 1: You say there were two men. What happened to the other--

THE COURT: What happened to the other person that you saw?

DEFENDANT: Well, now when I got up here, I didn't see anyone, okay? Now I'm assuming that the car that was going down the street at the time was the car that he was in. I don't know, okay? I know other stuff other than that, but it has nothing to do with anything that anybody asked me, so I didn't say anything about any of it.

THE COURT: Okay, thank you very much.

Bush was convicted on four counts: (1) conspiracy to commit armed bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 371; (2) armed bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2113(a); (3) illegal possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924; and (4) possession of a firearm while committing a felony, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(g)(1). He received concurrent 25-year sentences on counts one, two and four, and a consecutive five-year sentence on count three, for a total of to 30 years' imprisonment. Bush now appeals. Although Bush does not dispute any sentencing issue, the government concedes that the district court's 25-year sentence on the conspiracy count exceeded the five-year statutory maximum for that violation. Accordingly, the government suggests that we vacate and remand solely to reduce the sentence on the conspiracy count to the statutory maximum.

DISCUSSION

I. Juror Questioning of Witnesses

Bush urges this Court to adopt an absolute rule prohibiting jurors from directly questioning witnesses in criminal cases. He contends that such a prohibition is essential when the witness is the defendant himself. We disagree.

At the outset, we note that Bush's counsel never objected to the jurors' questioning of Bush. Thus, the error, if any, is not preserved for appellate review unless defendant can show "[p]lain errors or defects affecting substantial rights." Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b); see United States v. Johnson, 892 F.2d 707, 710 (8th Cir.1989) (citing United States v. Land, 877 F.2d 17, 19 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 894, 110 S.Ct. 243, 107 L.Ed.2d 194 (1989)).

The plain error doctrine "authorizes the Courts of Appeals to correct only particularly egregious errors ... that seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings." United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 1046, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985) (internal quotations omitted). Accordingly, litigants usually must show prejudice to establish plain error. See United States v. Olano, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1778, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993); Young, 470 U.S. at 16-17 n. 14, 105 S.Ct. at 1047 n. 14. The plain error exception to the contemporaneous objection rule should "be used sparingly, solely in those circumstances in which a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result." Young, 470 U.S. at 15, 105 S.Ct. at 1046 (internal quotations omitted).

Bush cannot show prejudice. The trial judge allowed only limited questioning, and kept it under his direct control. The questions merely clarified juror confusion about the position of the parked cars near the crime scene, the route by which Bush returned to his car after leaving the car dealership, and the whereabouts of a second robber who did not get into Bush's car. Moreover, the record indicates that both Bush and his trial counsel cooperated with the limited juror questioning, and probably derived some strategic advantage from it by establishing a rapport with the jury.

Notwithstanding his failure to object at trial, Bush argues for a per se rule banning jurors from questioning witnesses. We have already held, however, that direct questioning by jurors is a "matter within the judge's discretion, like witness-questioning by the judge himself." United States v. Witt, 215 F.2d 580, 584 (2d Cir.) (citing United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 593-94 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 838, 73 S.Ct. 21, 97 L.Ed. 652 (1952)), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 887, 75 S.Ct. 207, 99 L.Ed. 697 (1954); see generally Fed.R.Evid. 611(a) (instructing the court to "exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses").

Every circuit court that has addressed this issue agrees. See United States v. Sutton, 970 F.2d 1001, 1004-07 (1st Cir.1992); United States v. Lewin, 900 F.2d 145, 147 (8th Cir.1990); DeBenedetto v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 754 F.2d 512, 516 (4th Cir.1985); United States v. Callahan, 588 F.2d 1078, 1086 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 826, 100 S.Ct. 49, 62 L.Ed.2d 33 (1979); United States v. Gonzales, 424 F.2d 1055, 1056 (9th Cir.1970) (per curiam). State courts, moreover, have overwhelmingly placed juror questioning of witnesses within the trial judge's discretion. See, e.g., People v. Bacic, 202 A.D.2d 234, 608 N.Y.S.2d 452, 452 (1st Dep't), appeal denied, 83 N.Y.2d 1002, 616 N.Y.S.2d 483, 640 N.E.2d 151 (1994); see also 3 John H. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law Sec. 784a. American courts have long sanctioned the practice, see State v. Kendall, 143 N.C. 659, 57 S.E. 340 (1907), and indeed its common law roots are deeply entrenched. See 3 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 373 (William D. Lewis ed. 1922) (1765) ("[T]he occasional questions of the judge, the jury, and the counsel, propounded to the witnesses on a sudden, will sift out the truth much better than...